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ABSTRACT
Human population growth is a contributing factor to a number of significant
environmental problems. My dissertation addresses both the negative environmental effects of
human population growth and what ought to be done to curtail them. Specifically, I defend two
main claims: (1) we have a duty to reduce human population, particularly those of us with large
ecological footprints, and (2) morally permissible social policies can satisfy this duty.
I begin by addressing three well-known issues in population ethics that could serve as the
basis for objections to reducing population: the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity
Problem, and the Asymmetry. I then argue that we are neither obligated to refrain from
procreation altogether nor permitted to procreate as often as we like. This groundwork
establishes that the correct view about the ethics of procreation must lie somewhere in the
complicated middle ground between these two positions.
After surveying the environmental harms caused by rising human population (focusing
in detail on effects caused by climate change and biodiversity loss), I argue that we have a
collective duty to reduce human population in order to avoid causing catastrophic harm to future
people. While we should attempt to reduce environmental degradation by reducing our rates of
environmentally harmful consumption, it is not possible to do so rapidly enough to avoid
environmental catastrophe: we must reduce human population as well.
I then discuss the policies that might be implemented in the near term to slow population
growth and whether these policies could be implemented in ways that are not profoundly unjust
or otherwise unethical. I also argue, on the basis of maintaining moral integrity and taking the
harms of overpopulation seriously, that couples generally ought to avoid having more than two
children even in the absence of policies incentivizing this behavior and even when they live in
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parts of the world where their individual ecological footprints are relatively small. I close the
dissertation by highlighting some of the lingering questions that will have to be answered in
future research on this subject.
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CHAPTER 1: RISING NUMBERS AND TOUGH QUESTIONS
Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine in 1796. Up to this point in human
history, smallpox had devastated human populations, often claiming millions of lives per year. It
continued to cause deaths for some time afterward but was eventually eradicated. Effective
treatment for smallpox was one of the major events in human history that paved the way for the
rapid population growth that followed. When 2-3 million deaths are averted annually and the
people are already reproducing enough to ensure population stability, then population growth is
soon to follow.
Advancements in agriculture and other areas of medicine also facilitated increased
population growth, and the cumulative effects were stunning. When Jenner was developing the
vaccine, the world was on the cusp of holding 1 billion people. It took about 200,000 years for
humanity to reach the 1 billion threshold, and yet we have ballooned to over 7 billion barely two
centuries later.1 The Population Division of the United Nations (UN) Department of Economic
and Social Affairs (1999) estimates that 6-billion threshold was crossed on October 12th, 1999,
and the UN News Centre (2011) reported that population surpassed 7 billion on October 31,
2011. These numbers are so staggering that they are difficult to comprehend.
The global population has also failed to stabilize at 7 billion. The U.S. Census Bureau
(2017) calculates the current number of people on Earth at about 7.37 billion; the Population
Reference Bureau (2016) claims that we have already crossed the 7.4 billion threshold. When we
crunch the numbers, our current rate of annual worldwide population growth hovers just above
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I use the pronoun “we” to refer to collective humanity throughout this work, unless otherwise specified. At its core,
this project is about collective moral obligations and a moral problem that is genuinely global in nature, so the “we”
should be interpreted as broadly as possible.
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1.1%.2 Such a small percentage may seem insignificant, but 1.1% of 7.4 billion is equivalent to
81,400,000 people. The severity of this rate of growth can also be highlighted by considering its
doubling rate – that is, the amount of time the population will take to double. At a growth rate of
1.1% per year, a population will double in less than 63 years.3
The good news is that population projections predict a drop in the annual rate of global
population growth. (There probably will not be 14.8 billion people on Earth in 2080.) The most
recent study by the UN’s Population Division (2015) estimates that global population will, in
their medium-variant scenario, rise to 9.7 billion by 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100. This result is
also consistent with a recent study conducted by Gerland et al. (2014). These findings deviate
from earlier projections that suggested a swifter path to population stabilization: less than 15
years ago, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2004) projected that the global
population would peak in 2075 at 9.22 billion. These more recent projections are
controversial,4but it is clear that the global population is going to increase significantly in the
near term: there are no realistic population projections in which global population does not reach
9 billion.
Some may find it difficult to worry about these projections because claims about
population crises have been exaggerated in the past. Thomas Malthus (1798) argued that it was
inevitable that human population growth would outpace improvements in agriculture so
drastically that a collapse of population – caused by a scarcity of food – was inevitable. Malthus
2

There is some variance in the annual growth rate depending on what particular numbers are used, but the variance
is minimal. For some estimates, see data from The World Bank (2017) and Worldometers (2017).
3
The mathematical formula for calculating how many years it will take a population to double at a fixed rate is (ln 2
/ G) where the variable G represents the rate of growth per year. Thus, a population that grows at a constant rate of
1.1% will double in approximately 63 years: (ln 2 / 0.011)  63. For an overview of the mathematics involved in
calculating rates of population growth, see Bartlett (1993).
4
Lutz (2014), for instance, suggests that improvements in female education will result in a significant decline in the
fertility rates in Africa, the continent where the biggest population explosions are expected during the 21st century.
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did not anticipate technological advancements in agriculture that have enabled human beings to
continue growing their global population without suffering such a collapse. More recently, Paul
Erlich (1975) suggested that rising population could lead to hundreds of millions of people dying
of starvation in the 1970s and 1980s.5 This dire catastrophe did not come to pass. Since fears
about overpopulation disasters have been exaggerated, it is tempting to consider discussion of the
issue misguided, but the increasing impacts of population growth cannot be denied.
Earth cannot support continuous population growth because its resources are finite, and
we are approaching the limits of what the Earth can provide for collective humanity. One
illuminating example of this problem is our agriculture. Industrial agriculture requires the use of
technologies that use fossil fuels in great quantities – both in growing the food and transporting
it. These technologies release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and in some cases, we must
clear land to grow new crops, often releasing additional greenhouse gases that were trapped in
carbon sinks. As a result, our means of growing and distributing food accounts for 19-29% of our
annual greenhouse gas emissions (Vermeulen, Campbell, and Ingram 2012). The effects of
climate change will be devastating: rising sea levels will displace millions of people and cause
several island nations to disappear into the ocean, extreme weather events (such as hurricanes)
will become more intense, and dry regions will become dryer, causing more droughts and lower
crop yields.6 It is not difficult to see how population exacerbates the problem of climate change
in this scenario: more people need more food to survive, and creating more food requires
emitting more greenhouse gases.
5

Erlich presented hypothetical scenarios that illustrated dire outcomes caused by rising population. Although he said
that these scenarios were “just possibilities” and “not predictions” (Erlich 1975, p. 49), their presentation in
combination with the alarmist tone of his book created the impression that he viewed these scenarios as realistic.
6
This is far from an exhaustive list. The most comprehensive accounts of the effects of climate change can be found
in the reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). For the most recent report on the
impacts of climate change, see IPCC (2014a).
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Rising population also does not just affect people. While it may lead to more animals
being raised and slaughtered in industrial farming operations, perhaps its greatest impact on the
nonhuman community is the biodiversity loss that it causes. People are rapidly depleting Earth’s
biodiversity, leading some conservation biologists to conclude that we are in the midst of the
sixth mass extinction (Barnosky et al. 2011), and the scientific link between increasing human
population density and the extinction of plant and animal species is gradually being
substantiated.7 A greater human population makes a greater contribution to climate change –
which is, and will continue to be, a significant cause of species extinctions – and puts greater
stress on nonhuman ecosystems through increased habitat destruction, deforestation, and
pollution.
A growing population leads to a greater need to consume resources, a greater demand for
physical space in which to live, a greater need to grow crops or raise livestock, and so on. For
these reasons, a greater population will (other things equal) yield a greater ecological footprint
than a smaller one. The growing human population will have devastating impacts on presently
existing people, future people, and the nonhuman community. Thus, the ethical implications of
continuing human population growth must be confronted, even if they raise difficult and
worrisome questions.

Confronting an Uncomfortable Topic
Given the severe threats that overpopulation poses for collective humanity, one would
think that concern about stabilizing and reducing global population would be a central focus in
policy discussions. Once upon a time, that was true. The rapid population increase that occurred

7

See Luck (2007) for a recent review of this literature.
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during the first half of the 20th century drew the attention of both the general public and national
leaders in the United States during the 1960s and 70s. But as the decades passed, serious
discussions of crafting policies to reduce population growth started to disappear. Both in the
United States and globally, the topic has all but vanished from academia and the popular press
during the last 20 years.
At first glance, it might appear that academic philosophy has not mirrored this trend. The
area known as “population ethics” is a growing subfield, and most of its literature has been
written during the last 30 years.8 But once one understands the meaning of “population ethics” in
this context, it becomes clear that this appearance is misleading. PhilPapers, perhaps the most
extensive database of philosophy articles that presently exists, defines population ethics as
follows:
[Population ethics] covers two major issues concerning the ethics of future persons: (1)
Population axiology, or what principles determine the value of a population. E.g., does an
additional happy life make a positive contribution to the value of the world, all else
equal? (2) The non-identity problem, and the moral evaluation of actions that determine
who will exist in future. (Gustafsson n.d.)
Notice what is omitted from this definition: there is no explicit mention of current global
population growth, the moral significance of the impacts of population growth, concerns about
whether the present generation’s monopolization of the Earth’s resources is just, or anything else
explicitly related to how rising global population may affect our moral duties. Philosophical
discussions of population ethics are primarily theoretical, and while they might be intellectually
tantalizing, the writings in this subfield usually fail to engage our current population

8

Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons was first published in 1984, and the last few chapters of this book initiated
most of the discourse that has come to dominate this subfield.
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predicament. In fact, in many cases, the discussions are so abstract that there are no clear
practical conclusions to draw from them.
Why has explicit discussion of population policy become relatively rare? Martha
Campbell (2012) highlights six different reasons for the silence on population. First, since the
1960s, fertility rates around the world have been declining. The fertility rate at which the global
population will stabilize is about 2.1 births per woman, and many nations are still well above this
threshold. Nevertheless, the decline in fertility rates suggests that the population problem is
resolving itself. Obviously, this perception is incorrect: the statistics mentioned in the previous
section indicate that the global population is not nearing stabilization. But the point is that the
decline in fertility rates creates the appearance that population growth will not be a problem for
much longer.
Another reason that population discussions have largely ceased is that patterns of
overconsumption have become more visible, particularly in the context of discussions related to
climate change. Developed nations have generally consumed far more energy and resources than
developing nations, and one side-effect of their consumption is that they have been (and continue
to be) the primary emitters of greenhouse gases.9 Any morally acceptable response to climate
change will require significant reductions in the amount of fossil fuels burned by the inhabitants
of developed nations. High-consumption lifestyles have other powerful effects on the
environment as well, some of which I have already mentioned (e.g., pollution, deforestation,
biodiversity loss). These environmental impacts are easier to see and understand than the subtler
9

There are certainly some exceptions. Some countries with extremely large populations (such as China and India)
have larger carbon footprints than some developed nations despite lower per capita greenhouse gas emissions than
most industrialized nations. The point is simply that people often associated the general tendency of industrialized
nations to overconsume with the harms of climate change, and that this at least in part explains why concerns about
population have been dwarfed by concerns about consumption rates in policy discussions about climate change.
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effects of population growth and the relationship between population growth and the
environmental impacts of high-consumption lifestyles. As a result, the focus on reducing
consumption rates has eclipsed concern about stabilizing and reducing population.
Perhaps the most significant development in removing population growth from policy
discourse occurred at the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD) held in Cairo, Egypt. The unique feature of ICPD, which distinguished it
from previous population conferences held by the UN, was its emphasis on women’s needs
around the world. Prior to the conference, discussion of rising population and the connection
between population growth and environmental destruction became politically incorrect because
suggestions to stabilize or reduce population were perceived as disadvantageous to women.
Coercive episodes of family planning in India during the 1970s were highlighted, and China’s
one-child policy was also examined. These policies were thought to be unacceptable, and
conference attendees wanted to distance themselves from such policies. This desire resulted in
the adoption of a new strategy for addressing population issues: family planning and all other
health-related issues related to women were combined under the heading “reproductive health.”
Those advocating this change in language, whether intentionally or not, created the impression
that all the family planning efforts prior to 1994 had been objectionably coercive. These past
attempts at promoting family planning were derogatorily labeled as means of “population
control.” Despite the fact that many family planning organizations established prior to 1994
aimed only to make family planning easier for men and women (rather than trying to limit or
otherwise control their fertility), this false generalization has proven quite sticky: more than 20
years later, discussions of population policy are still often associated with unjustifiable coercion.

7

Although I suspect these are the most significant reasons why population discussions
have mostly disappeared from contemporary discourse, Campbell (2012) mentions three
additional contributing factors. First, conservative think tanks and religious leaders opposed to
abortion and family planning have had some success in reducing the attention paid to population
growth. Some preach the idea of having as many children as possible.10 The broader strategy,
however, has been to reinforce the notion that world population growth is at an end (Lutz,
Sanderson, and Scherbox 2001), an idea that has gained a foothold in the media and influenced
the public’s perception of how significant the population problem really is.11 Second, the AIDS
epidemic in Africa garnered significant attention worldwide, and many believed that it would
reduce population growth in the region significantly.12 Third, classic demographic transition
theory creates the impression that it is “natural” for people to want many children and that they
have to be coaxed by changes in society to want a smaller family (Potts and Campbell 2005, pp.
180-181). According to demographic transition models, people are naturally inclined to have
high birth rates until their societies develop from a pre-industrial to industrialized economic
system. According to the theory, it is only after this industrialization occurs (and death rates in
the society are lowered) that people become inclined to have smaller families. General
acceptance of this theory (despite the many exceptions to it) leads people to believe that we
cannot incentivize people in the developing world to have fewer children without unjust forms of
10

The most common source of this sentiment in Christianity and Judaism originates from Genesis 1:28 in which
God says to Adam and Eve, “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it” (King James Bible).
11
In the United States, for example, there is some evidence that scientists are significantly more worried about
population growth than the general public. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 59% of the
general public thought that there will not be enough food and resources to distribute around the globe if population
growth continues whereas 82% of members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science held this
position (Funk et al. 2015, p. 51).
12
This thought was mistaken: the populations of many African countries are still growing in size. Moreover, given
that the effect plagues and epidemics is usually quite transitory, it is unlikely that any long-term changes to
population growth will result from them.
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persuasion or coercion, and thus, they fear discussion of population policies will lead down a
slippery slope to discussions of “population control.”
Taken together, these six factors provide a fairly comprehensive explanation for why
worries about population growth are so rarely voiced in policy discussions and the popular press,
but why has the issue been largely neglected by academic philosophers? I cannot offer a detailed
answer to this question, but perhaps the simplest explanation is that philosophers, even with the
privileges of academic freedom, can still be affected by public perception of certain issues.
Alberto Giubilini and Fransesca Minerva (2012) received an enormous amount of attention from
the media after their paper “After Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?” was published.
In this paper, they argue that only persons have a right to life and that neither fetuses nor infants
are persons. Thus, they conclude that both abortion and infanticide are morally permissible in
many circumstances.13 This view was not well received by the general public, and the authors
found themselves bombarded by hate mail and death threats. Incidents like this one are rare,14
but they highlight the potential costs – even for academic philosophers – for arguing in favor of
an unpopular position on a controversial issue.
There is little doubt that most people are morally repulsed by the notion of legalizing
infanticide or otherwise regarding it as morally permissible. Nevertheless, threatening the lives
13

Giubilini and Minerva were not the first philosophers to advocate this position. For some other examples, see
Tooley (1972) and Singer (1993). In fact, philosophers seem far more willing to entertain the permissibility of
infanticide than the permissibility of a coercive population policy.
14
Julian Savulescu (2013), editor of the Journal of Medical Ethics, states that the paper “created unprecedented
global outrage for a paper published in an academic medical ethics journal” (p. 257). It is worth noting, however,
that other philosophers have suffered social costs for their defense of controversial views. Because of his views on
infanticide and euthanasia, Peter Singer’s public lectures in several European countries (especially Germany) have
often been cancelled due to protests (Schöne-Seifert and Rippe 1991). More recently, Phil Cafaro and Roy Beck
were disinvited from a conference in Maryland due to complaints (and threats of protest) regarding their views on
population and immigration (Kolankiewicz 2015). Cafaro has also confirmed (in personal correspondence) that
some of his published work on the relationship between population growth and climate change has been met with
hate mail and threats to his family.
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of those who argue for this view (or otherwise silencing them) is not a productive or permissible
way to resolve the issue. Those who defend this position do so through philosophical arguments,
and if we are going to be responsible critical thinkers, we must look at those arguments
charitably and then explain where they go wrong.
Of course, discussion of population did not disappear just because people were morally
repulsed by it. There were at least two morally sensible concerns that motivated suppressing this
discussion: fears regarding how coercive population policies negatively affected women and
recognition of the importance of reducing consumption rates. Some also worry that population
policies will be racist in application, since the countries that have the highest birthrates are
predominantly in Sub-Saharan Africa and other areas of the developing world. Non-white
populations would be the most affected by any policy placing restrictions on procreation. These
concerns must be taken seriously, but limiting explicit discussion of population may have caused
more harm than good. Following ICPD, access to family planning options did not expand
sufficiently to accommodate the increasing numbers of women who wanted them, and the term
“reproductive health” was more difficult for governing bodies and the general public to
understand and support than the narrow term “family planning” (Campbell 2012, pp. 47-48).15
Moreover, the limited visibility of the effects of population growth makes it difficult to notice
how population growth undermines the overall efficacy of reducing consumption rates.16 An
example will help illustrate this point.

15

It is possible, of course, that sufficient expansion would have been unachievable even if population growth had
remained a more explicit focus of discussion. The point, however, is that there was clearly greater improvement that
could have been made and that limiting discussion of population, rather than facilitating that improvement, may
have prevented it.
16
The effects of population growth are readily visible in certain parts of the world, particularly in areas where
wilderness is rapidly disappearing. When I refer to “limited visibility,” I refer to the ability of the ordinary person –
who may be otherwise unconcerned with population growth – to recognize its effects. Those who are insulated from
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Thousands of dams were built across the United States during the first half of the 20th
century. Eventually, people realized that these dams caused considerable damage to local
ecosystems, and a movement emerged to preserve the best remaining rivers in the nation.
Demand for water was still rising, but taking water from other people or making more water
available by creating more dams, people tried to make more efficient use of the water that was
available. They were successful: from 1980 to 1995, per capita use of water in the United States
decreased by 20% (Jehl 2002). Unfortunately, the United States population grew by 16% during
the same 15-year time period, which means that the progress toward solving the problem was
negligible: the need for water was virtually as great in 1995 as it was in 1980 despite the
reduction in the consumption of water.17
The key takeaway from this anecdote is that improvements to efficiency in our use of
resources are solutions only to the extent that they outpace population growth. They are only
temporary in the context of an ever-increasing population: if population continues to surge, then
eventually new solutions will be needed. Surely we have to reduce our consumption rates to
avoid perilous climate change and a host of other catastrophes, but these reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions per person, energy consumption per person, water consumed per
person, and so on will not amount to sustainable living if population growth continues
unchecked. Some even claim that we must ultimately reduce global population to about two
billion to maintain an adequate to comfortable standard of living in the long term (Smail 1997,

natural environments and rather unaware of the empirical research on population growth are unlikely to recognize
how pervasive or significant its effects really are.
17
I borrow this example from Palmer (2012, pp. 98-99).
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Foreman 2012). Whether or not one agrees with such an extreme proposal, it should be obvious
that we must stop ignoring the moral significance of rising human population.
Tackling overpopulation certainly means that we must confront difficult, often
uncomfortable moral questions. We must consider the moral status of future people and how
their needs should be weighed against the needs of present people. We must examine the moral
significance of population growth’s effects on the nonhuman community. We must confront the
possibility that non-coercive population measures may not stabilize or reduce global population
effectively or swiftly enough to be morally satisfactory. In taking these issues seriously, we may
discover that some of our moral values are in conflict with one another. It may not be possible,
for instance, to allow for maximal reproductive freedom while looking out for the interests of
posterity and the nonhuman community. Similarly, it may not be possible to allow a nation with
high rates of consumption, such as the United States, to grow its population through immigration
even if doing so enables many immigrants to improve their lives.
This dissertation will not answer all the questions relevant to developing ethically
acceptable population policies or making morally responsible procreative decisions as
individuals, though it will address the most significant moral questions that global population
growth currently raises in an anthropocentric context. My central hope is that this dissertation
will advance the philosophical discussion of overpopulation and help to break the silence on
overpopulation in the realm of academic philosophy.18

18

Since starting work on this project, two books – Sarah Conly’s (2016) One Child and Travis Rieder’s (2016b)
Toward a Small Family Ethic – have been published that address the overpopulation problem. Time will tell whether
this is the start of a trend.
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Is Overpopulation a Genuine Moral Problem?
Based on what I have said thus far, it is probably obvious that I give a resounding
affirmative answer to the question that titles this section: overpopulation is undoubtedly a
genuine moral problem. One might dissent, however, by arguing that genuine moral problems
require some uncertainty regarding what we ought to do and that virtually everyone agrees what
we ought to do with respect to population. Brian Barry (1999) claims that “virtually everybody
who has made a serious study of the situation and whose objectivity is not compromised by
either religious beliefs or being in the pay of some multinational corporation” has concluded that
concern for posterity demands a significant reduction in population (pp. 62-63). Furthermore,
Barry is not the only philosopher to think that the need to reduce population is a moral
requirement. David DeGrazia (2012) mentions avoiding disastrous overpopulation in his list of
obligations to future generations (p. 200), and John Nolt (2015) identifies population reduction
as one of five clear moral imperatives in the domain of environmental ethics (pp. 219-221). But
if Barry is right in thinking that it is clear what we ought to do regarding overpopulation, then
one may worry that a detailed philosophical examination of the issue is not too valuable. Further
scrutiny might appear unnecessary.
For the sake of argument, grant that those who have studied our population predicament
generally agree that we need to stabilize and then reduce global population.19 It does not follow
from the truth of this claim that all the relevant moral questions pertaining to population policy
are resolved. We are still left with many questions regarding the moral permissibility of
particular ways to achieve that stabilization and reduction and the relative moral significance of
19

As we shall see later, there is some significant disagreement about the implications of population growth
regarding what individual reproductive decisions are permissible, so this assumption is only plausible with respect to
a consensus on what we collectively ought to do.

13

achieving these goals when they conflict with other moral values (e.g., reproductive freedom).
Agreement on one of the broadest questions in population ethics does not entail agreement about
all the subsidiary questions that must then be answered. Moreover, agreement on controversial
issues can arise for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with the philosophical merits of
the adopted position. Thus, it is important to subject all positions to rigorous philosophical
scrutiny. Widespread agreement would not in itself provide us with a reason to cease
philosophical examination of the issue. Thus, Barry’s claim does not ground a significant
objection to the pursuit of this philosophical project.
Juha Räikkä (2000) tries to refine Barry’s claim into a more focused and sophisticated
argument. He claims that the issues commonly discussed within the philosophical subdiscipline
of population ethics are not genuine moral problems. Räikkä (2000) defines “genuine moral
problems” as those moral questions that “(1) are open in the sense that there are various plausible
answers to them and (2) have practical relevance in the sense that they concern the issue of what
should actually be done” (p. 401). He does not believe that anything typically discussed within
population ethics satisfies both of these conditions. While this restricts the scope of the objection
to some extent, its truth would imply that large portions of this dissertation do not concern
questions of philosophical interest. Given that this objection could undermine the value of this
project, it must be addressed before we proceed.
Räikkä begins by differentiating moral problems from social problems and empirical
uncertainties. He claims that the questions related to the socially detrimental effects of certain
population policies are merely social problems (Räikkä 2000, pp. 402-403) and that many of the
issues in population ethics hinge on disagreements about empirical claims (pp. 405-406). He is
certainly right to note that certain concerns, such as how relevant government actors can be
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motivated to act as they should or how family planning programs could earn public support, are
not moral in nature, but what about the questions about population policy that have an explicitly
ethical component? Consider the following question: should the United States government
restrict immigration in order to stabilize the U.S. population? This question clearly meets both
conditions of Räikkä’s definition of a genuine moral problem: there is certainly no consensus
regarding what immigration policy the U.S. ought to adopt, and this question clearly addresses
what should be done to resolve the moral problem. It is not difficult to pose other questions
concerning population that appear to be genuine moral problems by the criteria Räikkä provides.
Here are a few that will be addressed elsewhere in the dissertation:
1. What are the limits (if any) on the number of children a couple can permissibly have
in the context of overpopulation?
2. Are any coercive population policies morally permissible in light of the history of
abuses and human rights violations that have resulted from them?
3. What are the implications of overpopulation with respect to the moral permissibility
of abortion?
Even Räikkä’s handpicked examples of issues in population ethics that are not genuine moral
problems actually meet his criteria.
Räikkä highlights three issues that have been widely discussed in population ethics: the
Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Asymmetry. The Repugnant
Conclusion can be represented as the following claim: for any given population, there exists a
vastly greater population whose existence would be better even if the members of this population
have lives that are barely worth living (Parfit 1987, p. 388). The Non-Identity Problem refers to
the following puzzle: how can future people claim to have been harmed by our actions if they
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have lives worth living and they would not have existed at all if we had refrained from
performing those actions? Finally, the Asymmetry refers to a union of two claims in procreative
ethics: it is morally wrong to bring a child into existence who will have a miserable life, but it is
permissible not to bring a child into existence who will have a blissful life.
Räikkä claims that none of these issues constitute genuine moral problems because we
know what to do in all of them. We know that we are not obligated to bring about an
overcrowded world of people with lives barely worth living (even assuming that we had the
means of creating a world with those enormous numbers of people). We know we are not free to
do whatever we wish with the distant future even if the identities of future people are dependent
on what we do. We know that the two principles of the Asymmetry are correct. Since there is no
substantive disagreement about what we ought to do in these cases, they fail the first condition of
Räikkä’s definition of a genuine moral problem.
There are two problems with Räikkä’s assessment of these issues. First, his outlook
unjustifiably privileges philosophical intuitions. Philosophers typically acknowledge that the
positions Räikkä favors are the most intuitive ones on offer – the ones that seem most consistent
with common sense and ordinary practice. But to stop inquiry here favors intuition far too much.
I will explain why in greater depth in the next section, but the short explanation is that
philosophical intuitions are often mistaken. Trivially, since philosophers often have conflicting
intuitions, some philosophical intuitions must be mistaken. Moreover, even widely shared
intuitions can be incorrect, since they can result from biases and other distorting factors. So even
if intuitive positions turn out to be correct, we can only reach that conclusion after serious critical
evaluation.
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Second, Räikkä inaccurately assesses the level of agreement that has been achieved on
these three issues. All three of these topics are controversial. Many philosophers have suggested
that the Repugnant Conclusion, regardless of how counterintuitive it might seem, should be
accepted (Sikora 1975, pp. 409-419; Anglin 1977, p. 754; Sikora 1981, pp. 128-133; Ng 1990;
Attfield 1991, pp. 127-130; Ryberg 1996; Fotion 1997, pp. 95-96; Tannsjo 1998, pp. 160-163;
Tannsjo 2002; Huemer 2008). Michael Huemer (2008) even identifies several reasons for
thinking that the specific intuition underlying the repugnant conclusion is mistaken (pp. 907911).
Philosophers have come closer to consensus on rejecting the conclusion of the NonIdentity Problem – the claim that we cannot wrong future people whose identities are dependent
upon our actions so long as we do not make their lives no longer worth living. Nevertheless,
anyone who attends a conference presentation on a topic in intergenerational ethics will likely
discover that many philosophers still take the problem seriously. David Boonin (2014), author of
the first book-length treatment of the Non-Identity Problem, claims that the conclusion of the
Non-Identity Problem is actually correct. According to his view, it is not possible to wrong a
future person whose identity is dependent upon your actions unless you make that person’s life
no longer worth living. It follows from this claim that it is not morally wrong to conceive a
person who will be born with a severe physical or mental impairment, provided that the person
cannot exist without this impairment and that the person will still have a life worth living.20
Philosophers have also not achieved a consensus with regard to the Asymmetry. Many
philosophers have been unable to provide coherent theoretical support for the Asymmetry (e.g.,
McMahan 1981, 2009, 2013; Singer 1993; Persson 2009); others have posed creative, though
20

In chapter 2, I will explain and critically evaluate Boonin’s argument for this claim.
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controversial, ways of vindicating this view (e.g., Benatar 2006, esp. pp. 32-34; Roberts 2011b).
Thus, it is not clear whether the two claims in the Asymmetry can be held consistently.
This brief synopsis should be sufficient to demonstrate that it is not obvious what we
ought to do with respect to these three issues. Furthermore, as we shall see in chapter 2, one’s
views with respect to these issues could have significant implications with respect to addressing
our current population crisis. Specifically, one’s positions on these issues affects whether one has
reasons to object to a duty to reduce global population. Thus, according to Räikkä’s own criteria,
all three of these issues are genuine moral problems.
At this juncture, we can see that the moral questions raised regarding population – both
theoretical quandaries and problems that arise in the real world – are genuine moral problems.
We must now consider how they should be addressed.

The Philosophical Method
Many philosophers approach ethical dilemmas through the lens of a particular moral
theory. Perhaps they have adopted the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and apply his
Categorical Imperative to moral controversies. Or perhaps they think the utilitarian imperative to
maximize total welfare provides the proper decision procedure for moral dilemmas. There are
plenty of other possibilities as well.21 Unfortunately, any approach grounded solely in a single
moral theory has two significant shortcomings. First, an analysis of an ethical dilemma that is
grounded explicitly in a single theoretical outlook will only have a limited audience. There is
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The most prominent alternative to Kantianism and utilitarianism is virtue theory: the family of ethical theories that
ground right action in what the virtuous person would do and emphasize moral character rather than adhering to
moral duties or acting so as to bring about the best consequences. Care ethics (Held 2006) and contractualism
(Scanlon 1998) have also recently been defended, and there exist many other lesser-known moral theories.
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profound disagreement among philosophers regarding which moral theory is correct, 22 and thus,
any analysis of a moral dilemma grounded in a single theory will be unappealing to many
philosophers. Second, it may be impossible to condense all morally relevant considerations into a
single theory. Part of the reason that different families of moral theories have persisted in
philosophy is that they all appear to get an essential piece of the moral puzzle correct despite
their fundamental differences. But if no comprehensive unified theory of ethics is achievable,
then any approach to a moral problem based on a single theory is destined to provide only an
incomplete moral outlook on the issue.
Rather than attempting to examine the ethical dilemmas created by the rising human
population through moral theory, I will instead attempt to do so by crafting plausible moral
principles that offer guidance as to what we ought to do. While I am not confident in my ability
to defend any particular theory from its competitors or to craft a comprehensive, unified theory
of ethics, I believe I can articulate and defend certain fundamental moral principles. Ideally,
these principles could be derived from many, if not all, plausible moral theories. The pressing
methodological question is how we should determine what these principles are.
Following many moral philosophers, I will adopt the method of reflective equilibrium to
determine what moral principles we should endorse.23 In broad terms, reflective equilibrium
refers to the method of trying to explain our considered judgments – those moral convictions that
survive sustained critical reflection under conditions conducive to good reasoning (e.g., no
manipulation, an absence of social biases) – in terms of moral principles that can be unified into
22

In their survey of philosophers, Bourget and Chalmers (2014) found that participants “accepted” or “leaned
toward” the major positions in normative ethics with the following frequency: deontology, 25.9%; consequentialism,
23.6%; virtue theory, 18.2%; and other, 32.3%.
23
Nelson Goodman (1955, pp. 65-68) appears to be the first philosopher to explicitly describe and endorse this
method, though Goodman employed it as a means of justifying principles of deductive and inductive inferences.
John Rawls (1999, pp. 18-19, 42-45) is responsible for popularizing the term.
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a coherent system. A state of perfect coherence among all our theoretical principles and
considered judgments is the ideal equilibrium at which the method aims.
Reflective equilibrium has been used in normative theory by both nonconsequentialists
(e.g., Rawls 1999, 2005; Scanlon 1998, 2014) and consequentialists (e.g., Nielsen 1994, Hooker
2003). This method has also been used in conjunction with normative theory specifically to
address controversial issues in applied ethics (e.g., Carruthers 1992, DeGrazia 1996, Boonin
2003). Nevertheless, reflective equilibrium has a significant shortcoming, one that can be
highlighted by examining how other philosophers describe the method. Consider an excerpt from
Boonin’s (2003) description of reflective equilibrium:
We begin by accepting, at least provisionally, our moral intuitions about a variety of
types of actions, giving more initial weight to those which seem especially clear or
forceful. We then attempt to develop a credible moral theory that would serve to unify
and underwrite these various judgments (pp. 9-10).
The concern about this method of reasoning is the starting point: what exactly is a moral
intuition, and why would these intuitions be serviceable starting points for moral inquiry?
A growing trend in moral philosophy is to employ research in experimental psychology
to shed new light on age-old philosophical problems.24 We know that people’s moral intuitions
can vary, but the worries about their reliability run deeper than that. Some recent research
suggests that intuitions are grounded in automatic, unreflective responses (e.g., Haidt 2001,
Greene et al. 2001). One may also worry that our intuitions are just remnants of our evolutionary
history, cultural heritage, or the teachings of our parents. The way that some philosophers use
reflective equilibrium creates the impression that the method privileges moral intuitions in an
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unacceptable way: since intuitions are not reliable guides to truth, we cannot be confident that
the principles reached through reflective equilibrium will be true either.
This concern about reflective equilibrium arises in part because philosophers are
sometimes unclear about what they mean by “moral intuitions.” Some philosophers use the term
“moral intuition” to refer to a considered judgment, some consider moral intuitions to be
spontaneous initial judgments (e.g., McMahan 2000), others believe that moral intuitions refer to
the combination of both sets of judgments, and many fail to specify what they mean by the term.
I understand moral intuitions to be spontaneous initial judgments, and I consider this category of
judgments to differ greatly from considered judgments. Drawing in part on Rawls (1951), I
believe that considered judgments must meet the following criteria (pp. 181-183):
1. The judge (i.e., whomever is making the judgment) must be able to make the
judgment without her own interests hinging in some way on what judgment is made.
2.

The judgment must concern a case with which the judge is familiar and preferably
one in which the details are simple and easily graspable.

3. The judgment should not be made spontaneously. Instead, the judge should give the
details of the case careful consideration, and a judgment should be made only after all
the facts of the case are fully understood.
4. The judge feels strongly that her judgment is correct.
5. The judgment must be stable over time: there must be some evidence that others have
rendered similar judgments about similar cases.
6. The judgment should not be reached by the conscious, systematic application of a
moral theory or a complex series of moral principles, though it may involve sustained
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critical reflection and perhaps the application of a basic moral rule (e.g., promises
should be kept, equals ought to be treated equally).25
Intuitions frequently fail to meet conditions (2), (3), or (5). Some philosophers draw on intuitions
about complex thought experiments that are difficult to comprehend; these are not considered
judgments because they violate (2). Some philosophers portray intuitive judgments as
spontaneous, violating (3). As I mentioned earlier, I understand “intuitions” to have this feature,
so I believe condition (3) captures one of the fundamental differences between intuitions and
considered judgments. Some philosophers also appeal to intuitions that many other philosophers
do not share, which violates (5).
What makes considered judgments better than mere intuition? Focusing on (2), one might
ask why we cannot trust our intuitions about outlandish cases that are unlikely to be realized in
the real world. The central reason is that it is typically difficult to fully understand the features of
these outlandish cases and the moral import of these features (Elster 2011, pp. 150-153). To
illustrate this point, consider the following claim: there is no circumstance in which one would
prefer two years of intense torture to having a hangnail for her entire life, no matter how long her
life is. Larry Temkin (1996) uses this claim in a complex argument designed to show that the
“all-things-considered better than” relation is not transitive (pp. 179-180). His support for the
truth of this claim is a mere intuition: he has a spontaneous initial judgment that the claim is
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This sixth condition only applies to moral judgments, but considered judgments could be made about cases in
other areas of philosophy. We might, for instance, be able to form considered judgments about certain kinds of
Gettier-style cases in epistemology: cases that use luck as a means of deriving counterexamples to the claim that
knowing a proposition is equivalent to holding a justified true belief about that proposition (Gettier 1963).
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true.26 Does this intuition give us good reason to think that the claim is true? I contend that it
does not.
The problem with this example is that it is not possible to reasonably conceive of the
details that the case describes. If we were the kinds of beings who ordinarily lived for 100
million years, it is hard to know how we would feel about two years of torture. If we typically
lived so long, this period of torture would constitute a mere 0.0000002% of a person’s life; in an
ordinary human life of 80 years, this period of torture would take up 2.5% of a person’s life.
Thus, it’s not hard to think our intuitions about the case might be different if we had a better
grasp on what it would be like to live for 100 million years (or a similar length of time).
Unfortunately, knowing what it would be like to live that long is beyond our imaginative
capacities. As a result, we should not be surprised if our judgment about this case is misguided.
Judgments about these kinds of cases – those that are remarkably idealized and radically foreign
to ordinary human experience – are not reliable.
In a similar fashion, spontaneous judgments are often unreliable, which is why
considered judgments must satisfy (3). Spontaneous judgments, by their nature, do not involve a
careful consideration of the relevant facts, and sometimes even simple cases require careful
deliberation if a reliable judgment is to be reached. Many have the intuition that it would be
permissible to flip a switch to redirect a runaway trolley away from a track with five workers in
its path and onto a siding with only a single worker. But many also have the intuition that it
would be impermissible to push a large gentleman off a bridge and into the trolley’s path even if
doing so were the only way to derail the trolley and save the 5 workers.27 But these intuitions
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Temkin has presented this example to many audiences, and the intuition does appear to be fairly common.
The trolley problem originates with Philippa Foot (1967).
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appear to be in conflict because the cases are very similar: both involve sacrificing one person’s
life to save the lives of five other people. Even if the intuitive judgments can ultimately be
vindicated, it is clear that these spontaneous initial judgments are not, in themselves, enough to
justify holding these views. We have to see if these judgments can survive critical scrutiny.
A further indication of an intuition’s unreliability occurs when another expert on the
subject does not share that intuition. Appealing to our own personal intuitions to support our
claims is a foolhardy enterprise if others have intuitive judgments that differ from our own.
Appealing to controversial intuitions is problematic because “it seems unreasonable to have any
confidence that a judgment is correct if competent persons disagree about it” (Rawls 1951, p.
183). After all, our intuitions may merely reflect our own personal idiosyncrasies rather than
tracking anything of philosophical significance.

Chapter Outline
I will ultimately argue that we – that is, collective humanity – are morally obligated to
reduce our population over the next several generations.28 I will then explore some implications
of this moral duty, including what policies we should implement to achieve it and the
implications of this duty for individual moral decision-making. The journey towards this
conclusion begins with the extant literature on population and procreative ethics.
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, population ethics has traditionally been dominated
by three issues: the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Asymmetry. I
address these issues in chapter 2. Beyond their prevalence in the literature, each of these issues

28

As will be discussed later, demographic momentum will ensure that we do not reduce our population in the
immediate future, no matter what policies on procreation we implement. The process will be gradual and require
many generations to realize.
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can generate an objection to a duty to reduce population, so I will address them at the outset to
preemptively refute any objections that could later arise from them. We will see that they fail to
provide compelling reasons to reject a duty to reduce population.
In chapter 3, I examine two extreme positions in procreative ethics that, if correct, would
provide clear moral imperatives regarding population. The first of these is Antinatalism – the
position that we ought not to reproduce at all. If such a position were correct, it would follow
that we ought to try to reduce the human population to zero. While such a view would be
unlikely to get any traction with the general public, it has become a relatively hot topic in the
academic literature on procreative ethics and warrants serious treatment. The other extreme
position is the view that we have a right to procreate freely and have as many children as we like.
If this view were correct, then it would follow that we ought to not regulate procreation at all
because it would violate individual rights. I argue that both these positions are mistaken.
Procreation is sometimes (but not always) permissible, and individuals do not have a right to
procreate as often as they want. Our right to procreate is constrained by the effects that the
exercise of this right has on others. In the context of harmful overpopulation, the moral
constraints on this right may be quite limited. Hence, an appeal to individual rights does not
establish that all forms of procreative regulation are objectionable.
I begin presenting my positive view in chapter 4. This task starts with getting a firm grasp
on precisely how bad the population problem really is. Although I discuss a few of the problems
caused in part by overpopulation that are not primarily environmental in nature (e.g.,
overcrowding), my main topics of emphasis are climate change and biodiversity loss. Both these
environmental problems could have catastrophic and long-lasting impacts on future people.
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After highlighting the severity of the problems looming on the horizon, I argue in chapter
5 that we have a moral imperative to either significantly reduce human population, radically
reduce our rates of environmentally destructive consumption, or pursue reductions in both
human population and rates of consumption. If we properly recognize the moral status of future
people and treat their rights and interests with the moral seriousness they warrant, then it
becomes clear that we cannot continue with our currents trends in population growth and
destructive consumption. Something must change. Unfortunately, although some reductions in
consumption can be made, I further argue that it is not possible to make sufficient cutbacks in
environmentally destructive consumption – particularly in the short timescale in which they must
be made – to reliably avoid the worst outcomes these environmental crises may cause. Some
reduction in the human population will be necessary. The only viable path toward a solution
involves making efforts to both reduce consumption and reduce population.
In chapter 6, I consider what policy measures could be pursued to permissibly hasten the
stabilization of the global population and then aid its reduction. I argue in favor of a combination
of policies that would help lower fertility rates in both developing and developed nations. These
policies include increasing access to contraception and family planning services, implementing
preference-adjusting media campaigns that promote having smaller families, and providing
economic incentives that reward people for having smaller families. One of these economic
incentives is the ability to trade one’s right to an “allowed” number of children in an open
marketplace.29 All people would be able to sell their allowance (or a portion of it) to those who
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As we will see, this proposal would have some context sensitivity in application, since the ecological footprint of
a child is not equal in all parts of the world. Couples in some portions of the world, at least so long as their
ecological footprint remains low, may be permitted to have 2 or 3 children without purchasing additional rights to
have children.
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wanted to purchase the ability to have a larger family. To offer an example, if a couple was
allowed a total of two children but wanted a third, they could purchase the legal right to have a
third child from a seller (or group of sellers) in this marketplace.
We would not begin with the economic incentives, however. Our goal would be to
implement the least coercive set of policies that would solve the population problem, so we
would start with non-coercive measures such as increasing the availability of contraception and
family planning services, particularly in those countries with large unmet needs for these
services. Assuming that these measures did not have a large enough impact, we would then
implement preference-adjusting interventions that might motivate people to choose to limit their
family size voluntarily. Should we need to go further, we can provide economic incentives for
individuals to have fewer children, such as tax breaks for childless couples. Along these lines, we
could consider punitive measures to encourage compliance, though I argue that these measures
could not in practice go beyond heavy fines. More severe punishments, such as mandatory
sterilizations or abortions, carry too great a risk of abuse and may violate individuals’ rights to
privacy and bodily integrity even if they are not abused. Thus, they are too morally problematic
to be a feature of a satisfactory population policy. I conclude chapter 6 by considering some
objections to the policies I have proposed and considering whether unjust outcomes resulting
from these policies can be avoided.
While prior chapters address the collective moral duties that we have with respect to
reducing population, chapter 7 focuses on individual procreative choice. Whether or not policies
are eventually implemented to limit procreation, many people will have the freedom to decide
how many children they have for some time to come. What are they morally required to do? Our
individual obligations cannot be to remain childless: a universalized obligation of this sort would
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lead to our extinction. Moreover, many view having a child as a central feature of the ideal
human life, so requiring such people to remain childless would be to demand too great a sacrifice
on their parts. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I argue that it is morally wrong for couples to
intentionally have more than two children, given the impacts of continued population growth on
future people. Given the moral seriousness of the situation, we should all acknowledge the
existence of a collective moral imperative to reduce global population. If one accepts this
imperative, then maintaining integrity requires that one also not take individual action to increase
the global population. Practically speaking, this means that individuals should, when possible,
avoid having more than two children. While having fewer children would be morally better, I
argue that it would be too onerous to require couples to have only a single child in the absence of
a collective scheme that provides options for having larger families.
I conclude the dissertation in chapter 8 by recapping the main arguments presented and
the central conclusions that I have reached. I also gesture at some of the lingering questions that
should be addressed in future work, noting in particular the limitations of the anthropocentric
approach that I have adopted. I also address one final objection: the concern that we should not
act to prevent overpopulation because the looming environmental crises are not solvable
regardless of what we try to do. According to this defeatist objection, we should not worry about
making sacrifices for future people because they are already doomed, meaning that our sacrifices
will be meaningless. I argue that this objection rests on a mistaken conception of what it means
to “solve” a moral problem and that there are still opportunities to make a great difference in the
state of the future even if some of the destructive impacts of our past actions can no longer be
prevented.
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CHAPTER 2: FAMILIAR ISSUES IN POPULATION ETHICS
In the opening chapter, I mentioned the three issues that have traditionally dominated the
subfield of philosophy known as population ethics: the Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity
Problem, and the Asymmetry. All three of these issues provide a basis for objecting to a duty to
reduce population. Moreover, given the theoretical implications of these issues for
intergenerational ethics more broadly, any adequate discussion of long-term population ethics
must address them. In this chapter, I examine each of these issues in turn, clarify my views on
them, and explain why none of them grounds a strong objection to a duty to reduce human
population.

The Repugnant Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion is an implication of what Parfit (1987) calls the Impersonal
Total Principle: “If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in which there would be
the greatest quantity of whatever makes life worth living” (p. 387). This principle implies that for
any population, no matter how blissful the lives of its members, there exists a much larger
population that is better even though its members all have lives barely worth living. A population
with hundreds of trillions of members whose lives are barely worth living may, for instance,
have a greater total welfare than a population with a billion members who are all living blissful
lives. Thus, according to the impersonal total principle, the larger population is preferable to the
smaller population.
As the name of this implication suggests, Parfit (1987) finds the conclusion of this
reasoning “hard to accept” (p. 388). However, he does not explain why in great detail: the
Repugnant Conclusion is simply counterintuitive and rejected on those grounds. As my
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discussion of philosophical methodology in chapter 1 indicates, I do not think a mere intuition
provides strong grounds for rejecting or endorsing philosophical claims. Intuitions are simply too
unreliable to play such a strong role in our deliberations.
Perhaps Parfit believes his verdict about the Repugnant Conclusion is a considered
judgment rather than just a mere intuition. That proposal faces a significant problem, however,
because it does not seem possible to have a considered judgment about the Repugnant
Conclusion. I have already mentioned that having a considered judgment about a case requires
(among other things) familiarity with the case and stability of the judgment over time. It is clear
that we do not have a deep familiarity with the case described by the Repugnant Conclusion. We
do not have much experience reasoning about populations with trillions of members (or more),
and it is also difficult to conceptualize precisely what constitutes a life that is just barely worth
living. We also have a natural difficulty comprehending extremely large numbers and
compounding small quantities (Huemer 2008, pp. 908-910), and both of these are required to
make a judgment about the plausibility of the Repugnant Conclusion. Additionally, as also
discussed in the prior chapter, many philosophers have dissented from the intuitive verdict about
the Repugnant Conclusion. Since many people with similar expertise and familiarity with the
case have rendered different judgments about it, the judgment cannot be considered stable. For
these reasons, we should not regard the rejection of the Repugnant Conclusion as a considered
judgment.
Now suppose that someone accepts the Repugnant Conclusion. This claim could provide
the basis for an objection to population reduction. If a world with vast numbers of people at low
welfare can be better than a world with a much smaller population of individuals at a very high
welfare, then perhaps we should not be so concerned about our increasing population, even if it
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reduces the average welfare of everyone. After all, the total welfare of a larger population could
still be higher than the total welfare of a smaller population.
Whatever theoretical implications the Repugnant Conclusion may have, however, it does
not in practice entail that we should work toward creating a world in which we have as many
human beings as possible that have lives barely worth living. Attempting to create such a world
would run a grave risk of leaving many members of the population with lives not worth living.
Moreover, we can expect that reductions in average welfare among members of a population will
be rather drastic once a population begins to exceed the planet’s carrying capacity: resources will
become more limited, and inhabitants will have greater difficulty satisfying their basic needs.
Figure 1 below, which originates from Huemer (2008, p. 930), illustrates this aspect of the
Repugnant Conclusion.

Figure 1: The Relationship between Population and Average Utility

This figure is a representation of what the actual relationship between average utility and
population size appears to be. Initially, increases in population improve the efficiency of
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resource distribution and production, resulting in an improvement in average welfare.
Eventually, however, the population increases to the point that it is no longer feasible to
adequately distribute resources to everyone. Once this threshold is passed, increases to
population size decrease the average welfare of those in the population. In Figure 1, according to
the Impersonal Total Principle, the ideal population size is point P because that is the point
where total welfare, which equals the total population multiplied by the average utility, is
maximized. As we can see, point P is nowhere near the maximum population size, so the
Impersonal Total Principle “does not enjoin us, in reality, to pursue the world of cramped
apartments and daily gruel” (Huemer 2008, p. 930).
An adherent to the Impersonal Total Principle who thinks long-term may also be
concerned about the far-reaching consequences of having too many children in the present.
Doing so may exhaust resources in such a way that larger populations become impossible to
sustain in the future, which would significantly reduce total welfare. Each person with a life
worth living increases total utility, so if an overpopulated generation depletes resources so
severely that the population size must be drastically reduced in subsequent generations, then this
may result in lower total utility than if a more modest population size had been maintained over
many generations.
Additionally, the Impersonal Total Principle is typically thought to include the welfare of
many nonhuman animals.1 Taking animal welfare into account radically alters the calculation of
ideal population size because we must balance the welfare of our own species with the welfare of
other species, which entails that we cannot assume that a large human population is the one that

1

Animals that are sentient (i.e., capable of experience pleasure and pain) are typically included. Whether the biotic
welfare of plants and other non-sentient organisms should be considered morally significant is more controversial.
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maximizes total welfare. After all, increasing our numbers may result in significant decreases to
the numbers of other sentient animals and may cause significant suffering to those that remain.
Thus, even if we accept the moral principle that we ought to maximize total utility, this principle
does not imply that we should always strive to increase our population size.
There are also strong deontological reasons to reject the population-increasing imperative
of the Impersonal Total Principle. Perhaps the most powerful of these reasons is that an
imperative to increase population would place enormous burdens on women that would not be
shouldered by male members of the population. As Christine Overall (2012) explains:
The Repugnant Conclusion is repugnant in part because it does not direct adequate moral
attention to the women who would have to do the reproductive labor to generate the
millions of new human beings. It is mistaken because the premises that lead to it are
insidiously gender neutral. That gender neutrality at best ignores and at worst mandates
injustice to women, first by requiring disproportionate sacrifices from women for the
sake of the alleged goods to be obtained through procreation and second by ignoring
women’s right not to reproduce. (pp. 73-74)
If we view the Repugnant Conclusion purely as an abstract exercise in which we are choosing
among two possible worlds to actualize, perhaps the higher total utility is sufficient for us to
choose the world with the larger population, but in practice, we would not have such a choice.
The larger population could only be generated through large-scale human reproduction, and if we
value gender equity and reproductive rights, we should not endorse an imperative to create such
a world, even if doing so would ultimately increase total welfare. In this manner, Overall
highlights a more general problem with the Impersonal Total Principle: it ignores justice and
equity in cases where these considerations do not contribute to maximizing utility, which is
perhaps the most fundamental reason why many moral philosophers do not endorse the claim
that we should always strive to maximize total welfare. There are simply too many other moral
considerations to weigh in our deliberations, and they are not all significant only insofar as they
contribute to improving the people’s overall welfare.
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Rule utilitarians may be able to accommodate some or all of these justice-oriented
considerations indirectly by emphasizing how their promotion ultimately contributes to overall
welfare. But if one favors rule utilitarianism, it is not clear that the Repugnant Conclusion will be
generated. One of the central tenets of rule utilitarianism is that the general rules be followed
even in rare cases where following the rules does not lead to maximizing utility2 – that is, cases
in which utility would be maximized by violating the rule.3 So suppose we implement a rule to
respect women’s reproductive autonomy – a very plausible inclusion to a rule utilitarian’s list of
principles given the ways in which a failure to respect their reproductive autonomy has caused
unnecessary suffering in the past (and continues to do so in the present). Here, we might have a
case in which violating this rule would promote greater overall utility, but according to rule
utilitarianism, we ought to respect the general rule nonetheless. Respecting this moral rule would
not entail the Repugnant Conclusion, since not all women would volunteer to produce such an
extraordinary number of children. In contrast, if we violate this general rule whenever doing so
maximizes utility, then we have retreated straight back to the Impersonal Total Principle. Under
those circumstances, we are really only adhering to one rule: do whatever maximizes aggregate
impersonal utility, and we return to the worry that we are not properly incorporating justiceoriented concepts into our moral decision-making.4

2

If a rule frequently leads to non-maximal utility, then the rule may need to be altered, but even generally effective
rules will likely yield non-maximal utility on occasion.
3
This feature of rule utilitarianism has led some philosophers to reject it because they consider it inconsistent with
the central goal of utilitarianism – maximizing utility. The classic representation of this view comes from J. J. C.
Smart (1956).
4
There is obviously much more that could be said about why one should reject the utilitarian outlook that gives rise
to the Repugnant Conclusion, but this is not the venue for a detailed discussion of the merits of different moral
theories. While my own outlook is rather pluralistic, it may be worth mentioning that the core arguments of later
chapters do not appeal explicitly to any particular moral theory – only to moral principles that I consider plausible.
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Ultimately, we have strong theoretical reasons to reject the Impersonal Total Principle
that gives rise to the Repugnant Conclusion, and even if we accepted the Impersonal Total
Principle, it would not in practice require us to pursue radical population expansion. Thus,
accepting the Repugnant Conclusion is not a strong reason to object to an imperative to reduce
the global human population.

The Non-Identity Problem
A second objection to a proposed obligation to reduce population could arise from the
Non-Identity Problem. To illustrate this moral quandary, imagine that Wilma is thinking about
having a baby (Boonin 2014, p. 2).5 She learns from her doctor that if she conceives a child in
the near future, that child will have a severe and irreversible disability, though that disability will
not render her child’s life not worth living. Fortunately, Wilma can prevent her child from
having a disability by taking a tiny pill once a day for two months before conceiving the child.
Her health insurance will cover the costs of the medication, and the pill boasts no side effects.
But Wilma decides to conceive at once despite the doctor’s advice, and her child – Pebbles – is
born with incurable blindness.
Here’s the moral puzzle created by Wilma’s decision: most believe that she acted
wrongly in conceiving Pebbles in this manner, but if she had taken the pill for two months, the
child she would have conceived would not have been Pebbles – it would have been someone
else. After two months, an entirely new sperm and egg pair would be united, and since the child
would have a complete different genetic constitution than Pebbles, it could not have been
Pebbles. Why does this matter? It matters because it raises a serious question about whether

5

This case is heavily influenced by Parfit’s (1982) Handicapped Child case (p. 118).
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Pebbles was harmed by being born with blindness: since it is impossible for Pebbles to exist and
not be blind, she is not made worse off than she otherwise would have been.
David Boonin (2014) uses Wilma’s case of decision-making to present what he calls the
Non-Identity Argument (p. 27):
P1: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day for two months
before conceiving does not make Pebbles worse off than she would otherwise have
been.
P2: If A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off than B would otherwise have
been.
P3: Wilma’s act of conceiving now rather than taking a pill once a day for two months
before conceiving does not harm anyone other than Pebbles.
P4: If an act does not harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone.
P5: If an act does not wrong anyone, then the act is not morally wrong.
C: Wilma’s act of conceiving Pebbles is not morally wrong.
If we cannot find a premise in the argument to reject, then we have to accept the conclusion that
Wilma did not act wrongly in conceiving Pebbles.
This particular case might not seem relevant to the rising global population, but the
argument can be tweaked to have some significant moral implications for population policy.
Suppose that we were considering whether to implement an international policy that only allows
couples to have a maximum of two children rather than allowing individuals to have as many
children as they wish. Under full compliance to a global two-child policy, the global population
would eventually stabilize and then gradually reduce, but this outcome would take some time to
occur. Suppose that demographic momentum ensures that population stabilization will take 100
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years. Under this policy, many people will have children at different times or refrain from having
children that they otherwise would have had, and over time, some people who would otherwise
never have met will meet and start families together. Iterated over many generations, these
outcomes result in a completely different set of people existing in 100 years than would have
existed under the more liberal procreative policy. But this means that the people who would have
existed under the more liberal procreative policy would not have been harmed had we not chosen
the more restrictive policy. In fact, they needed us to choose that policy in order for them to exist
at all. If it is true that we cannot wrong those that we cannot harm, then it appears that allowing
for a more liberal procreative policy – even one that lowered overall welfare by promoting
overpopulation – would not have wronged any future people.
Admittedly, the case sketched above requires a number of idealized conditions, but the
thought experiment nevertheless illustrates how the Non-Identity Problem could ground an
objection to certain population policies if the basis for those policies is that they harm future
people. This strategy fails, however, because the Non-Identity Argument is unsound: the second,
fourth, and fifth premises are all false. It is possible for one to be harmed by actions that do not
make one worse off than she otherwise would have been, it is possible to wrong someone
without harming them, and it is possible for actions to be morally wrong even if they do not
wrong anyone.
Let’s begin with the second premise: if A’s act harms B, then A’s act makes B worse off
than B would otherwise have been. This premise reflects what is known as the counterfactual
comparison notion of harm (CCH). The standard defense of CCH is that it is the notion of harm
that best accords with common sense. On this basis, Boonin (2014) presents CCH as the default
position “unless a better alternative comes along” (p. 52). There are important methodological
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questions about appeals to common-sense morality (some of which were discussed in chapter 1),
but even granting that common sense is an appropriate starting point for moral inquiry, this
defense of CCH is flawed. Boonin provides no compelling evidence for the claim that CCH is in
fact a part of common-sense morality.
Boonin supports CCH with some hypothetical anecdotes about how people would explain
why they were harmed or did not harm someone else. Suppose I vandalize your car. What
justification would you offer if you were pressed to explain why you had been harmed? Boonin
(2014) claims that “you are likely to reply by pointing to the various ways in which my act has
made you worse off than you would have been had I not vandalized your car” (p. 52). If you
asked for compensation, it would presumably be the amount that would come closest to
nullifying the extent that you have been made worse off. Additionally, if you had to explain why
scratching your nose did not harm me, then “you are likely to appeal to the claim that your act
did not in any way make me worse off than I would otherwise have been by way of rebutting the
complaint” (p. 52).
This defense of CCH has a very serious shortcoming. The way to determine the contents
of common sense morality would be to poll the general public on their views. Boonin has not
conducted such surveys, and I am not aware of anyone who has done so. He is simply
postulating that CCH is a part of common sense morality, and that strategy is indefensible. Why
assume that ordinary people have any firm convictions about what account of harm is correct?
Although harm is a component of virtually everyone’s moral reasoning, I doubt it is common for
ordinary people to reflect on what constitutes harm or what its necessary or sufficient conditions
are. Thus, I suspect that their understanding of harm will usually be a mish-mash of inconsistent
intuitions that does not converge neatly on any extant view. In the absence of evidence showing
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convergence on a particular conception of harm, there is no reason to grant Boonin’s assumption
that CCH is part of common-sense morality.
A deeper problem with Boonin’s defense of CCH is that it fails to handle cases of
preemption. Consider this case from Hanser (2008):
The Two Hit Men: Mr. Bad orders Hit Man 1 to shoot and kill you. Hit Man 1 doesn’t
always follow his orders, so Mr. Bad orders Hit Man 2 to shoot and kill you if Hit Man 1
fails to shoot and kill you. Hit Man 2 always follows his orders. As it happens, though,
Hit Man 1 shoots and kills you and Hit Man 2’s orders prove to be unnecessary. (p. 436)6
According to CCH, Hit Man 1 does not harm you because he does not make you worse off than
you otherwise would have been. It would be an odd result if the most plausible account of harm
entails that an act of murder does not constitute a harm so long as someone else was also
planning to murder you! Boonin (2014) recognizes this point but still claims that a proponent of
CCH should just bite the bullet (p. 58). In contrast to Boonin, I think the proper conclusion to
draw is that CCH is wrong. Clearly, there are cases in which people can be harmed without being
made worse off than they otherwise would have been. Given my earlier skepticism about CCH
occupying a privileged position as an account of harm (because of its supposed presence in
common-sense morality), I see no reason to cling to it as Boonin does.7
Boonin’s main strategy for countering this concern is to highlight that the other accounts
of harm have bigger problems than CCH, but this approach is misguided. Even if he succeeded
in showing that CCH was better than all rival accounts currently on offer, that would not
establish that CCH was true. We do not have to establish a full account of harm to reject the
6

Plenty of other philosophers have presented variants of preemption cases as a problem for CCH. For some
examples, see Thomson (2011, pp. 446-447), Woollard (2012, p. 484), and Bradley (2012, p. 397).
7
The non-identity problem is also frequently mentioned as a problem case for CCH, but it would be questionbegging to present it as a problem case in this context. We would have to assume the Non-Identity Argument is
unsound to make that claim, and determining the argument’s soundness is precisely why we are examining CCH in
the first place.

39

second premise of the Non-Identity Argument; we only have to establish that CCH should be
rejected. We have more than enough reason to abandon CCH, even if we are unsure what a full
and comprehensive account of harm would be.8
We can now turn to the fourth premise of the Non-Identity Argument: if an act does not
harm anyone, then the act does not wrong anyone. This premise is false because it is vulnerable
to a wealth of counterexamples. Some of these counterexamples are cases that involve violations
of rights that do not harm anyone. Voyeurism, for instance, is wrong even when the act is never
discovered by anyone because it violates a person’s right to privacy. Similarly, sexually
assaulting a person who is unconscious is wrong, even if no one ever learns about the act and it
causes no physical harm, because it violates a person’s right to bodily integrity. Another class of
counterexamples would be instances of non-harmful promise-breaking. Even when one can
break a promise without it being known and without harming anyone, this does not obviously
permit one to break the promise. After all, the whole point of promises is that they should be
upheld except in dire and extreme circumstances.
There are also counterexamples to this premise that relate to the mere risk of harm.
Driving while intoxicated is wrong even in circumstances where no harm occurs because there is
a non-trivial risk of harming someone else. But the wrongness of the action surely does not
originate from whether or not the person actually harms someone. Whether a person is injured by
a drunk driver may be solely a matter of luck – a result of where a person happens to be on the

8

In previous work (Hedberg 2013), I argued that fully capturing the relevant notion of harm required two principles
– one that captured CCH (or something similar to it) and one that specified a non-comparative component. Although
I no longer think the particular account offered there is correct, I am still receptive to the more general idea that a
full account of harm will contain (at least) these two distinct components.
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sidewalk at a particular moment or when precisely someone happens to leave the parking lot.9
Whether one’s conduct is wrong, however, cannot hinge exclusively on luck. If luck alone can
make that much of a difference to our moral responsibility, then we would have little control
over our own moral conduct, and judgments about one’s moral character would be arbitrary.10
Boonin’s response to this line of reasoning is to highlight how these explanations do not
account for how Wilma’s specific act is wrong. He thinks it is possible to modify the fourth
premise to avoid these shortcomings. Thus, “the question is not whether we can show that P4 is
false. The question is whether we can show that it is false enough” (Boonin 2014, p. 109).11 Even
so, I believe that we can show this premise to be “false enough” to render the Non-Identity
Argument unsound.
The most plausible objection to P4 is what Boonin refers to as a direct rights-based
argument. The best candidate for a right that Wilma violates is a child’s right “not to be born
with important opportunities foreclosed” (Jecker 2012, p. 34).12 Such a right explains not only
why it is generally wrong to intentionally have a child who will be blind (or suffer some other
significant disability) but also why it is wrong to have children in circumstances where they will
not have a reasonable chance at a good life (e.g., because they are born into severe poverty,
because they are born addicted to drugs). Pebbles is wronged by having her right to nonforeclosed opportunities violated, even though this rights violation does not necessarily harm her.

9

I borrow the example of a drunk driver from Rahul Kumar (2003, p. 103).
The extent to which moral luck is an obstacle for contemporary moral theorizing remains a topic of controversy.
For an overview, see Nelkin (2013).
11
Strangely, Boonin never explicitly presents a version of this fourth premise that is immune from all these
counterexamples and still makes the Non-Identity Argument work. He leaves that reconstruction to the reader.
12
Velleman (2008) proposes a similar alternative: children have “a right to be born into good enough
circumstances” (p. 275). These “good enough circumstances” would presumably include the condition that
important opportunities have not been foreclosed.
10
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Of course, one important aspect of Wilma’s circumstances is that she can conceive a
child whose right to non-foreclosed opportunities will not be violated. If Wilma were unable to
conceive a child who would be sighted, then we might reason that her action is permissible even
though it would violate a right of the child. The violation of a right is prima facie morally wrong,
but an inability to conceive a sighted child might provide a basis for violating this right, so long
as Wilma would be able to give her child a good life despite the child’s blindness. The general
point, however, is that there is a very strong presumption against violating a child’s right to nonforeclosed opportunities.
Boonin (2014) expresses considerable skepticism that anything that happens to Pebbles
could be considered a rights violation (pp. 111-113). He reasons that the only viable candidate
for a right that Wilma could violate is Pebbles’ right not to exist in her present condition, which
is the strategy that Doran Smolkin (1999) adopts. Since Pebbles’ present condition results in her
having certain opportunities foreclosed, this interpretation is consistent with the aforementioned
right of non-foreclosed opportunities.13
Boonin (2014) objects to this strategy on the grounds that it is not properly motivated: he
claims that the only reason to endorse this solution is to avoid the conclusion of the Non-Identity
Argument, which violates what he calls the “Independence Requirement” (pp. 20-21). According
to the Independence Requirement, any reason for rejecting a premise in the Non-Identity
Argument must be independent of the fact that rejecting that premise would enable us to avoid
accepting the Non-Identity Argument’s conclusion. Boonin focuses on Smolkin’s (1999)
presentation of a direct rights-based argument, and he is right that Smolkin offers little to
13

Smolkin’s considered position does not perfectly match the language used here. He later refines his claim to the
following: “a person’s life is complaint-warranting if and only if some act that was necessary for her to come into
being also resulted in her being unable to lead a good life in any particular life stage” (Smolkin 1999, p. 206).
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motivate his rights-based account other than the claim that it allows us to avoid the Non-Identity
Problem. But the same is not true of the right not to have one’s opportunities foreclosed. As I
suggested earlier, this right has plausible support independent of any discussion of the NonIdentity Problem: it explains why it is wrong not to provide children with circumstances that are
conducive to them living a good life. Since rights violations are prima facie morally wrong, the
burden of proof would be on Wilma to show that she was justified in committing this rights
violation when it could have easily been avoided at no significant cost to her. Since she could
have easily had a child that was not born blind – a child that would not have had this right
violated – the wrongness of her conceiving Pebbles is not overridden.14 Thus, her conceiving
Pebbles was morally wrong.
The flaws with P2 and P4 are hopefully sufficient to reject the Non-Identity Argument,
but if further evidence is needed, there are also good grounds for rejecting P5. According to this
premise, an act is not morally wrong if it does not wrong anyone. A straightforward way to
refute this claim is via appeal to virtue ethical considerations. Virtue ethics is principally
concerned with one’s moral character. Its focus is not on the rightness or wrongness of particular
actions but on our dispositions to behave in certain ways. Now imagine what the ideally virtuous
parents would be like. They would deeply love and cherish their child, promote their child’s
welfare, respect their child’s autonomy, and so on. Now consider what decision such a parent
would make if placed in Wilma’s position. Is there any virtuous parent who would choose to
conceive a child immediately instead of taking the pill for two months and then conceiving?
14

There is an assumption here that rights apply universally to all persons and specify appropriate thresholds of
treatment below which no one should fall. As Caney (2010b) states, “[H]uman rights specify minimum moral
thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply by virtue of their humanity, and which override all other
moral values” (p. 165). This approach to rights is also defended by Shue (1996) and Bell (2011, pp. 104-110).
Hence, the fact that Pebbles could not have existed without suffering this rights violation does not change the fact
that her rights were violated.
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Even if we assume that Pebbles herself was neither harmed nor wronged, conceiving
Pebbles was still wrong because it instantiates a vice. Wilma is not properly concerned with
conceiving a child who has the best possible chance at a good life. Parents should care about
their child’s welfare and potential for a good life regardless of who their child turns out to be.
Intentionally choosing to create a child who will have lower welfare or greater obstacles toward
living a good life than another child demonstrates that the parents are not sufficiently concerned
with their child’s welfare. Admittedly, few claim that parents are required to do everything they
can to maximize their child’s chances of living a flourishing life,15 but we usually do expect
parents to do what’s reasonably possible to ensure that their children have a good chance at
living such a life. Deliberately choosing to conceive a blind child rather than a sighted child for
such frivolous reasons as Wilma’s is inconsistent with this feature of being a good parent.
Wilma’s choice and the reason she makes it reveal that she does not have a strong commitment
to promoting her children’s flourishing. Her action is wrong because it manifests morally
defective character.
Boonin (2014) does briefly acknowledge this virtue ethical objection to P5 (pp. 184-188),
but he identifies the relevant vice as an insensitivity to suffering, particularly as discussed by
Urbanek (2010). I do not think that the relevant character flaw is necessarily an insensitivity to
suffering, however; it can be understood as a kind of parental negligence – a failure to care
sufficiently about the impersonal welfare of one’s future children. Consider David DeGrazia’s
(2012) remarks about a case very similar to Wilma’s:

15

Julian Savulescu (2001) is a notable exception. He defends the principle of Procreative Beneficence: “couples (or
single reproducers) should select the child of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best
life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information” (p. 415). For further defense
of this position, see Savulescu and Kahane (2009).
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...it is very clear that the parents did not make this choice in order to benefit this very
child. Indeed, their conduct expressed a highly cavalier attitude about their procreative
options and their likely consequences. In this way, the parents expressed a profound lack
of regard for their offspring–whoever it would be. … Although the couples disregard was
not intentionally directed at the child they had, it was, in a sense, negligently directed at
whatever child they might have. (pp. 180-181, original emphasis)
Wilma is displaying the same vice: she should care much more about the circumstances into
which her child – whoever it will be – will be born, and she should avoid actions that lower the
impersonal welfare of her future child for frivolous reasons.16 Hence, P5 is false.
Before moving on from the Non-Identity Problem, two final remarks should be made.
First, the Non-Identity Problem has a surprisingly narrow scope, a fact that is rarely highlighted
when the issue is discussed.17 The Non-Identity Problem only applies to narrow, person-affecting
theories – that is, those that evaluate the rightness or wrongness of actions on the basis of how
they affect particular, identifiable individuals. Consequentialist moral theories evaluate the
rightness or wrongness of actions based on their overall consequences. Since these theories are
concerned with aggregate goodness, they are not narrow person-affecting theories. Virtue ethical
theories focus on developing virtuous character and acting in accordance with the virtues. They
do not ground rightness or wrongness in narrow person-affecting moral principles.
Typically, the Non-Identity Problem is framed as applying to deontological moral
theories, but even many deontological theories are not narrowly person-affecting the way that the
Non-Identity Problem requires. As Rivka Weinberg (2016) explains,
…[deontological moral theories] are not narrowly person-affecting in the sense relevant
to the non-identity problem because they do not determine wrongdoing on the basis of the
16

These remarks should not be confused with strict consequentialist reasoning. How our actions affect the welfare
of others will be a significant component of any plausible view of morality, and nothing here commits me to the
claim that only impersonal welfare matters to determining what we morally ought to do. The point is simply that
parents should strive not to lower the impersonal welfare of their children unnecessarily.
17
A notable exception is Weinberg (2016, ch. 3).
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of the effect of an act on an individual. They are not theories the determine permissibility
of an act on the basis of consequences at all. Instead, deontological theories determine the
permissibility of an act on the basis of its adherence to principles designed to treat people
as having a special status as moral agents and ends-in-themselves. The non-identity
problem does not apply to deontology because the non-identity problem is a problem
only if permissibility of acts is determined by the act’s effects or consequences on a
particular person. Focusing on the effects or consequences of an act is a fundamentally
nondeontological approach to ethics. (p. 105, original emphasis)
Most deontological theories will, for the reasons Weinberg mentions, not accept P4 of the NonIdentity Argument because the wrongness of an action will be determined by whether the action
violates a particular moral principle – not by whether or not the action harms some particular
identifiable person. Thus, the Non-Identity Problem is only applicable to a small subset of
deontological moral theories that adopt the idiosyncratic notions of harm and wrongness that it
presupposes.
Second, the analysis I have offered in this section only scratches the surface of the many
responses that have been made to the Non-Identity Problem. It has been addressed in literally
hundreds of venues, and there are dozens of proposed solutions.18 Philosophers frequently
disagree about the best way to address it, but there is broad consensus that it can be resolved in
some way. The Non-Identity Problem, despite its frequent discussion in philosophical circles, is
not a significant obstacle to reasoning about procreative or intergenerational ethics.19

The Asymmetry
The Asymmetry in the ethics of procreation consists of two distinct ethical claims. The
first is that it is morally wrong to bring into existence a child who will have an abjectly miserable

18

For some examples of these responses, see ‘t Hooft (1999, pp. 50-51), Woodward (1986), Kumar (2003),
Davidson (2008, p. 482), Harman (2009b), Nolt (2011a, pp. 71-72), and Weinberg (2016, ch. 3).
19
Even Boonin (2014) acknowledges that the practical implications of the Non-Identity Argument in large scale
intergenerational cases may not be very significant even if the argument is sound (p. 216).
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life; the second is that it is permissible not to bring into existence a child who will enjoy a very
happy life. Both claims of the Asymmetry are supported by strong moral intuitions, but finding a
plausible moral theory which can accommodate both claims has proven a difficult task. As a
result, some philosophers have concluded that the Asymmetry is not defensible and that one of
its claims must be false (e.g., McMahan 1981, 2009, 2013; Singer 1993; Persson 2009). If
someone holds this position, then unless one is unwilling to abandon the claim that it is wrong to
create a child who will have a miserable life, one must conclude that we have a moral obligation
to procreate when doing so will result in the creation of someone with a great life.20 But of
course, this implies that many of us – namely, those who could provide such good lives to future
people – may have duties to increase the human population rather than reduce it.
It would be implausible to claim that it is permissible to create a child who will live an
unremittingly miserable life. Such an action harms the child by putting her in a state that is worse
than experiencing nothing at all. One of the most basic moral principles is the duty to avoid
causing suffering (when possible). Creating a child with a miserable life blatantly violates this
principle. Moreover, parents have a general responsibility to promote the welfare of their
children, and deliberately having a child with a poor quality of life does not adhere to this
responsibility. An appropriately beneficent parent would not create conditions that ensure their
child suffers so much during her life. Thus, the first half of the Asymmetry – the claim that it is
wrong to create children who will lead miserable lives – is strongly supported.
Why does this matter with respect to overpopulation? Since the first claim of the
Asymmetry is plausible, one may worry that we actually have a duty to procreate unless we can

20

In practice, we obviously cannot predict precisely what a child’s quality of life will be, but we can still make
reasonably informed judgments about what children would have a high probability of living a good life.
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vindicate the other half of the Asymmetry. A duty to procreate would complicate the moral
picture a great deal and make it much more challenging to argue for a duty to reduce the global
population. Fortunately, it is possible to bypass this obstacle by vindicating an alternative
procreative asymmetry – one that differs from the Asymmetry that philosophers most frequently
discuss.
As I have argued elsewhere (Hedberg 2016), the Asymmetry is actually ambiguous
between two distinct sets of claims. The first set of claims can be put as follows (Roberts 2011a,
p. 765):
Claim 1:

It is wrong to bring a miserable child – a child whose life is less than worth living –
into existence.

Claim 2:

It is permissible not to bring a happy child – a child whose life is worth living or even
well worth living – into existence.

These claims are almost always discussed as idealizations: it is assumed that the relevant acts of
procreation do not impact the lives of anyone else except those who are created. In this manner,
Claims 1 and 2 refer to instances of procreation in a vacuum. Thus, I label these claims as the
Abstract Asymmetry.
The Abstract Asymmetry can be contrasted with the Real-World Asymmetry, which I
represent as the union of two different claims:
Claim 3:

Under ordinary conditions of human reproduction, people are not morally permitted
to bring a child into existence who would have an abjectly miserable life.

Claim 4:

Under ordinary conditions of human reproduction, people are not morally obligated to
bring a child into existence who would have a very happy life.
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I refer to these claims as the Real-World Asymmetry because they are, unlike their Abstract
counterparts, explicitly grounded in the conditions of typical human reproduction. It is also
worth noting that the Real-World Asymmetry leaves open the possibility that we can be
obligated to perform these procreative actions under certain extreme circumstances. Perhaps, for
instance, we may have an obligation to procreate if it is required for the continuity of the human
species.
This distinction enables us to avoid positing a general duty to procreate. I contend that the
Abstract Asymmetry is false but that the Real-World Asymmetry is true. The primary support for
the Abstract Asymmetry is an appeal to intuition: it just doesn’t seem like we have a duty to
procreate, even in the idealized circumstances specified. But this is precisely the problem: given
these idealized circumstances, how could anyone have a clear intuition about what our
reproductive obligations are? No human being has ever witnessed or experienced a case of this
costless procreation, so there is no reason to believe our judgments about such cases is reliable.
Thus, we should be suspicious of our intuitions about the Abstract Asymmetry.
We should be especially willing to revise our intuitions about the Abstract Asymmetry
because it violates the following moral principle.
Goodness for Free: if we can perform an action that causes something good to happen
without sacrificing anything at all, we are morally obligated to perform that action.
Virtually all moral decisions we make will involve costs of some sort, so this principle often will
not apply to ordinary moral decision-making. It does, however, apply to Claim 2 of the
Asymmetry. Goodness for Free is plausible because it highlights one of the most basic aspects of
moral reasoning: it is morally preferable to bring about good outcomes. Certainly, other moral
considerations may override the promotion of a good outcome. Donating money to charity may
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make the world a better place, but it does not follow that I should steal from my friends to
acquire more money to donate even if the world is made better (in terms of total welfare) by my
actions. Goodness for Free specifies, however, that there are no other considerations in play –
moral or otherwise. In Claim 2, we have a morally salient reason to bring a child into existence
but no countervailing reason not to do so. Thus, we can only conclude that we do have an
obligation to procreate in that otherworldly case.
The good news is that we do not need to support the Abstract Asymmetry to defend the
claim that people generally do not have an obligation to procreate. I have already gestured at the
reasons for not creating a miserable child: the most central reason is the duty not to cause
unnecessary suffering. Supporting Claim 4 is more challenging, but there are two routes to doing
so. The first originates from the existence of supererogatory actions – those that are morally good
to do but not morally required. The paradigm examples of these actions usually involve heroic
levels of self-sacrifice,21 but they need not be limited to such extraordinarily demanding
sacrifices. The existence of these actions stems from the recognition that worthy life pursuits are
not just limited to doing morally good things: we have the moral latitude to sometimes to refrain
from maximizing the good in favor of pursuing other aspects of our life plans.
Creating a happy child can be a good thing to do, but it is not something that people are
morally required to do under ordinary circumstances. Pregnancy can be the most physically and
emotionally challenging experience of a woman’s life and frequently affects her physical
appearance for the remainder of her life, and the responsibilities and burdens associated with

21

J. O. Urmson (1958) is usually credited with initiating the discussion of supererogation in secular moral theory.
His examples of supererogatory behavior were saints and heroes, and the philosophical literature on this topic has
often focused on these particular examples. For useful surveys of the literature written in response to Urmson’s
article, see Jackson (1986) and Stanlick (1999).

50

parenting are among the greatest and most demanding that a person can experience. The
investments of time, emotion, and financial resources required to be a good parent are
extraordinary. They are also enduring: children do not typically leave their parents’ care until
they are close to twenty years old. Burdens of this severity and duration are not typically
required except under the most dire of circumstances.
The second route to securing Claim 4 is to acknowledge the gender asymmetry in the act
of procreation. Women typically bear far more of the costs of reproduction than men. Some of
these costs are rooted in the biological differences between men and women. Others are rooted in
culture: compared to men, women are still expected to bear more of the responsibilities in most
of the world. If we posit a general obligation to produce happy children, women will be the ones
who are forced to bear most of the responsibilities associated with fulfilling it. Beyond the
obvious suffering that this would cause many women, this practice would also cultivate
resentment and distrust in them and impede any serious efforts at the long-term attainment of
gender equality. The children’s lives may bring much more good into the world, but I doubt
many would be prepared to make such massive sacrifices with respect to gender equality in order
to achieve that happiness. Moreover, it is unclear that the long-term consequences of this
pervasive and systematic oppression of women would ultimately result in the best overall
consequences: social arrangements of this sort often lead to discontent, subordination, and even
violent revolts.
With Claims 3 and 4 secured, the Real-World Asymmetry is supported, and that is all we
need to deny that there exists a general obligation to create happy children. In this manner, even
if we deny the Abstract Asymmetry, we do not encounter an objection to reducing human
population.
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Recap
The Repugnant Conclusion, the Non-Identity Problem, and the Asymmetry have all
become foci of significant philosophical discussions. When we examine these issues in detail,
however, we see that they do not provide strong reasons for skepticism about a duty to reduce
population. In fact, on close examination, these problems are revealed to be solely theoretical in
nature and lacking in practical application to our real-world circumstances. Perhaps in the future
that will change, but as it stands, these three issues should not be a serious focus when we turn
our attention to the global population growth under way in the twenty-first century. Our solution
to this problem will not be meaningfully influenced by reflecting on the Repugnant Conclusion,
the Nonidentity Problem, or the Asymmetry.22

22

In chapter 1, I argued that these issues did constitute genuine moral problems according to Räikkä’s (2000)
criteria. One of these criteria is that the moral questions have “practical relevance in the sense that they concern the
issue of what should actually be done” (p. 401). I am not reversing my position here. These three issues could
potentially provide us with insight that would influence what we should do under various circumstances and the
views we form on these issues could have implications for what we owe future people. In this sense, they certainly
concern how we actually ought to act. What I have argued is that they do not in fact provide us with meaningful
guidance about what to do about the specific problem of population growth in the 21st century.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXTREMES OF PROCREATIVE ETHICS
This chapter considers and evaluates two opposing views of procreative ethics. The first,
which is commonly called Antinatalism, is the view that procreation is always (or at least
usually) morally wrong.1 The second, which I will call Procreative Liberty, is the view that
everyone has a right to procreate as much as they wish. According to antinatalism, there is an
extremely strong presumption against procreating. According to Procreative Liberty, there is a
very strong presumption against placing any limitations on procreative freedom. If Antinatalism
were correct, then we would likely want to promote population policies that would not just
reduce population in the short term but those that would do so until population were reduced to
zero. In contrast, if Procreative Liberty were correct, then we might not be able to enforce any
restrictions on procreation whatsoever.
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate both that antinatalism in its extreme forms
is false and that Procreative Liberty is false. Refuting these extreme positions will establish some
bounds on what constitutes an acceptable procreative ethic and also set the stage for the
principles of procreative and population ethics that will be defended in subsequent chapters.
I begin with the most extreme form of Antinatalism, as advocated by David Benatar
(2006, 2015). According to this view, it is always wrong to procreate. Some readers may wonder
why it is worth even considering a position so radically at odds with ordinary moral beliefs and
human behavior, but over the last decade, philosophers have started to take challenges to the
permissibility of procreation quite seriously. Take, for example, this excerpt from the opening

1

As will become clear in my discussion of Antinatalism, some variations are global in scope and meant to apply to
everyone while others are more localized and sensitive to context. Given the scope of our discussion, the focus will
be on the forms of Antinatalism with a broad scope.
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paragraph of Jamie Nelson’s (2016) review of Permissible Progeny? The Morality of
Procreation and Parenting:
...the tenor of the text is that, given environmental fragility and existing children in need
of families, bearing and begetting as such are morally fraught enterprises, certainly on the
defensive, and possibly best seen as indulgence in an expensive hobby. Antinatalism is
taken in general quite seriously throughout, sometimes bracketed, but never directly
confronted.
Nelson encapsulates a view that has been gradually gaining momentum in moral philosophy:
despite the widespread belief that procreation is almost always something to be praised and
celebrated, procreation is actually only permissible in a fairly narrow range of circumstances.
This view may not be held by many people, but the correctness of a philosophical position is not
determined solely by the proportion of people who hold the position. If the arguments in favor of
Antinatalism are strong, then we must give them serious consideration regardless of their
unpopularity.2

Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument
David Benatar (2006; 2015, pp. 18-39) argues that it is always a harm to come into
existence and that on these grounds there is a moral duty not to procreate.3 Part of Benatar’s
reasoning here just reflects what many of us already know: if you live for any decent length of
time, it is inevitable that you will endure some harm, and some of that harm may be pretty
severe. But few people believe that this fact entails that procreation is impermissible. In most

2

One might argue that there is no point in considering a view that would never be adopted as a social norm or matter
of public policy. This objection will be treated near the end of the chapter, but for now, it is sufficient to note that
moral imperatives that cannot be fully realized in practice can still often be approximated in some way. We can still
consider what policies get closest to what is morally required.
3
A further implication is that one should discontinue pregnancy when it is possible to do so. Benatar (2006) refers to
this as the “pro-death” view of abortion: “On this view, it is not any given abortion (in the earlier stages of
pregnancy) that requires justification, but rather any given failure to abort. For such a failure allows somebody to
suffer the serious harm of coming into existence” (p. 161).
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cases, people believe that the good people experience significantly outweighs the bad caused by
their pain and suffering. Thus, overall, most people’s lives are good, and it was better for them
that they came into existence rather than never existing at all. Benatar’s rebuttal to this objection
is the foundation for his Asymmetry Argument against procreation.
Benatar (2015) endorses a cluster of evaluative judgments that he calls the Axiological
Asymmetry. First, he claims that (1) the presence of harm is bad, and (2) the presence of benefit
is good. Then he claims that (3) the absence of harm is good, even if that good is not enjoyed by
anyone, whereas (4) the absence of benefit is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this
absence is a deprivation (p. 23).4 Benatar (2015, p. 23) represents these asymmetrical evaluations
of harm and benefit in the graph depicted in Figure 2 below.

Scenario A
(X Exists)
(1)

Scenario B
(X Never Exists)
(3)

Presence of Harm

Absence of Harm

(Bad)

(Good)

(2)

(4)
Presence of Benefit

Absence of Benefit

(Good)

(Not Bad)

Figure 2: Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry

4

The same asymmetry can be found in Benatar (2006, p. 38), but the terms “harm” and “benefit” are replaced with
“pain” and “pleasure” respectively. The (2015) formulation is closer to what Benatar actually means. Harm and
benefit are broader concepts than pain and pleasure, and harm is the morally salient concept in his argument.
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A person X exists in Scenario A but does not exist in Scenario B. In Scenario A, X experiences
both harms and benefits; in Scenario B, X does not experience either harms or benefits. To
determine which of these scenarios is preferable, Benatar argues that we must compare (1) with
(3) and (2) with (4). He believes that there is a clear preference for (3) instead of (1) and no
preference for (2) over (4). On his view, an absence of benefits is not bad unless a person exists
to be deprived of the benefits. This claim explains why the absence of benefits in Scenario B is
not analogous to the absence of benefits in Scenario A. Since (3) is preferable to (1) and (2) is
not preferable to (4), he reasons that nonexistence is always preferable to existence.
Based on the argument outlined above, Benatar (2015) claims that coming into existence
is always a harm, but he also acknowledges that this alone does not demonstrate that it is always
wrong to bring people into existence (p. 40). Even so, given that a general principle of non-harm
is one of the most foundational aspects of any plausible moral theory, it is not difficult to
produce a straightforward argument that it is prima facie wrong to procreate, provided that that
Axiological Asymmetry is endorsed.5
We should pause to digest Benatar’s reasoning in a bit more depth. According to the
Axiological Asymmetry, nonexistence always has one advantage over existence: the absence of
harm. Benatar claims that the absence of harm is good even when no one exists to experience it,
but while nonexistence does feature the absence of benefits, this absence is not bad because the
absence of benefits is only bad when someone exists to experience the deprivation. In his first
formulation of the axiological asymmetry (which uses “pain” and “pleasure” rather than “harm”
and “benefit”), Benatar (2006) argues that we view the absence of pleasure as bad only in
5

Given the ease with which this maneuver can be made, it is surprising that Benatar does not make this point.
Instead, he opts to combine the Axiological Asymmetry with the Quality-of-Life Argument (which will be discussed
in the next section) to show that coming into existence is not merely a minor harm but a very serious one.

56

relative terms – it is bad when a person is deprived of pleasure relative to the state the person
would experience if they were to experience the pleasure:
Just as absent pleasures that do deprive are ‘bad’ in the sense of ‘worse’, so absent
pleasures that do not deprive are ‘not bad’ in the sense of ‘not worse’. They are not worse
than the presence of pleasures. It follows that the presence of pleasures is not better, and
therefore that the presence of pleasures is not an advantage over absent pleasures that do
not deprive. (pp. 41-42)
So whereas the absence of pain is impersonally good, the absence of pleasure is not impersonally
bad. We can extent this same line of reasoning to the newer formulation of the Axiological
Asymmetry: the absence of harm is impersonally good, but the absence of benefits is not.
According to Benatar, if we accept this asymmetry about harm and benefit, then we ought to
favor nonexistence over existence.
Now one might wonder why we should favor Benatar’s asymmetry over alternative views.
Benatar’s central supporting argument is that this asymmetry best explains other asymmetries in
the ethics of procreation. These other asymmetries include (Benatar 2015, pp. 25-27):
1. The Asymmetry: we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence those who would live
miserable lives, but we have no duty to bring into existence people who would live
happy lives.6
2. The prospective beneficent asymmetry: it would be strange to cite the benefits to the
child as a reason for having a child but not similarly strange to cite the child’s
suffering as a reason not to have a child.
3. The retrospective beneficence asymmetry: it makes sense to regret bringing a suffering
child into existence and to do so for the sake of the child, but it does not make sense to
fail to bring a happy child into existence and regret this fact for the sake of the child.
6

This is the same Asymmetry discussed in Chapter 2.
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4. The asymmetry of distant suffering and absent happy people: we are saddened by the
suffering of distant existing people but not similarly sad for absent people who could
have led happy lives on vacant areas of Earth or on other planets.
Benatar holds that all of these intuitively plausible asymmetries can be explained by the
Axiological Asymmetry. He also contends that the Axiological Asymmetry can resolve the NonIdentity Problem and avoid the Repugnant Conclusion (Benatar 2006, ch. 2; 2015, pp. 34-37).
Regarding this latter point, he is surely correct. If coming into existence is always a harm, then
all acts of procreation – including non-identity cases – will harm the person born, and if
nonexistence is always preferable to existence, then it is clear that a world with a massive
population is not the moral ideal. Rather, the moral ideal would be the world with as few
inhabitants as possible. Nevertheless, whatever advantages Benatar’s position might have, it
should still be rejected.
The first important observation to make about Benatar’s position is that it relies
extensively on appeals to intuition. The central reason to endorse the four other asymmetries that
Benatar discusses is that they appear to capture intuitions that are commonly shared in
procreative ethics. The problem is that Benatar’s conclusion – that coming into existence if
always a harm – is one of the most counterintuitive claims that one can make within the ethics of
procreation. Insofar as Benatar wants to defend his position via appeal to intuitions, I cannot see
how he can succeed: the balance of intuitions likely favors rejecting his conclusion and either
abandoning the other asymmetries or searching for alternative ways to explain them.7

7

It is also telling that some philosophers use intuitive verdicts about thought experiments as a way to refute the
axiological asymmetry (e.g., Overall 2012, pp. 98-103).
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Additionally, Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry may not have the explanatory power that
he believes it does. First, it is clear that not all of these four asymmetries may be true. In fact, I
argued in the previous chapter that the Asymmetry, at least as commonly examined in the
philosophical literature, is false. I do not think it is an advantage of Benatar’s position that it
“explains” why we should endorse an incorrect view. Second, as I argued in the prior chapter,
there are alternative explanations for how we can avoid the Non-Identity Problem and the
Repugnant Conclusion. I even argued that the intuition underlying the Repugnant Conclusion is
unreliable, which leaves us to wonder whether it is really a favorable feature of Benatar’s view
that it avoids this rather innocuous conclusion.
The Axiological Asymmetry has deeper problems than weakness in its support, however.
Claim (3) is simply false. It does not make sense to speak of something being “good” in the
impersonal sense that the claim requires. Since the person in question does not exist, the absence
of harm cannot be good for that person. Thus, when Benatar (2006) claims that “the avoidance
of the bad by never existing is a real advantage over existence” (p. 14), we must wonder for
whom it is an advantage. The goodness generated by the absence of harm is not good for any
existing individual, and it is implausible to claim that goodness can be attributed to merely
possible entities.8 The only way to make sense of (3) is to posit the existence of some kind of
free-floating goodness – goodness that is somehow disconnected from being good for any
particular person or creature. But how are we to understand goodness that is completely
unrelated to the good some individual or group of individuals? Furthermore, how could we
recognize this goodness or make judgments about it in ways that are empirically informed or
8

Overall (2012) echoes this thought when she notes that the term “good” is a person referring term: “A mere
absence or avoidance is neither good nor bad unless it is good or bad for someone” (p. 105). DeGrazia (2010) and
Harman (2009a) also criticize Benatar on these grounds.
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reliable? When we speak of goodness for individuals, we can observe their behavior, ask them
about their mental states and preferences, and in various other ways observe the effects of
different forces on their welfare. We cannot do any of these things to assess the presence or value
of free-floating goodness.9
The reliance on free-floating goodness is, in my view, a fatal theoretical flaw in the
Axiological Asymmetry, but other substantive problems would undermine it even if this one
could be overcome. Perhaps the biggest problem is that accepting the Axiological Asymmetry
does not clearly entail that nonexistence is preferable to existence. This problem becomes
obvious when we recast the argument in premise-conclusion format:
1. Nonexistence contains something good (i.e., the absence of harm) and something
neutral (i.e., the absence of benefits).
2. Existence contains something good (i.e., the presence of benefits) and something bad
(i.e., the presence of harm).
3. A package containing something good and something neutral is preferable to a
package containing something good and something bad.
4. Therefore, existence is preferable to nonexistence.
The first two premises are just restatements of the different parts of the Axiological Asymmetry,
but even granting those to Benatar, this argument clearly fails because the third premise is false.
Which of these packages is to be preferred will depend greatly on the quantities of the goods and
bads being weighed.10 Moreover, human lives vary greatly in the quantity of benefits and harms

9

DeGrazia (2012) makes a similar point when he identifies Benatar’s reliance on “free-floating interests” as a
problem with his view (p. 146).
10
This weakness is highlighted nicely by Belshaw (2007), who goes so far as to call the argument “dreadful”
because of this shortcoming.
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experienced, so there is no prima facie reason to assume that the positive value of the benefits
experienced will always be too low to make existence worthwhile.11
Benatar’s response to this objection relies on an analogy. He asks us to imagine two
people: S and H. S often gets sick but also has the capacity to recover quickly from sickness. H
never gets sick but lacks the capacity to recover quickly from getting sick. Benatar (2006) argues
that it would obviously be preferable to be H rather than S:
The capacity for a quick recovery, although a good for S, is not a real advantage over H.
This is because the absence of that capacity is not bad for H. This, in turn, is because the
absence of that capacity is not a deprivation for H. H is not worse off than he would have
been had he had the recuperative powers of S. S is not better off than H in any way, even
though S is better off than he himself would have been had he lacked the capacity for
rapid recovery. (p. 42)
Benatar (2006, p. 47) represents this assessment of S and H in Figure 3 below:

Figure 3: Benatar’s Sickness Case

11

Benatar does supplement this argument with further claims that attempt to establish that our lives are much worse
than we typically believe. These empirical claims will be treated separately in the next subsection since they provide
the basis for a different argument for Antinatalism.
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Benatar reasons that the case of S and H is relevantly similar to the case of existence and
nonexistence. Thus, he concludes that just as H’s circumstances are preferable to S’s, we should
prefer nonexistence to existence.
The standard way to refute an analogical argument is to reveal a relevant dissimilarity
between the cases being compared. Benatar’s argument is susceptible to this strategy because
there is a clear difference between the cases. S’s capacity for quick recovery from illness is only
valuable in circumstances where S gets sick. Since H never gets sick, the capacity for quick
recovery from illness will never be valuable for him. The value of life’s benefits is not
contextualized in this way. For the case to be relevantly similar, the capacity to experience life’s
benefits (e.g., pleasure) would have to be valuable only in cases where it served to alleviate
harms that were suffered. (After all, the capacity for quick recovery from illness is only valuable
when it serves to alleviate the suffering caused by illness.) But the capacity to experience life’s
benefits is clearly valuable even in circumstances where it does not serve to alleviate pain. For
example, while the sensation of pleasure often does accompany the amelioration of some painful
state, such as when our hunger is sated by a delicious meal, there are also circumstances where
pleasure does not seem to alleviate pain at all. Even if I am not in a state of discomfort,
pleasurable experiences – perhaps the feeling of a gentle breeze, the sound of pleasant music, or
an unexpected encounter with an old friend – remain valuable. The goodness associated with
pleasure is not dependent on the ability to experience pain in the way that the goodness of quick
recovery from illness is dependent on the ability to fall ill. Pleasure is just a good thing to
experience, independent of its relationship to experiencing pain.12 On these grounds, our
judgments about the case of S and H can deviate from our judgments about existence and
12

A similar appraisal of Benatar’s analogy is offered by Smuts (2014, pp. 716-717).
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nonexistence. S may not have any advantages over H, but an existing person does have an
advantage over a merely possible one – the ability to experience life’s benefits.
One final flaw in Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry is worth highlighting. This view
simply has absurd implications, one of which Benatar (2006) highlights himself: “One of the
implications of my argument is that a life filled with good and containing only the most minute
quantity of bad—a life of utter bliss adulterated only by the pain of a single pin-prick—is worse
than no life at all” (p. 48). It would be hard to find a better candidate for a reductio ad absurdum.
Benatar (2006) is right to mention that “a brief sharp pain is a harm” (p. 49); his mistake is his
claim that a blissful life with only this small quantity of pain “has no advantages over never
existing” (p. 48, my emphasis). The ability to experience life’s benefits is an advantage over the
inability to experience them, and without that claim, we are stuck with this absurd conclusion –
the claim that even a life better than any human life ever lived is worse than having never
existed. Because the Axiological Asymmetry entails an absurd conclusion, it ought to be
rejected.
Since its publication, Benatar’s Axiological Asymmetry has been subjected to many
criticisms, including some not illustrated here (e.g., Kaposy 2009, Bayne 2010, Bradley 2010,
Brown 2011).13 Despite its provocativeness, the arguments that support it are weak. If there is a
good reason to embrace Antinatalism, then it must be found elsewhere. This is not Benatar’s
only argument supporting Antinatalism, however, so we can see whether his other arguments
fare better.

13

To his credit, Benatar does attempt to address many of his critics. See Benatar (2013).
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Benatar’s Quality-of-Life Argument
Benatar’s second argument for Antinatalism is based on the following claim: the majority
of human lives are very bad.14 Because human lives are usually very bad, we are not justified in
subjecting people to such lives, provided that we can avoid doing so. Any act of procreation is
too risky because the odds are overwhelming that the person born will live a very bad life.
Benatar supports this argument with two general strategies. First, he highlights a variety
of psychological phenomena that cause us to see our lives as being better than they really are
(Benatar 2006, pp. 64-69; 2015, pp. 41-54). One of these is optimism bias – the general tendency
of human beings to interpret our experiences in an optimistic fashion. This bias manifests when
we, for example, tend to remember a greater number of positive events in our lives than negative
events or when we overestimate how good events in the future will be.15 Another is the general
phenomenon of adaptation (or habituation), which refers to our tendency to adjust our
expectations to suit our circumstances. A pronounced example of this occurs in cases where
those who become paraplegic often become happy again, according to their own self-reports,
within one year after losing the use of their legs (Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978).
Paraplegics adjust to their circumstances within one year and are then able to feel just as happy
as they did before despite the loss they have experienced. In fact, we are remarkably resilient in
the face of negative events: few bad things affect us for longer than three months (Suh, Diener,
and Fujita 1996). The third major phenomenon that contributes to making inaccurate perceptions
14

The most thorough presentations of this argument are found in Benatar (2006, pp. 60-92; 2015, pp. 40-77). In
some respects, this argument is related to the Axiological Asymmetry. Benatar thinks the Axiological Asymmetry
demonstrates that coming into existence is always a harm, and this argument is designed to give us a sense of just
how bad the harm is. However, even if one rejects the Axiological Asymmetry, “one can recognize that a life
containing a significant amount of bad is a harm” (Benatar 2006, p. 60). In this sense, it can be interpreted as an
independent argument for the claim that it is morally wrong to procreate.
15
For some examples of this research, see Matlin and Stang (1978), Taylor (1989), Weinstein (1980, 1984), and
Taylor and Brown (1998).
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of our own well-being is our tendency to make implicit comparisons between ourselves and
others (Wood 1996). We often compare ourselves to those around us to assess how well our lives
are going, but this entails that widely shared negative features of human life will be overlooked
in our assessments of our own well-being. Moreover, we tend to compare ourselves with people
who are worse off than we are (Brown and Dutton 1995), further biasing our assessments in an
optimistic direction.
Benatar argues that these three psychological phenomena alter our perceptions such that
our self-assessments of our own well-being are inflated: our lives are objectively worse than we
usually believe. As far as this part of his argument goes, he is surely right. The empirical
evidence supporting this idea is substantial, and these tendencies make sense from an
evolutionary perspective. Those with a broadly optimistic outlook on their lives will, other things
equal, be more likely to survive and reproduce than those who are more pessimistic.16 As
Benatar (2006) puts the point, these psychological phenomena “militate against suicide and in
favor of reproduction” (p. 69).
Even if we have these optimistic biases, however, this fact does not entail that our lives
are often very bad. After all, two of these biases can also make us perceive our life as being
worse than it is objectively. Just as we adapt to negative events, we can also adapt to positive
ones. As we become more successful, for instance, we will often raise our expectations to
correspond with our success, such that continued success at the same level is no longer as
fulfilling to us.17 Similarly, if we are surrounded by people whose lives appear to be going
particularly well, our tendency to compare ourselves with our peers may cause us to think that

16
17

For more on this topic, see Tiger (1979).
See Kahneman, Diener, and Scwartz (2003) for various essays on this phenomenon.
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our own lives are going worse than they actually are. Benatar (2006) acknowledges the two-way
nature of these tendencies, but he claims that the underlying optimism bias means that “both
adaptation and comparison operate from an optimistic baseline” (p. 68). Benatar may be right
that overall our perceptions are generally more positively influenced by the confluence of these
factors than they are negatively affected, but his response is unsatisfactory. The fact that we
often overestimate the goodness of our lives does not entail that our lives are bad. His claims are
consistent with our lives being (objectively) good or decent despite our beliefs that our lives are
very good or even sublime. For his argument to work, we need an explanation for why the gap
between the perceived quality of our lives and their actual quality is as enormous as he suggests.
To see if Benatar can provide that explanation, we must look at his second strategy for
supporting the Quality-of-Life Argument.
According to an influential taxonomy of views concerning the quality of life, there are
three accounts of what makes a life go well or poorly.18 On hedonistic theories of well-being,
lives fare well or poorly depending on the quantity of pleasure and pain that is experienced. On
desire-fulfillment theories of well-being, lives fare well or poorly depending on the extent to
which a person’s desires are fulfilled. Finally, on objective list theories of well-being, lives fare
well or poorly to the extent that they contain certain things that are objectively good or bad.
Some items on the objective list are good or bad for one’s life independent of their connection to
pleasure and pain or to the person’s desires. Benatar’s second means of supporting the Qualityof-Life argument is to show that our lives fare poorly on all three of these theories.
Benatar’s general strategy is highlighting the various negative aspects of our lives that we
routinely minimize or overlook. From the hedonistic perspective, these take the form of minor
18

This taxonomy of what makes a person’s life go well comes from Parfit (1987, pp. 493-502).
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pains and discomforts, such as hunger, thirst, allergies, headaches, nausea, and boredom (Benatar
2006, pp. 70-72). We are fairly familiar with the great tragedies that can befall human lives –
early death, cancer, depression, and other chronic or life-threatening ills – but these more banal
pains are not often taken to be bad-making features of our lives. Moreover, pleasures tend to be
short-lived while pain and discomfort are often long-lasting (Benatar 2015, pp. 48-49). Chronic
pain is an all-too-common experience, but there is no such thing as chronic pleasure.
When we consider desire fulfillment, Benatar (2006) notes, “Rather little of our lives is
characterized by satisfied desires and rather a lot is marked by unsatisfied desires” (p. 74). Some
of our desires are never satisfied, and the others are usually only satisfied after a significant time
has passed. Thus, we spend much of our lives in a state of desire frustration. A further problem is
that we are often caught in a treadmill of our desires: upon fulfilling one desire, another simply
arises to take its place, which prevents long-term desire satisfaction.19 The result is that our
moments of desire fulfillment are rare and fleeting while our moments of desire frustration are
pervasive.
Regarding objective list theories, Benatar’s strategy is to evaluate human lives from the
point of view of the universe. He questions why a death at the age of 40 is regarded as a tragedy
while a death at 90 is not. If longer lives are better, then isn’t the fact that the person did not live
until 240 an indication that the person’s life did not go particularly well?20 The natural response
is that it would be ludicrous to think one must live that long to live well, given that human beings
cannot live anywhere near that long at present. Benatar (2006) rejects this response:
19

This phenomenon led Abraham Maslow (1970) to remark, “It looks as if the human hope for eternal happiness
can never be fulfilled. Certainly happiness does come and is obtainable and is real. But it looks as if we must accept
its intrinsic transience, especially if we focus on its more intense forms” (p. xv).
20
The basic point here can be made using possible ages. I use 240 because that is the number Benatar (2006) uses in
his own writing (p. 82).
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But why must it be that the good life is within our reach? Perhaps the good life is
something that is impossible to attain. It certainly sounds as though a life that is devoid of
discomfort, pain, suffering, distress, stress, anxiety, frustration, and boredom, that lasts
for much longer than ninety years, and that is filled with much more of what is good
would be better than the sort of life the luckiest humans have. Why then do we not judge
our lives in terms of that (impossible) standard? (p. 82)
Benatar contends that when we evaluate our lives from the view of the universe, they do not fare
well and that this perspective is the proper one to take. There is little doubt that our lives are not
too great when judged by such grand and idealistic standards. Even the best human lives have
significant shortcomings in various respects (e.g., bad experiences, lack of knowledge, short
duration).
Benatar’s claims about how we ought to assess our lives from the perspective of
hedonistic and desire-fulfillment theories are bold, but they do not hold up to scrutiny. One
significant factor that Benatar overlooks is that many of the minor pains he mentions are either
balanced by other feelings and sensations (such that we are not in constant states of discomfort)
or even pleasant in certain contexts (Wasserman 2015, pp. 156-157). While it would be very bad
to be in a constant state of hunger, it is hardly bad to feel hungry right before a large meal. The
anticipation of satisfying that hunger and the actual satisfaction that follows can be far more
pleasurable than that of a meal eaten on a partially full stomach. In similar fashion, feelings of
minor discomfort are often nullified or entirely overridden by minor pleasurable sensations that
we routinely fail to notice. Suppose, for instance, that the weather outside is a bit hotter than we
would prefer, but that the surrounding greenery is also aesthetically pleasing to us. In practice,
because both phenomena are commonplace, we might not notice either of these features of our
surroundings.
Herein lies a representative example of a glaring error in Benatar’s assessment of how
well our lives go. Since he is making an empirical argument, he needs to explain – in detail – all
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of life’s goods and how they compare to all of life’s bads (Marsh 2014, p. 447). Benatar has not
undertaken this task: there is no serious effort to catalogue all the minor pleasures we routinely
experience or grander pleasures and satisfactions (e.g., from accomplishing goals or completing
major life projects). He may be right that our lives go worse than we often think, but that does
not establish that our lives go badly. They might still go fairly well overall. To establish that
lives go badly, we need more information.
An additional complication in Benatar’s calculation is that certain things that people value
and identify as making positive contributions to their lives cannot be neatly explained in terms of
pleasurable and painful mental states. For example, people want their lives to be meaningful.
Having a meaningful life is not equivalent to being happy or to having a certain portion of one’s
mental states be positive in nature. In fact, there is evidence that higher levels of worry, anxiety,
and stress correlate with higher levels of meaningfulness (Baumeister et al. 2013). Those who
center their lives around substantial and difficult projects – which will often be a deep source of
meaning for the person pursuing them – are more likely to experience these unpleasant mental
states, but that does not mean that they would rather pursue a different life plan or that they are
acting irrationally. Rather, this phenomenon highlights how there is more that we care about in
our lives than just the aggregation of our positive and negative mental states. Insofar as a
hedonistic theory cannot properly take these other valuable components of our lives into account,
it fails to accurately assess a human life’s value.
Benatar’s assessment of the desire-satisfaction view fares even more poorly. Ordinarily,
the way we would appraise how well a life goes on the desire-satisfaction account would be to
see how many desires the person has and how many of them are ultimately satisfied. Benatar
does not undertake this task in an empirically informed way: there is no effort to gather empirical
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evidence on how many desires people typically have or how many of them are typically fulfilled
in a lifetime. Instead, he highlights the fact that many desires go unsatisfied:
Because we typically want more than we get, more desires are never satisﬁed. For
example, billions of people want to be younger, cleverer, better looking, to have more sex
(and to have it with more or better looking people), to have a better job, to be more
successful, to be richer, to have more leisure time, to be less susceptible to disease, and to
live longer. Even when our desires are satisﬁed, they are rarely satisﬁed immediately and
often take a very long time to be satisﬁed. The desires thus remain unsatisﬁed between
when they arise and when they are eventually satisﬁed. When they are ﬁnally satisﬁed, the
satisfaction either lasts or it does not. The latter is more common. Even when the
satisfaction of a desire does last, new desires typically emerge. Thus the general pattern is
a constant state of desiring punctuated by some relatively short periods of satisfaction.
(Benatar 2013, p. 143)
The problem is that Benatar’s conclusion – that we are dissatisfied far more often than we are
satisfied – does not follow from this list of examples. What about all those desires that get
satisfied? How numerous are they in comparison to these that go unsatisfied?
Jason Marsh (2014) illustrates this flaw in Benatar’s reasoning by rewriting this passage
through a more optimistic lens:
Because we typically get what we want, most desires are satisﬁed. For example, billions of
people want to spend time with their families, to talk to their friends, and to enjoy stories,
music, good meals and the outdoors; they also want and get to have some kind of sex and
to have some kind of job (which is more important than having even better versions of
these things). True, the satisfaction of many, but not all, desires doesn’t last, but then you
get to have other desires, most of which are fulﬁlled. You meet new people, visit new
websites, cities, restaurants, and the like. Clearly the general pattern for most people, then,
is a constant state of desiring and a constant state of getting most of what one desires. In
fact, even if we just focused on our capacity to think about what we want to, this alone
leads to billions of satisﬁed desires everyday and could alone outnumber most frustrated
desires. (p. 448)
Is this picture more accurate than Benatar’s? Based on the information provided, we do not
know. Even assuming that we can make this assessment in a consistent, non-arbitrary way, trying
to answer this question would require a great deal of difficult empirical research. Whether or not
such research could be done in a way that gives accurate assessments, it is clear that Benatar has
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not tried to conduct this research or gather extant research on people’s desires to adequately
support his claims.
As we can see, a general problem for Benatar’s analysis is that he pays insufficient
attention to cataloging the positive features of life and rigorously comparing them to its negative
features.21 An equally significant problem is that there may be no way to individuate desires in a
way that is informative and not arbitrary. The desire to finish a fiction novel, for instance, could
be understood as a single desire (e.g., to finish the book in its entirety) or a series of smaller
desires (to finish chapter 1, to finish chapter 2, etc.). Which of these portrayals is accurate? How
many desires are in play here? There may be no consistent, non-arbitrary way to answer such
questions. But if that is true, then there is no such thing as the number of desires that we have or
the proportion of our desires that are satisfied or unsatisfied. As a result, Benatar’s attempt to
quantify satisfied desires and compare their proportion to unsatisfied desires will not yield viable
results.22 Ultimately, the weaknesses in his strategy render his evaluation of the quality of human
lives, whether conducted on a hedonistic account or a desire-satisfaction account, thoroughly
inconclusive. His position also does not prove any more defensible when we use objective list
views to evaluate the quality of human lives.
The basic response to Benatar’s claims about objective list views is to deny that the
evaluative criteria for determining whether a human life is good should be the universe’s point of
view. In practice, we do not evaluate other species in this manner because we recognize that they
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Benatar and his critics also usually neglect the additional complication of how difficult it may be to actually
compare the goods and bads of life in any sensible way. As Marsh (2014) notes, some of these goods and bads may
be incommensurable with one another (p. 449, fn 23). The result is that there may not be a fact of the matter about
whether certain lives are good or bad, all things considered. The goods and bads may just be too different to admit of
a sensible comparison. For an overview of the problem of value incommensurability, see Hsieh (2016).
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Marsh’s view, insofar as he assumes that desires can be coherently and sensibly individuated, is on similarly
shaky ground.
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have species-specific criteria for their flourishing. We do not, for example, evaluate whether our
dog has lived a good life by virtue of how many novels she read. That would be absurd because
dogs do not have the capacity to read, and it is not essential to what makes their lives go well.
Instead, we will compare our dog’s life – in terms of both quantity and quality – with other dogs.
Similarly, it seems absurd to evaluate human beings according to standards that extend well
beyond the capacities of their species. Our lives might be better if we could live for 240 years
rather than typically dying around the age of 80, but that fact does not imply that a life of 80
years is bad – only that it is less good than its hypothetical counterpart. There is no compelling
reason to hold human beings to impossibly high standards and thereby conclude that their lives
are bad because they cannot meet those standards.
Benatar does attempt to respond to this objection. He considers the fact that we do not
usually evaluate physics professors by supra-human standards of intellect and so should similarly
not evaluate human lives according to supra-human standards of quality. Counter to this claim,
Benatar (2006) argues that we “sometimes do and should judge the brightest people by suprahuman standards” (p. 86). His illustrating case is the virtue of modesty. It is difficult to explain
how modesty is a virtue that can be held by those who genuinely exemplify the best of human
beings in a particular area. If they act modest and the appropriate comparison is only to other
people, then either they are not accurately appraising their abilities or they are acting in ways
inconsistent with their actual assessment of their abilities. The former behavior would represent
an epistemic defect, and the latter would be an act of deception. Either way, modesty would not
appear to be a virtue. Benatar (2006) claims that the best solution to this problem “is to say that
although the modest person has an accurate perception of his strengths, he also recognizes that
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there is a higher standard by which he falls short” (p. 86). This higher standard is sub specie
aeternitatis – the point of view of the universe.
There are several lines of response that one can pursue regarding Benatar’s points about
modesty. One could obviously bite the bullet and deny that modesty is a virtue, but that line of
response is rather unpopular.23 After all, modesty appears to provide a check on the human
tendency to overestimate oneself in comparison to others and to be a virtue on those grounds.
Moreover, defending the claim that modesty is not a virtue would require more detail and rigor
than I can offer here. An alternative strategy is to deny that the epistemic defect manifested by
modesty prevents it from being a virtue. Julia Driver (1989, 1999) has been the strongest
proponent of this position, going so far as to characterize modesty as a virtue of ignorance.
Driver (1999) denies the claim that ignorance is always regarded as being negatively valuable,
noting that ignorance of one’s own beauty is thought to enhance it and that we often value
children’s naive innocence (p. 828). This strategy may worry some readers, however, since they
may not share Driver’s intuitions about these cases and since her account raises problems with
the perception of a virtuous person as one who has an accurate understanding of herself and her
abilities.24 For these reasons, we ought to pursue a different line of reply.
The best response to Benatar’s analysis of modesty is to deny the dilemma that he poses:
there are ways to understand modesty as a virtue without entailing that the modest person is
either epistemically defective or engaging in acts of deception. One promising strategy is to
23

Most accounts of modesty presuppose that it is a virtue and that an account of modesty that cannot explain this
fact is therefore defective. Those who believe that virtue consists in phronesis, however, will likely deny that
modesty is a virtue. Phronesis requires, among other things, accurate self-knowledge and appropriate responsiveness
to salient moral reasons. Modesty, if it requires that a person be unaware of their accomplishments or act as if they
were unaware of them, appears to be incompatible with phronesis. For these reasons, Aristotle (1980) denied that it
was a real virtue (Book IV.7).
24
Driver’s account has had many critics. For a sampling, see Schueler (1997, 1999), Ridge (2000), Brennan (2007),
Allhoff (2010), and Wilson (2016).
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understand modesty as a virtue of attention (Bommarito 2013). It manifests when we remain
inattentive to certain skills or accomplishments that, if we were to focus on them, might foster
arrogance in ourselves or envy in others. It can also manifest in circumstances where we are well
aware of our accomplishments and abilities but also remain well aware of the roles that luck and
circumstance have played in our achievements. In this manner, modesty does not require an
inaccurate appraisal of one’s self-worth or accomplishments, even in cases involving inattention.
A person who is inattentive to something is not necessarily unaware of it (Bommarito 2013, pp.
99-100). Consider the common occurrences of getting lost in thought while driving and then
being surprised when you have arrived at your destination or navigating around people and
objects on your walk across campus while being immersed in a conversation with a colleague. In
both cases, we clearly have some awareness of our surroundings, but our attention is not focused
on them while we engage in other activities. Modesty functions in an analogous manner: one can
be fully aware of the merits of her achievements and the remarkable skills she possesses but be
inattentive to them in her dealings with others. This does not involve ignorance. It also does not
require deception, since the modest person could freely acknowledge her feats and abilities in
conversation when pressed by others to do so (and will often do so with suitable
acknowledgement given to the luck-based factors that have contributed to these things). In short,
we can account for modesty being a virtue without falling into Benatar’s trap.
There is also a deeper problem with Benatar’s claim that the best physicists, philosophers,
writers, and so on should evaluate themselves in accordance to a higher standard – that is, the
point of view of the universe. Such an outlook would not promote modesty:
Holding ourselves to a higher standard than others is one way of being self-aggrandizing.
Philosophers who, when hearing a paper at a conference, often think, “Oh, that’s a pretty
good paper for them. But if it were me, I would expect more of myself” are immodest in
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part because they take themselves to be worthy of a higher standard of evaluation than
their colleagues. (Bommarito 2013, p. 99, original emphasis)
Comparing oneself to a grand standard while evaluating others according to a lower standard is a
way of acknowledging – whether overtly or implicitly – that one is better than others, and it does
so in a way that may well be more offensive to others than a candid, realistic acknowledgement
of one’s abilities.25 In this manner, Benatar’s account of modesty proves inaccurate, and on these
grounds, we should reject his claim that it is appropriate to evaluate people by supra-human
standards of quality. The failure of people to meet his supremely high standards does not entail
that their lives fare poorly.26
In fact, once we abandon Benatar’s imperative to evaluate human lives by such lofty
standards, we can see that people actually do live good lives pretty frequently according to
objective list theories. Consider some of the standard welfare criteria of these theories: longevity
(in ordinary human terms), suitable level of knowledge and education (for a human being),
ability to engage in self-expression, and freedom from oppression. Many people satisfy these
conditions, so unless we have a compelling reason to adopt Benatar’s standards of evaluation, we
ought to conclude that human welfare, at least on objective list theories, is often fairly high.

25

In some cases, the person might be trying to compensate for the natural tendency to hold oneself to looser
standards than others, but nevertheless, a statement that one should be held to higher standards than her peers still
sends a message of immodesty.
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It is worth mentioning that this entire line of argument against Benatar assumes, as he does, that there is a “point
of view of the universe” or perhaps a “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) – an objective, mind-independent
viewpoint from which the universe can be evaluated. That assumption may not be worth granting. Value may only
be intelligible as value for a particular entity. If the universe is understood as a single entity, it is not conscious (or
even alive) and has no point of view. Things can go well or badly for individual organisms in the universe, but
nothing can go better or worse for the universe itself. If there is no point of view of the universe, then Benatar’s
appeal to this standard is obviously groundless.
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Benatar’s Misanthropic Argument
While his earliest work on the ethics of procreation focused on the Axiological
Asymmetry and the Quality-of-Life Argument, Benatar (2015) has recently advanced a new
argument for Antinatalism. Rather than trying to establish that procreation harms the person who
is created, this argument tries to establish that procreation is wrong because of the harm it causes
to other people. Benatar (2015) labels the argument as “misanthropic” because it focuses on “the
terrible evil that humans wreak, and on various negative aspects of our species” (p. 78). Benatar
(2015, p. 79) presents the Misanthropic Argument as follows:
1. We have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing into existence new members of
species that causes (and will likely continue to cause) vast amounts of pain, suffering,
and death.
2. Humans cause vast amounts of pain, suffering, and death.
3. Therefore, we have a (presumptive) duty to desist from bringing new humans into
existence.27
The argument has valid form, and the second premise is obviously true. Although Benatar (2015)
devotes quite a bit of space to establish this premise (pp. 80-100), it should not be controversial.
Even the most optimistic person must acknowledge that human beings often commit moral
atrocities, and our history of violence, oppression, exploitation, and deception provides plenty of

27

Harrison and Tanner (2011) defend a similar argument, but they describe the central idea in terms of an
unjustifiable gamble. They describe procreating as taking “an unjustifiable gamble that future generations will
behave responsibly… Given the rather pathetic, late-in-the-day changes humans have managed so far it is unlikely
future generations will do any better” (p. 114). Thus, they claim that we should not bring more humans into
existence: “Human beings are dangerous things; too dangerous” (p. 114). Fundamentally, I do not think their
argument meaningfully differs in spirit or substance from Benatar’s, even if the presentation of the argument is
slightly different.
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evidence for the claim. Thus, the first premise does all the argumentative work. Is this premise
true?
Benatar thinks that this premise would be widely accepted if the species under
consideration were not human. He asks us to imagine people breeding a destructive species of
nonhuman animal or scientists releasing a deadly virus and argues that both of these practices
would be widely condemned (pp. 101-102). The conclusion that he suggests is that our
reluctance to accept this premise is rooted solely in a bias toward our own species. Here,
however, Benatar makes two mistakes. First, he is wrong about our judgments about other
species. Many predator species cause a great amount of suffering to other animals: they have to
savagely kill other animals for their own sustenance. Yet there is not a widespread condemnation
of these species or a strong public outcry for the elimination of predation. In fact, we sometimes
undertake efforts to re-introduce predator species into environments where their numbers have
dwindled. Certainly, predators do not cause as much harm as human beings – in large part
because their numbers are so much smaller – but these observations provide some evidence that
not everyone would immediately accept Benatar’s judgment about the first premise even when it
concerns nonhuman species.
The second mistake is that Benatar overlooks the fact that human beings also perform
actions that are morally good. No one is morally perfect, but few are as monstrous as the
murderers and animal abusers that he references. Surely the good that people do counts in favor
of creating more of them, so we need further discussion of just how great the harms of the typical
person are and how they compare to the good that the person does. Furthermore, there is some
evidence that human beings are improving. We are, for instance, much less prone to violence
than we were in the past (Pinker 2011), and there have been growing cultural trends in the
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developed world of acceptance of people of different races, nationalities, genders, sexual
orientations, and religions.28 These trends suggest that humanity may not be the “moral disaster”
that Benatar (2015, p. 111) claims we are.
Benatar (2015) does acknowledge this point and make an effort to establish that the
harms that even normal people cause are substantial (pp. 107-109). After rightly pointing out
some of the difficulties in determining how much good would nullify the bad, he notes that each
new human being – at least under our current rates of consumption and given our current
population size – “adds incrementally to the amount of animal suffering and death and, via the
environmental impact, to the amount of harm to humans (and animals)” (Benatar 2015, p. 109).
Moreover, some of the goods that human beings produce could be produced by fewer humans, so
procreation can be a net harm in the context of a large and destructive population. Benatar also
places a particular emphasis on the harm done to nonhuman animals, primarily through animal
agriculture. After citing figures that suggest 166 billion animals are killed annually per year for
human consumption, he notes that the vast majority of human beings contribute to this
phenomenon. The end result is that a meat-eater is, on average, “responsible for the deaths (and
suffering) of at least 27 animals per year—which amounts to at least 1690 animals over the
course of a lifetime” (Benatar 2015, p. 110).29
One of the puzzling aspects of Benatar’s position is that, given the significance that harm
to animals and the environment plays in his argument, he does not argue for the eradication of
industrialized farming or swift mitigation efforts toward climate change. Why are these not
28

This claim does not imply that racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination have been purged from society.
The point is that equal rights and social standing for people is gradually becoming the norm, which is a stark
contrast to the dominant and overt racism and sexism of the past.
29
In this argument, Benatar assumes a very strong view of the moral significance of animal suffering – particularly
those with a very low level of sentience – that some moral philosophers would reject. See, for example, Wasserman
(2015, p. 166). Even so, I am willing to grant this assumption.
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preferable alternatives to prohibiting procreation altogether? Perhaps there is an assumption that
human beings will just continue to perform various evils in perpetuity and that this pattern can
never be stopped. So the obligation to refrain from procreating is in part a practical one – the
only feasible way that evils of this sort could be prevented. But it seems more likely that human
beings will change their behaviors with respect to animal farming or emitting greenhouse gases
than cease procreating altogether. (After all, many nations are already making efforts to address
climate change.) Thus, if there is a feasibility condition in the argument, it would seem to count
against Benatar’s position. The more practical solutions – namely, trying to reduce animal
suffering and live in more sustainable ways – are also likely to be more ethically preferable in
practice because enforcing a prohibition on procreation would require massive systemic
oppression and impose substantial suffering on many people.30
A further problem for Benatar’s position is that his observations about collective human
behavior have little import for individual procreative decision-making. One reasonable response
to Benatar’s long list of human evils is to instill parents with procreative caution: they should be
reflective and determine whether they can provide their child with the proper upbringing and
education so that their children will be extremely unlikely to commit, or be complicit in, dreadful
wrongdoing (Wasserman 2015, pp. 167-168). Many parents can meet this obligation, and for
them, it is not wrong to procreate. Benatar could well be right that there are some fairly
significant restrictions on permissible procreation and that many people violate them, but that
only tell us what we probably already suspected. Parents have very strong obligations to their
children. Not everyone is able to raise children effectively, and even for those who are able to be
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The harmful effects of draconian population control schemes are well-documented. See Mosher (2008, chs. 3 and
5).
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good parents, their life circumstances may only be conducive to raising children well at certain
times or under certain financial conditions. Still, many people can meet these conditions, and so
Benatar’s prohibition on procreation is not as broad as he argues.

Consent-Based Arguments
Benatar is not the only person to offer an argument against procreation. Seana Shiffrin
(1999) presents an argument that could yield the same conclusion. Her argument proceeds from
two observations. First, coming into existence renders a person vulnerable to a wide range of
harms. Second, a person cannot consent to coming into existence. Often, it is morally wrong to
cause harm to someone else or to expose them to risk of harm unless they give consent to the
action in question (e.g., before undergoing surgery). If consent is indeed required to nullify the
harms that accompany continued existence, then procreation seems morally impermissible.
This reasoning proceeds too quickly, however. After all, we are sometimes justified in
causing harm to someone when it prevents them from suffering a greater harm, particularly when
it is impossible or unrealistic to acquire consent. If a speeding driver fails to stop at a red light
when a pedestrian is crossing the street, I am justified in shoving the pedestrian to the ground if it
is the only way to get him out of the driver’s path even though obtaining his consent to this
action is not possible and he may suffer minor physical injuries because of my action. But
Shiffrin (1999) claims that this justification does not hold when we harm someone merely to
provide the person harmed with a benefit (p. 127):
Absent evidence that the person’s will is to the contrary, it is permissible, perhaps
obligatory to inflict the lesser harm of a broken arm in order to save a person from
significant greater harm, such as drowning or brain damage from oxygen deprivation.
But, it seems wrong to perform a procedure on an unconscious patient that will cause her
harm but also redound to her a greater, pure benefit. At the very least, it is much harder to
justify. For example, it seems wrong to break an unconscious patient’s arm even if
necessary to endow her with valuable, physical benefits, such as a supernormal memory,
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a useful store of encyclopedic knowledge, twenty IQ points worth of extra intellectual
ability, or the ability to consume immoderate amounts of alcohol or fat without side
effects. At the least, it would be much harder to justify than inflicting similar harm to
avert a greater harm, such as death or significant disability.
Beyond these examples, Shiffrin also suggests that it would be wrong for a wealthy islander to
air drop gold bars into a neighboring island community when doing so breaks someone’s arm,
even when this increased wealth makes the islanders (including the victim) better off overall and
even when there are no other viable means of transporting his gold to this community.
Shiffrin may be right to stress the moral seriousness of imposing harm on others or even
just exposing them to likely harms, but her supporting examples are problematic if we try to
extend them to the case of procreation. The harm in these cases – breaking a person’s arm –
constitutes a rights violation.31 Procreation, in contrast, does not involve any clear rights
violations. For this reason, breaking a person’s arm requires a particularly strong moral
justification, but it remains unclear whether procreation requires a comparably strong moral
justification, particularly when we acknowledge that we routinely expose our children to
potential harms to provide them with pure benefits (DeGrazia 2012, p. 153). When we make our
children play outside on a sunny day, we expose them to potential harms – bruises, cuts,
splinters, and so on – that they would be much less likely to suffer if they stayed in a carpeted
indoor environment, but we assume that whatever benefits come from being outdoors outweigh
the risks of these harms. When we send our children to school, we know there is a chance they
will be mocked, ridiculed, humiliated, or otherwise hurt by their peers, but we assume that the
benefits associated with making friends and getting an education are worth the risk of suffering
these harms. For these reasons, we should reject Shiffrin’s claim that it is always wrong to
31

Here, I echo a point made by Wasserman (2015, pp. 169-170).
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expose someone to the risk of harm to provide pure benefits when the person affected cannot
consent.
Jimmy Licon (2012) offers an alternative consent-based argument against the morality of
procreation. His argument can be outlined as follows:
1. An individual is justified in subjecting someone to potential harm only if either: (a)
they provide informed consent, (b) such is in their best interests, or (c) they deserve to
be subjected to potential harm.
2. Bringing someone into existence is potentially subjecting them to harm.
3. Individuals that do not exist: (a) cannot give their consent to being brought into
existence, (b) do not have interests to protect, and (c) do not deserve anything.
4. Hence, procreation is not morally justified. (Licon 2012, p. 88)
While this argument does avoid appealing to Shiffrin’s principle about the wrongness of causing
harm to bestow pure benefits, the argument on the whole is not any better than hers.
The central flaw in the argument is in its third premise. Licon claims that individuals who
do not exist lack interests. As stated, this premise is false. The phrase “individuals who do not
exist” could be interpreted to refer to future people, possible people, or both future people and
possible people. The premise is only true if it is restricted to referring to possible people. As I use
the term, a “future person” is someone who will exist later even though they do not at present.32
A merely possible person is, in contrast, someone who could exist but never actually will exist.
Merely possible people do not have interests (and never will), but future people do have
interests. At a minimum, they have interests in the basic requirements for a decent human life.
Indeed, much of our way of talking about future generations operates on the assumption that they
32

I borrow this usage from Nolt (2016).
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have interests that we can prevent or thwart. There is nothing incoherent in saying that
someone’s grandchildren, whomever they are, have an interest in a getting a good education, and
there is nothing incoherent in saying that people living in 2100 have interests in clean air and a
reliable supply of fresh water. Children who are not yet born but will be born are best understood
as future people, and so they have interests that we can promote or thwart. When we promote
these interests sufficiently well, doing so can justify exposing them to potential harms.
Perhaps Licon could respond by pointing out that while future people will have interests,
they do not have interests yet. When we speak of our children having interests when they are not
yet born, we may be misrepresenting what we really mean. Even if we can grant Licon this
move, it does not salvage his argument. On this interpretation, the argument is invalid: we can
affirm all three premises but deny the conclusion because future people will have interests to
protect. Sufficiently protecting or promoting those interests is enough to justify the risk of harm,
particularly when the probability of significant harm is extremely low and the probability of
beneficial experiences is extremely high. This thought accords not only with my remarks in the
prior paragraph but also with widespread considered judgments about when procreation is
justified.33 To make his argument valid, Licon would have to alter part (b) of the third premise to
read “do not have interests to protect and will not have interests to protect.” But this construction
renders the premise clearly false, since future people will certainly have interests to protect.
Thus, regardless of which change is made, the argument fails.

33

Indeed, there is perhaps no more stable or widely shared judgment about the ethics of procreation than the claim
that it is generally justified when the child has an excellent chance of living a good life overall.
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Häyry’s Risk-Aversion Argument
Matti Häyry offers a further argument against the permissibility of procreation. When it
comes to procreative decisions, he endorses the maximin rule, a principle of reasoning endorsed
by John Rawls (1999, §26-28) in the context of his political philosophy. The maximin rule states
that in some situations where probabilities of specific outcomes are uncertain, we ought to
choose the alternative in which the worst outcome is superior to the worst outcomes of the
alternatives. In other words, we seek to minimize our potential losses.
Häyry argues that the maximin rule should be applied to reproductive decision-making
because all lives carry a risk of being worse than having not been born at all, at least from the
perspective of the person living such a life. The risk may be small, but it is always a possibility.
Since we always have the option of refraining from procreation, we can always avoid this
disastrous outcome, and Häyry (2004) thinks that is precisely what we should do:
When people consider the possibility of having children, they confront the following
choice. They can decide not to have children, in which case nobody will be harmed or
benefited. The value of this choice, in terms of potential future individuals and their lives,
is zero. Alternatively, they can decide to have children, in which case a new individual
can be born. If this happens, the life of the future individual can be good or bad. The
eventual value of the decision, depending on the luck of the reproducers, can be positive,
zero, or negative. Since it is rational to avoid the possible negative outcome, when the
alternative is zero, it is rational to choose not to have children. (p. 377)
If we genuinely believe that the rational and morally appropriate course of action is to avoid the
worst possible outcome in this scenario, then Häyry is right: we should refrain from procreation.
But is the maximin rule really the appropriate decision procedure under these circumstances?
Rawls (1999) notes that the maximin rule “is not, in general, a suitable guide for choices
under uncertainty” (p. 133). He then specifies three conditions that must be met for an appeal to
the maximin rule to be appropriate:

84

1. The probabilities of the possible outcomes are unknowable, or there exists some
reason for discounting the estimated probabilities.
2. The person choosing cares very little about what she might gain above the minimum;
it is not worth taking a chance to try to gain a further advantage.
3. The worst possible outcome is one that the person making the choice cannot accept –
typically one that involves a grave risk.
In the case of procreation, only the third condition is met. We have strong reasons to believe that
certain children will have a very high probability of living a good life and that certain children
will not. Thus, we can form reasonable estimates about the probabilities of the possible
outcomes. Furthermore, although not-yet-existing children cannot choose to be born, it is clear
that they have something substantial to gain from taking the gamble – all their positive future
experiences. So, if they could make a choice, they might well opt for the gamble, even knowing
that there was a small probability of a disastrous outcome.34
These observations illustrate the general problem with Häyry’s reasoning: it is
excessively risk-averse. We do not apply maximin-style reasoning very often, even in scenarios
involving life-and-death risks. Many actions, including those as common as driving cars, impose
unlikely but severe risks on others. Moreover, in the realm of policy, we routinely avoid
choosing the safest policy. A 20 mile-per-hour speed limit on highways would surely prevent
many fatalities, but would anyone endorse such a policy? Even though the harms caused by
higher speed limits are severe, many believe that the benefits offered by the higher speed limits
34

Wasserman (2015, pp. 175-176), in his own critique of Häyry, also argues that the second condition is not met.
But Wasserman suggests that the first condition does seem to apply to the case of procreation (although he provides
no explanation for holding this view). While I admit that we may not be able to assign exact probabilities, we have
fairly strong empirical evidence that the vast majority of people regard their lives as worth living, and so I am not
skeptical about our ability to make probabilistic estimates, perhaps using ranges (e.g., 90-95%), to estimate the
likelihood that a person’s life will be worth living.
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outweigh the costs associated with the harms. The mere possibility of severe harm does not
provide a strong enough reason to categorically avoid an action that may result in that outcome,
and so we do not have an obligation to avoid all procreation. Out duty is to minimize the risk of
serious harm to our children once they are born, not to forego procreation altogether.

Contingent Anti-Natalist Arguments
The prior arguments for Antinatalism try to establish that procreation is always (or
virtually always) wrong. Some other arguments for broadly Antinatalist conclusions are not so
broad in scope and aim only to establish that Antinatalism is true for some particular group of
people, perhaps given a certain set of empirical conditions that happen to be met at present.
According to one such argument, there is a strong presumption to adopt a child rather than
procreating.
Daniel Friedrich (2013) argues that some people are under a moral obligation to adopt
children rather than procreating. His argument rests on an empirical observation and a moral
principle. The empirical observation is that, for those of us who want to be parents, “we can
protect parentless children from serious harm at little cost to ourselves by adopting them”
(Friedrich 2013, p. 25). The moral principle Friedrich proposes is the claim that we ought to
protect other people from serious harm when we can do so at little cost to ourselves. These two
claims, if true, generate the conclusion that some people, if they are going to undertake the task
of raising children, have a moral obligation to adopt children rather than creating their own.35
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Friedrich (2013, p. 28) acknowledges that many people do not want to raise children and that raising them is
extremely demanding. Hence, he concedes that those who do not wish to have children can be exempt from the duty
to adopt of those grounds. Thus, his argument applies only to those who intend to raise children.
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Friedrich bolsters his case by considering a wide array of objections to his position. Most
of these objections stem from false beliefs about adoptable children, such as claims that
adoptable children are more likely to be maladjusted or have behavioral problems or that parents
generally cannot love adopted children as much as their own biological children (Friedrich 2013,
pp. 28-31). Friedrich rightly points out that many would probably be more willing to adopt if
they were to abandon these false beliefs and give appropriate weight to the upsides associated
with adoption. But he also makes a concession that threatens to undermine the argument’s
significance. For certain people, the experiences associated with pregnancy and childbirth as well
as other aspects of having biological children (e.g., family resemblance) are significant parts of
their life plans, and this fact will not change even after full consideration of all the information
concerning the choice to adopt rather than procreate.36 Friedrich (2013) states that such people
are exempt from the duty to adopt (p. 31). While there is no way to know how many people
satisfy this criterion, this admission demonstrates that the duty to adopt may only be applicable
to a relatively narrow range of people. After all, biological and cultural factors incline people to
prefer procreation over adoption, and people often structure their lives using the creation of a
biological family as a focal point. Thus, a great many people may be beyond the scope of
Friedrich’s proposed duty to adopt.
A further limitation of Friedrich’s argument is that there are only so many children in the
world in need of adoption. Some have argued that the number of people seeking to adopt
children is significantly greater than the number of children who have been identified as
requiring adoption – in both the western and non-western world (e.g., Cantwell 2003;
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Rulli (2016) identifies the desire to experience pregnancy as the most plausible exception to the general duty to
adopt.
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Lammerant and Hofstetter 2007, pp. 4-5; Graff 2009). Friedrich (2013) notes that the number of
children identified as adoptable is likely much lower than the number of children who are
actually in need of adoption (p. 34). Many countries lack the resources or cultural environment
needed to maintain institutions that could properly identify children who need to be adopted. The
number of children who need to be adopted may actually be millions higher than the number
who are presently available for adoption. The problem, of course, is that until those children
actually are available for adoption, it is not possible for would-be parents to adopt them and
therefore implausible to suggest that these prospective parents have a duty to do so. This
limitation renders much of the purported duty to adopt moot, and furthermore, even if all these
children in need could be adopted, they constitute a very small percentage of the global
population. All these children could be adopted, and there would still be billions of people
worldwide who would have to procreate to become parents. So even if this purported duty to
adopt were optimally fulfilled, it would only reduce the number of procreating parents by a few
million. While that would represent some progress, it would not do much to slow global
population growth. An adequate response must do much more.
Beyond the practical limitations to Friedrich’s argument, there also looms a significant
theoretical worry. The moral principle that forms the foundation of his argument is the claim that
we ought to prevent people from serious harm when we can do so at little cost to ourselves. If
that principle is correct, one may wonder whether adoption is really the appropriate course of
action to take. Friedrich (2013) acknowledges that it typically costs more than $200,000 to raise
a child in the United States (p. 32).37 A recent estimate by the United States Department of
Agriculture concludes that a child born in the United States in 2015 will cost $233,610 to raise
37

He cites USDA (2010, p. 39) regarding this estimate.
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(Lino et al. 2017). The problem for Friedrich’s position is that a lot more harm will be prevented
by donating that money (or even just a significant portion of it) to cost-effective charities, such
as the Against Malaria Foundation or Schistosomiasis Control Initiative.38 Thus, one may
wonder why – at least for those who do not view children as an indispensable part of their life
plans – this principle of preventing harm does not entail that they should refrain from procreating
altogether when they could use the money saved to prevent a much greater quantity of harm.
This alternative argument has recently been developed at length by James Rachels (2014).
Rachels draws significantly on Peter Singer’s (1972, 2009) work on world hunger and
poverty. Singer (1972) defends the following moral principle: “If it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
importance, then we ought, morally, to do it” (p. 231). He also observes that there are millions of
people across the world who are suffering and dying because they do not have adequate food,
water, shelter or medical care. Suffering and death caused by a lack of food, water, shelter, and
medical care are undeniably bad, and many of us have the ability to prevent these harms from
occurring by donating to cost-effective charities. Moreover, these donations will often not
deprive us of anything important. Almost anyone living in the western world surely purchases
some luxuries that she could forego without any meaningful impact on her welfare. Thus, Singer
reasons that many of us are morally obligated to donate a significant portion of our income to
charities that will help prevent these harms.
Rachels’ views his argument as a variant of Singer’s that is designed to illuminate one of
its surprising implications: taking this duty to reduce suffering seriously requires that many of us
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These charities persistently rank near the top of GiveWell’s list of most cost-effective charities. See
http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities for their current list.
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refrain from procreating. Friedrich (2013) tries to avoid endorsing this position by arguing that
we have a duty to prevent suffering only when we can do so “at little cost to ourselves” (pp. 2526). He assumes that foregoing parenthood (both of biological and non-biological children)
would be very costly for most people but also holds that foregoing parenthood only of one’s
biological children will often not be as costly. While this position is perfectly coherent, if one
properly appreciates the moral weight of millions of people suffering and dying annually from
easily preventable circumstances, it becomes more difficult to maintain. A desire to raise a single
child, in terms of moral significance, does not remotely compare to the suffering and death that
could be prevented through $200,000 worth of donations to cost-effective charities. Can those
living in developed nations really justify spending so much on their own children when they
could save the lives of many other children who are on the brink of death elsewhere in the
world?39
Rachels’ argument is very powerful, and while it would be psychologically challenging
for most of us to live up to the standard that the argument requires (i.e., to prioritize the
prevention of suffering to this degree), such difficulty does not obviously remove the obligation.
Even if we were destined not to perfectly adhere to such an obligation, we could still have a duty
to strive for it, and we might well come close to meeting the standard if we really tried. Even so,
many feel that there must be a limit to what morality can reasonably demand of us and that this
kind of obligation surpasses the threshold of what morality can require. The relevant question is
why: if we cannot offer a good explanation, then this thought amounts to little more than
complaining that being moral is difficult.

39

The World Health Organization (2016) estimates that 5.9 million children under the age of 5 died in 2015 and that
over half these deaths could have been prevented with access to cheap, routine medical interventions.
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On my view, the limits to morality’s demandingness originate from two sources: our
limitations (both physical and psychological) as human beings and our desire to have a
flourishing human life. When morality requires that we do something that we are physically or
psychologically incapable of doing, then our limitations almost always release us from a duty to
perform the task. This idea is often represented as the phrase “ought” implies “can.” It captures
the observation that it is not reasonable to morally require people to do things that they are
incapable of doing. The other limitation on morality’s demands can be understood as follows:
when a moral imperative proves antithetical to one’s goal of living well, then sometimes that
moral imperative should no longer be regarded as a strict obligation. I say sometimes because our
life plans are often malleable enough to accommodate moral imperatives without undercutting
our goal of living well. Without this qualification, the claim could serve to justify moral apathy
in cases where it is not justified.
There is nothing physically impossible about refraining from procreation, except in
particularly dire circumstances.40 Fortunately, these cases are rather rare. The more common
challenge to a duty to refrain from procreation is likely psychological: not everyone may be
capable of resisting the psychological urge to procreate. Rachels (2014) acknowledges that it
may be permissible for such people to have children:
I don’t think it makes sense, either as social policy or as abstract philosophy, to hold
people accountable for choices that are psychologically forced on them (even if they
could physically do otherwise). For that reason, even though it would be regrettable for
such people to have children (because their $227,000 could be better spent), I would not
regard their decision to have children as immoral. Indeed, I’m not even sure I would
regard it as a decision. (p. 578)

40

These would be cases when a woman is a victim of an unwanted sexual encounter and prevented from taking any
actions that might prevent pregnancy or end the pregnancy before birth.
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This exception is reasonable, but it likely does not apply to most people. Many of the
motivations that people have for wanting children do not involve a desperate psychological need
for them. It might be a preference, of course, but a mere preference is not sufficient to ground the
claim that one is psychologically incapable of doing otherwise. Ultimately, “ought” implies
“can” does ground some exceptions to this purported duty to refrain from procreation, but it will
not get most of us off the moral hook.
If an imperative to procreate is objectionable because it is too demanding, then the
problem will usually be that it would impede the goal of living well. Bernard Williams (1973), in
his critique of utilitarianism, connects this limitation to an agent’s integrity. He argues that
utilitarianism is objectionable because any commitment an agent has must be abandoned as soon
as it becomes inconsistent with maximizing utility. Williams (1973) imagines a person being
required to abandon central life projects to fulfill the obligation to maximize utility and states the
following:
It is absurd to demand that such a man, when the sums come in from the utility network
which the projects of others have in part determined, that he should just step aside from
his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation
requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action
in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone’s
projects, including his own, and an output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the
extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions
which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is
thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity. (pp. 116-117, original emphasis)
Williams might exaggerate when he suggests that utilitarianism assaults an agent’s integrity, but
the underlying point remains quite strong. We often structure our lives around certain personal
and professional pursuits, and abandoning them would seem inconsistent with our character and
opposed to our long-term life goals. When moral imperatives force us to abandon the individual
pursuits that serve as the central source of our lives’ meaningfulness, sometime those imperatives
ought to be rejected.
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Of course, the key question is whether a duty to refrain from procreation opposes a
person’s life plans in such a significant way. For many people, it is doubtful that a duty to refrain
from procreation would have such a profound impact. About 40% of pregnancies worldwide are
unintended (Sedgh, Singh, and Hussain 2014).41 It is a safe bet that some of these pregnancies
were not an essential part of the parents’ life plans if they were unintentional, although those
who identified the pregnancy as merely mistimed may have elected to have a child at some point
later.
Additionally, many people who do have children intentionally do not do so because it is
an indispensable part of their life plans. Other factors, such as social pressures and expectations
or the desire to continue one’s family line, often play a role. Moreover, some decide to have
children based on the belief that doing so will make them happier – a belief that is not consistent
with the empirical evidence about the effects of having children. In fact, much of the social
scientific research on happiness suggests that having children decreases happiness (e.g., Alesina,
Di Tella, and MacCulloch 2004; Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Twenge, Campbell,
and Foster 2003; Gilbert 2007, pp. 242-244; Powdthavee 2008; Hansen 2012; Deaton and Stone
2014; Margolis and Myrskylä 2015).42 Having children, on average, appears to have an adverse
effect on one’s marital satisfaction, life satisfaction, and general reported happiness.43 Having a
child may increase the perceived meaningfulness of one’s life even if it diminishes one’s wellbeing (Baumeister et al. 2013), but the key point is that people who believe having children will,
on the whole, make their lives better are often mistaken.
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In some countries, the rate is higher. In the United States, for example, 45-50% of pregnancies are unplanned
(Finer and Zolna 2016).
42
In this context, happiness typically refers to a person’s subjective well-being.
43
There is some variability depending on where one lives. In most industrialized countries, having children seems to
have a pronounced negative effect on parents’ well-being, but in others (e.g., Portugal, Hungary), the effect appears
to be positive (Glass, Simon, and Andersson 2016).
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This last observation strikes many as counterintuitive, but the empirical evidence is
overwhelming. There are also plausible error theories for why we would hold these beliefs even
if they are false. Those who hold them are obviously more likely to reproduce, and so there may
be an evolutionary explanation for why this belief persists over time. Furthermore , social and
cultural expectations give us plenty of reasons to endorse these beliefs, and because people must
invest so much into raising children, coming to believe that doing so was not worth it would
create overwhelming cognitive dissonance.44 So parents have strong motivations to affirm the
value of having children, even if it does not reflect what social scientific research suggests.
Nevertheless, we must recognize that having children is an extremely strong desire for
many people. For those who genuinely view rearing biological children as a central aspect of
their life plans and base this belief on a reasonable appraisal of the research on having children, I
think it is unreasonable to demand that they remain childless, even if the money required to raise
their children would do more good in the world if spent elsewhere.45 But if we are being honest,
not many people meet this condition. How many people think so carefully and reflectively about
the likely effects of their having a first (or second or third) child? Some do, but many do not. So
while some may be able to justify their procreative activities, many cannot, and so the upshot of
Rachels’ argument is that many people who reproduce are unjustified in doing so – independent
of concerns about overpopulation.
What can we conclude about these contingent Antinatalist arguments? In broad terms,
none of them are successful in establishing a sweeping prohibition on procreation. Nonetheless,
44

Cognitive dissonance is a well-established psychological phenomenon in which the recognition of inconsistent
beliefs or attitudes creates a feeling of discomfort. Typically, this discomfort motivates individuals to resolve the
inconsistency. For the classic psychological studies on cognitive dissonance, see Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and
Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter (1964).
45
Rieder (2015) makes a similar point in his discussion of the “gestational project” that women often view as a
central life project (pp. 301-302).
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they do demonstrate that some people, particularly those who do not view procreation as a vital
part of their life plans and who have significant financial resources at their disposal, have
powerful moral reasons to refrain from procreation and either adopt a child instead (if
parenthood of some form is essential to their life plans) or use some of the time and money saved
by not raising children to help others in need.

The Other End of the Spectrum
As one can gather from this survey, there are many philosophical arguments that can be
offered to support some version of Antinatalism. I have argued that they are all unconvincing, at
least insofar as they attempt to establish a near universal duty not to procreate. This conclusion
might comfort people on the opposite end of the spectrum – those who believe that procreation is
not only permissible but also a fundamental right that all people should be able to exercise freely.
Given the widespread practice of procreating, positions in favor of procreative freedom are likely
to be more popular than any version of Antinatalism. In this section, I briefly appraise
Procreative Liberty – the view that all people have a right to procreate as much as they wish.
Those who hold Procreative Liberty usually regard the choice to procreate as a crucial
and indispensable freedom. John Robertson (1994) captures this idea nicely, noting that the
experience of procreation is often central people’s individual identity, a source of
meaningfulness, a comfort in the face of death, and an expression of a couple’s love for each
other (p. 24). Because of the importance of procreation to so many people, Robertson (1994)
states that our ethical outlook should “recognize a presumption in favor of most personal
reproductive choices” (p. 24). That presumption can easily be reflected in a right to reproduce. If
such a right exists, then one might think that procreative choices are immune from moral
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criticisms and that there exists a strong imperative not to impose any constraints on procreative
behavior.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the right to procreate really is a fundamental
and essential right. Does it follow from this claim that all people are permitted to procreate as
much as they wish? Surely, it does not. Having the right to do something does not entail that
doing it is morally right. I have a right to speak freely, but I can nevertheless speak in ways that
are morally wrong. I could make disparaging remarks about minorities or mock my colleagues in
an effort to humiliate them. Doing so would (usually) be wrong, even if I have the right to say
such things. I may have the right to view sexually explicit content, but it may be morally wrong
to do so because such material often objectifies women and reinforces harmful views of sexual
interactions and personal relationships. I may have the right to vote, but I can still act wrongly
when I vote (e.g., if I vote in favor of immoral policies, if I make no effort to become informed
about what I am voting for).46 Having the right to procreate does not establish that one ought to
procreate or that one’s doing so is always morally permissible.
Additionally, it is implausible to think that the right to procreate is limitless in scope
because no rights are limitless in scope. Everyone has the right to life, but we recognize that we
may permissibly violate this right when, for instance, a person threatens the lives of innocent
others. Everyone has a right to bodily autonomy, but we recognize that this right does not permit
me to physically assault someone else. Rights are constrained when exercising them inflicts harm
on other people or conflicts with the rights of those other people.47 Procreation can clearly harm
other people. As emphasized in the discussion of Antinatalism, procreating carries a risk of
46

In his recent book on the ethics of voting, Brennan (2011) makes the same point (pp. 5-6).
My exercising my right to control my body by assaulting another person would, in addition to causing them harm,
violate the other person’s right to personal security.
47
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severe harm to the child who is born. Moreover, since people consume resources to survive and
because some of this consumption is harmful to present and future people, creating more people
can and (as I will argue in the next chapter) often does harm others. Both these considerations
provide grounds for restricting procreation under various circumstances.
Conly (2016) also persuasively argues that our right to have a child can only be
interpreted as granting us the right to have one child. Rights must correspond to fundamental
interests that we have, and the fundamental interests that are fulfilled by procreating can be
adequately fulfilled by having just one child.48 If we have an interest in having a biological child,
that interest can be fulfilled by having a single child. One child is enough to continue genetic
lineage, after all. If we have an interest in having a family, that interest can be fulfilled by having
a single child. Having a large family might require additional procreation, but the right to
procreate does not entail having a right to “the family that fulfills one’s dreams” (Conly 2016, p.
51). We do not have a right to a family with four children any more than we have a right to a
child who will become a professional athlete. Additionally, the notion that a larger family is
better than a smaller family is dubious, and the central goods associated with family life do not
require the participation of several biological children.49 The right to procreate could also track
an interest in being regarded by others as equally worthy of reproducing, but equal standing can
be achieved if the constraints are enforced on everyone equally – for instance, if everyone is
allowed to have one child.50
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In fact, some of these interests – such as becoming a parent – can be satisfied through adoption and so do not
require procreating at all.
49
Adoption also presents an option for increasing family size without procreating.
50
In chapter 6, I will actually argue that the constraints imposed on procreation in response to population growth
ought not be enforced equally due to considerations of fairness, but the point here is that there is nothing inherent in
the concept of restricting procreation that runs afoul of our interest in having equal standing with others.
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The right to procreate without restriction might also be derived from a broader right to
bodily autonomy, but that strategy is even less promising than the strategies suggested above.
The right to bodily autonomy only allows us to exercise this freedom when doing so does not
harm others, and procreation can harm others – both the person born and others affected by that
person’s use of resources – under a wide variety of circumstances. Appealing to a right of bodily
autonomy will therefore be insufficient to justify procreation in cases where it causes harm. We
may recognize a right to procreate, but this right is certainly not unlimited in its scope, and it
plausibly extends only to a right to have one biological child.
To counter this point, one might argue that procreative acts do not cause harm in the way
relevant to limiting our rights. Consider Travis Rieder’s (2016a) remarks in his review of
Conly’s One Child:
Conly is of course correct that having a right to bodily autonomy doesn’t mean that one
can do whatever she likes with her body. Although I have a right to swing my arm, I do
not have a right to swing my arm where your face is located. However, this sort of
argument is problematic in the context of overpopulation… my procreating doesn’t harm
anyone through its contribution to overpopulation. Precisely as she notes, environmental
problems like climate change make traditional moral reasoning hard, because they
involve massively complex collective action, and it just doesn’t seem true that my taking
almost any single action harms anyone. In a population of 7.3 billion people, any number
of people that I can add to the population makes virtually no difference—the resources
consumed by my child, against the earth’s available resources, are infinitesimal (pp. 3031, original emphasis).
Rieder does not think that procreative acts cause harm in the way that would justify restricting a
person’s rights because one more child born has such a miniscule impact on the Earth in the

98

grand scheme of things. Conly does not offer a substantive response to this concern,51 but there
appear to be two strategies she could pursue to rebut this criticism.
First, she might deny Rieder’s claims about harm. One way of calculating the harm
caused by collective action is to determine one’s individual contribution, determine the total
collective harm caused, and then calculate the individual harm that one is responsible for by
multiplying the portion of one’s individual contribution (which will be some value between 0
and 1) by the total harm caused. So if some collective activity caused the deaths of 100 people,
and my contribution to this activity was 1/100th of the total, then I would be responsible for the
harm of 1 person dying. This strategy has been employed by some philosophers to assess harm in
cases of collective action (e.g., Nolt 2011b), but not everyone agrees that harm should be
understood in this manner when the individual actions are innocuous in isolation. Fortunately,
Conly has an alternative strategy available.
One plausible constraint on fundamental rights is that the exercise of these rights cannot
be incompatible with respecting the fundamental rights of other people. In other words,
fundamental rights impose a type of constraint on other fundamental rights. In a very basic case,
a person’s right to personal security places a constraint on my right to bodily autonomy: except
in unusual circumstances, I cannot assault another person. The case with population is more
complicated, but the underlying principle is no different. The collective exercise of an unlimited
right to procreate will cause the rights of others – both in the present and future – to be violated,
and the rights violated will be among the most critical rights they have: the right to life, the right
to health, and the right the means of subsistence (Caney 2010b). These are rights that must be
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She acknowledges that the picture of harm is more complicated in the case of climate change than more typical
circumstances (Conly 2016, p. 93), but as Rieder (2016a, p. 31) says, she does not seem to properly appreciate the
significance of this observation.
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fulfilled just to ensure a person’s physical survival; a right to procreate is important, but it is not
that important, so these other rights should take priority over the right to procreate when they
come into conflict. Thus, the right to procreate cannot be understood as a right to unlimited
procreation: it is limited by the extent to which its collective exercise affects the ability of others
to have their basic rights respected.
In the past, there was often no danger of undermining others’ rights by procreating
excessively: in fact, for the vast majority of human history, we needed to be rather prolific in our
procreation just to ensure the continuation of our species. But our circumstances have changed,
and so our limits on the right to procreate must change as well. Does this mean that our right to
procreate should be understood as allowing us to have only one child under present conditions?
Conly (2016) believes that it does (pp. 217-220). As I will discuss in chapter 6, I am not sure
such an extreme position is justified. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that the only right that is
guaranteed by a right to procreate is a right to have one child. Whether we have a right to have
more children or not will vary depending on our circumstances.52

Where We Stand
In this chapter, I have examined two deeply opposing views on the ethics of procreation:
Antinatalism and Procreative Liberty. While I have argued that neither position is correct, the
swath of arguments that attempt to support Antinatalism reveal something significant about our
procreative acts: they are much more morally problematic than people usually appreciate. There
are powerful moral reasons that count against having children, and often people procreate
without taking these reasons into account. In these cases, the decision to procreate will often lack
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For further discussion of the right to procreate, see Overall (2012, ch. 2) and Conly (2016, ch. 2-3).
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moral justification, given the risk of harm to the child born and the arguments in favor of either
adopting a child or remaining childless.
We are left with a fairly surprising conclusion: procreation is permissible but not nearly
as often as most believe. The presumption in procreative decisions would seem to be that we
ought not procreate and that doing so permissibly requires a careful examination of the effects of
our procreation in comparison to the effects of other actions – namely remaining childless and
pursuing adoption. This outlook runs counter to common beliefs that procreation is almost
always permissible and something that should typically be praised, but it also reflects the
conclusion that many recent authors have reached on the subject (e.g., Overall 2012, Wasserman
2015, Weinberg 2016). The practice of human reproduction is fraught with moral peril, and as a
result, we must conclude that ordinary moral beliefs about the ethics of procreation are deeply
mistaken.
As I argued in the prior section, one of the major constraints on the right to procreate
originates from the harms that procreation can cause. Thus, to understand exactly what
constraints on procreation might be justified, we must consider just how significant the harms
caused by population growth really are. That is the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: HOW BAD IS THE POPULATION PROBLEM?
We have nearly seven and a half billion people on Earth, and that number keeps rising.
To determine the moral significance of this fact, we have to assess its effects. Population growth
is not necessarily a problem in isolation: it is not as if one additional person on the planet
automatically means that someone else in the world must live a worse life. The real significance
of population growth lies in its status as a multiplier of other bad things (Ryerson 2010). A
growing population exacerbates many problems we are already struggling to deal with. To
determine just how significant the population problem is, we have to examine the problems to
which population growth contributes. This chapter is a survey of those problems, although I
emphasize climate change and biodiversity loss more than the others.
Nevertheless, before focusing on these specific threats, we should begin with some
general observations. The Earth has finite resources: there is only so much water, so much
farmable land, and so much physical space that we can inhabit. Technological advancement may
improve our ability to use these resources more efficiently, but there is nevertheless a limit on
how far they can be stretched. Some have suggested that the long-term limit for the global
population at a sustainable level is about two billion (Pimentel et al. 2010), which would suggest
that the global population is already well beyond its sustainable carrying capacity. Such an
estimate is unlikely to be accurate, however, because too many variables can alter what the
Earth’s carrying capacity. Technological improvements, especially in agriculture, may increase
the Earth’s carrying capacity while strains on available resources, such as soil erosion (Pimentel
2006) or overfishing (UN Food and Agricultural Organization 2016), decrease it. Perhaps this
explains why Joel Cohen (1995) never concretely answers the titular question of his How Many
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People Can the Earth Support? While the Earth’s carrying capacity is finite, it is also constantly
shifting. There is no precise, immutable number of people that the Earth can support.
Even without a firm carrying capacity, it is still easy to identify ways in which humanity
is currently pushing ecological limits. While we are still currently able to produce enough food
globally to feed everyone (if this food were distributed more equitably), a recent estimate from
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (2006) suggests that the necessary supply of food
will increase dramatically – by up to 70% by 2050.1 Additionally, under our current
circumstances, it is foolish to imagine a world with an ideal distribution of food: the regional
differences in population size and farmable land, especially when combined with national
differences in political and economic circumstances, render an equitable distribution of food an
impractical fantasy. There are almost 800 million people in the world who are undernourished
(UN Food and Agricultural Organization 2015), and a population increase will only make it
more difficult to provide the food that they need.
Water shortages are another serious concern. Groundwater plays a crucial role in
irrigating crops, providing water to those who need it, and maintaining the health of local
ecosystems (Giordano 2009, Siebert et al. 2010). Groundwater is a renewable resource, but it can
still be depleted when our rate of consumption exceeds the rate at which it replenishes. Our
current practices are depleting groundwater at 3.5 times the sustainable rate, leaving 1.7 billion
people living in areas where their groundwater resources or the ecosystems that depend on
groundwater (or both) are threatened (Gleeson et al. 2012). A greater population will make this
overconsumption of groundwater even more difficult to reverse.
1

A recent update to this report offered little change in these estimates, although the authors do express a bit more
pessimism in the ability to meet the global demand for food in the future, citing an increased population projection
for developing countries as a significant reason why (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2016, p. 37).
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Shortage of resources often leads to conflicts between or within nations, and we know all
too well that this can result in war. Water shortage played a crucial role in triggering the recent
civil war in Syria (Gleick 2014). A lack of available land and inequity in land distribution
contributed significantly to the civil war that began in Rwanda in 1994 (André and Platteau
1998). As population grows, we can expect conflicts of this sort to arise more frequently.2
These general concerns may well be enough to make us mindful of our growing
population, but the biggest problems to which population growth contributes are climate change
and biodiversity loss. Each of those problems warrants a more thorough description.

Climate Change
The changes in global climate that are occurring in the 21st century are largely the result
of people emitting greenhouse gases (GHGs) like carbon dioxide, methane, ozone, and nitrous
oxide. These gases absorb infrared radiation from sunlight, thereby trapping it in the atmosphere
for a period of time. During the last two centuries, increased emissions of GHGs have caused the
average global temperature to rise significantly. Average global surface temperature increased
from 1880-2012 by about 0.85°C (IPCC 2014b, p. 2).3 That may not sound like a significant
increase, but the average global temperature during the most recent ice age was only 5°C lower
that the average global preindustrial temperature. Relatively small changes in global temperature
can have enormous impacts.
The majority of the increase in global average temperature is a result of our emissions of
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Pre-industrial levels of carbon dioxide were about 275 parts
2

Beyond the broad effects surveyed here, it is worth noting that some of the adverse effects of population growth
are more localized. For example, increasing population often leads to overcrowding in urban areas, which can have a
variety of negative effects on human health (Gray 2001).
3
Specifically, there is a 90% likelihood of the average warming having a value of between 0.65 and 1.06 °C with
0.85°C being the most likely value.

104

per million (ppm) by volume in the atmosphere. We have now surpassed 400 ppm of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere (Kahn 2016).4 The effects of climate change on other human beings
are significant and widespread. I will highlight some of the major effects, all of which are
summarized in recent reports from the IPCC (2014a, 2014b).
Perhaps the most powerful way to understand the harm of climate change is to consider
the number of deaths it will cause. One study from the World Health Organization (2005)
concludes that climate change may have been responsible for at least 150,000 deaths in 2003.
One of their later reports (World Health Organization 2009) reaches a similar conclusion: by
2004, the annual global death toll from climate change had reached 140,000 people. Figures
from the Global Humanitarian Forum (2009) suggest that these estimates are too low: their
research estimates that 300,000 people die from climate change annually with the majority of
those deaths occurring in developing nations. More recent estimates are even bleaker. DARA
(2012) suggests that the annual death toll from climate change is about 400,000. Their research,
like the study conducted by the Global Humanitarian Forum, indicates that most of those deaths
take place (and will continue to take place) in developing nations. They also project that the
annual death toll from climate change could reach 700,000 by 2030.5 An even more recent study
estimates 529,000 annual deaths being caused by climate change due to its effects on agriculture
and food security (Springmann et al. 2016).

4

Current levels of CO2, gathered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, are accessible through
NASA’s website at https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/.
5
The World Health Organization (2014) estimates 250,000 annual deaths in 2030-2050 from climate change, but
their estimate is not comprehensive because it does not account for certain “major pathways of potential health
impact, such as the effects of economic damage, major heatwave events, river flooding and water scarcity” (p. 1).
An additional survey on the effects of climate change on human health can be found in Kim, Kabir, and Jahan
(2014).
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Obviously, the particular numbers of these annual death tolls vary, but two facts are clear.
First, on any plausible estimate, hundreds of thousands of people are already dying annually
from climate change. Second, the number of annual deaths from climate change will almost
surely increase as the effects of climate change become more severe. Even without increasing the
rates of climate-change related deaths, there will still be tens of millions of deaths caused by
climate change this century, a point highlighted by John Broome (2012, p. 33).
Another crucial feature of climate change is its long-lasting nature. The temperature
increase resulting from climate change will, unless we perform extraordinary feats of
geoengineering, persist for tens of thousands of years, if not longer (Archer et al. 2009). Zeebe
(2013) reaches a similar, though more specific, estimate: according to his models, changes to
surface temperatures will persist for 23,000 to 165,000 years. If we tie this observation with the
estimate death tolls caused by climate change each year, we immediately reach a stark
conclusion: climate change may lead to billions of deaths over the next millennium, depending
on its severity and the extent to which we are able to adapt.6
We also cannot overlook the fact that many affected by climate change will not die but
will nevertheless suffer significantly. Climate change will increase the prevalence of severe
weather events, such as droughts, heatwaves, and hurricanes. Increased surface temperatures will
make agriculture more difficult in certain parts of the world, and ocean acidification will reduce
the food productivity of the oceans (IAP 2009). Temperature increases will alter and expand the
range in which many insects can survive, causing more people to become vulnerable to various
diseases they carry. These effects can cause death, of course, but more often they result in
6

Suppose that the average annual deaths caused by climate change for the next 1000 years is 200,000 – a relatively
low estimate given the studies I have cited. This would still translate to 2 billion deaths (1000 × 200,000) caused by
climate change over the next millennium.
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suffering. People survive but have their quality of life reduced, often severely – at least in the
case of dehydration, malnourishment, and sickness. Although it is difficult to estimate the
number of people who will suffer significantly (but not fatally) from climate change with
precision, the widespread distribution of its effects and their severity indicate that these numbers
are massive – in all likelihood at least comparable to the number of annual deaths caused by
climate change.
Additionally, military leaders are also concerned about climate change threatening
national security by creating mass migrations (Carrington 2016). Droughts and other resource
shortages caused by heat waves and other severe weather events may destabilize regions and lead
to war. Sea level rise will displace millions of people around the world as island nations
disappear into the ocean and coastlines creep further inland.7 The result is that millions of people
will be displaced, many of whom will seek relocation to other countries. In this manner, climate
change may cause a refugee crisis that is unprecedented in scope and magnitude.
Finally, climate change increases the rate of species extinctions (Thomas et al. 2004). As
ocean and surface temperatures increase, species often become unable to survive in the niches
that they inhabit. They migrate toward the poles or to higher elevations when possible, but many
species are simply unable to adapt to their rapidly changing environments and go extinct. Of
course, species extinctions occur from more than just climate change, and their decline is so
significant that the topic warrants its own separate treatment.

7

Some of these effects have already been observed. Five of the Solomon Islands vanished beneath the sea between
1947 and 2014, and six other islands in this area are experiencing severe shoreline recession (Albert et al. 2016). We
have also begun seeing cities along the U.S. coastline flood as a result of climate change (Gillis 2016).
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Biodiversity Loss
As I use the term, “biodiversity” refers to global species diversity. Thus, biodiversity loss
refers to decrease in global species diversity caused by human action. Human-caused
biodiversity loss has been occurring for some time, and climate change is not its only cause
(Barnosky et al. 2011). But while we can say conclusively that biodiversity is in decline, it is
challenging to determine just how steep the decline is (Wilson 2016, ch. 3). The main difficulty
lies in determining what the pre-human rate of extinction is – that is, the rate at which species
would go extinct if not for the impact of human beings. Without an accurate estimate of that rate,
we cannot know how much our actions are increasing the rate at which extinctions would
ordinarily occur. Obtaining accurate numbers on how many species exist and how many are
being lost is similarly difficult. New species are discovered each year, and many extinctions
likely go unnoticed because the species that go extinct are unknown to us. Even so, the estimates
we have are truly disheartening. Excluding bacteria, there are an estimated 8.7 million species on
Earth (Mora et al. 2011). While conservation biologists previously estimated the pre-human
extinction rate at about 1 species per million per year, recent studies suggest that this figure is
actually about 0.1 species per million per year (Pimm et al. 2014, De Vos et al. 2015). That
means that the current estimate rate of species extinctions – roughly 100 per million per year – is
an astonishing 1000 times the rate at which extinctions would occur without the impact of human
actions!
The main contributors to biodiversity loss are captured in the acronym HIPPO (Wilson
2016, pp. 57-58): habitat destruction, invasive species, pollution, population growth, and
overhunting (including overfishing). While population growth is listed as its own factor, it also
contributes to all of the other items of this list. More people means a greater need for space and
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resources, and this often leads to habitat destruction when land is cleared for housing or farming.
More people means a greater need for food, which can cause regional overfishing as demand for
fish increases. More people means more traveling and a greater need to transport goods across
borders. Non-native species often get transported to new environments unintentionally, and
sometimes, they can eliminate native species by overtaking their ecological niche.8
Naturally, the rapid loss of biodiversity has a lot of conservation biologists concerned.
Biodiversity loss affects human beings in many ways. Perhaps most significantly, human beings
are affected by reductions in biodiversity by being deprived of the ecosystem services that
biodiversity enables. Ecosystem services refer to the “properties of ecosystems that either
directly or indirectly benefit human endeavors, such as maintaining hydrologic cycles, regulating
climate, cleansing air and water, maintaining atmospheric composition, pollination, soil genesis,
and storing and cycling of nutrients” (Hooper et al. 2005, p. 7). These services would be costly to
provide by alternative means (assuming that it was even feasible to do so), and these services
provide the basic conditions necessary for human beings to survive. The loss of them would not
be a trivial matter.
Biodiversity is also a source of much joy for people, whether it stems from aesthetic
appreciation of exotic species (such as the peacock) or curious fascination with the most bizarre
ones (such as the blob fish). Alan Carter (2010) even argues that the best reason to preserve
biodiversity is rooted in aesthetics and that the loss of a species to the loss of an entire genre of
music or film (pp. 73-75).9 Certainly, there are many species that can be considered beautiful,

8

Further details on the ways in which overpopulation contributes to biodiversity loss can be found in Foreman
(2014, ch. 4).
9
Darrel Moellendorf (2014) also argues that a central aspect of biodiversity’s value for people is its aesthetic value
(ch. 2).
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such as the majestic bald eagle or the graceful antelope, but even species that strike us as outright
hideous, such as the Amazonian giant centipede, can have robust aesthetic value. After all, wellmade horror films have aesthetic value even if their tone, imagery, and subject matter are far
from beautiful. Aesthetic value is not limited to beauty alone.
Biodiversity is also a bountiful source of knowledge. E. O. Wilson (1992) describes
biodiversity as “The Great Encyclopedia of Life” – a relatively untapped font of knowledge that
“would occupy 60 meters of library shelf per million species” even if each species occupied only
a page in the volume (p. 151). Our scientific understanding of the nonhuman world is vastly
incomplete, and the ability to study other life forms can offer crucial insights into how nonhuman
life forms interact. Beyond fulfilling the scientific interests of many people, these discoveries can
also give us insight into ways in which we might improve the welfare of human beings. For
example, biodiversity provides a source biologically active compounds that can aid the
development of medicines crucial for promoting human health (Butkus 2015).
Many further reasons for valuing biodiversity could be offered.10 Nevertheless, not
everyone really believes that biodiversity loss is important or that its loss is particularly bad. Don
Maier (2012) offers a robust critique of the value of biodiversity in which he surveys 12 different
reasons that one might value biodiversity and argues that none any of them can sufficiently
ground biodiversity’s value. His strategy is to propose a particular reason as the core of
biodiversity’s value and then raise counterexamples to this proposal. In the case of ecosystem
services, for instance, Maier (2012) notes that the discussion of these services often omits
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For example, biodiversity may have value because of its ability to transform our values and alter our preferences
(Norton 1987, Sarkar 2005) or because of its maintenance is necessary to secure future people’s autonomy
(Zwarthoed 2016). Additionally, Rolston (1988, ch. 1) lists fourteen different reasons for why human beings
typically value nature, many of which can apply to why we should value biodiversity.
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discussion of ecosystem disservices (p. 167) and proceeds to list many examples of ways in
which the services that biodiversity provides are not always so beneficial. When discussing the
claim that biodiversity is a source of valuable medicines and pharmaceuticals, Maier (2012) is
quick to mention that only a small portion of all the existing species actually provide this benefit
(pp. 196-206) and that biodiversity can often increase the incidence of disease (pp. 207-220).
Once he finishes surveying one of these purported reasons to value biodiversity, he concludes
that it cannot be the core of biodiversity’s value and moves onto the next proposal. Once he has
exhausted all possible proposals, he concludes that biodiversity must not be particularly valuable.
Defenders of biodiversity’s value could respond to Maier in several ways. They may
point out that Maier does not address nearly all the reasons on offer for thinking biodiversity is
valuable. In other places, they may simply deny the plausibility of his arguments. For example,
his reasons for thinking that biodiversity’s value cannot be primarily epistemic is that there
would be much to learn “from a vastly changed biological world that contained a significantly
different set of species with significantly different population sizes (abundances)” and that “the
very processes involved in bringing about such an altered world…would be a rich source of
knowledge that could not be tapped except by observing them unfold” (Maier 2012, p. 235).
Certainly, there might be some knowledge to gain from such events, but it is difficult to believe
that this knowledge would actually be comparable to what we can learn by studying the vast
array of different species around the world, especially since so many of them have yet to even be
discovered. It is also doubtful that the knowledge obtained by facilitating a mass extinction
would be as instrumentally valuable as greater knowledge of currently existing species. Studying
currently extant species could yield new insight into ways that these species contribute (or could
contribute) to human flourishing. Studying their demise might give us similar insight, but then
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the species would be gone and unable to make those contributions: the instrumental value of this
knowledge would be greatly diminished or lost entirely.
I cannot here survey every argument that Maier makes, but I will highlight a flaw that
undermines his general argumentative strategy. The central problem is that Maier’s overall
argument is invalid. He assumes that because none of the individual reasons he considers can be
the core of biodiversity’s value, it is not valuable. But that does not follow. Suppose we ask the
question, “What makes love valuable?” We might answer initially that love makes people happy,
and this claim is often true: many people report being their happiest when they are deeply in
love. But love can also be a source of great sorrow when our loved one suffers, dies, or leaves us.
Thus, the core value of love cannot just be that it makes us happier. Perhaps we think love is a
means of cultivating virtues like sympathy, empathy, and kindness. Certainly, it is not hard to see
why loving someone will acquaint a person with these virtues, and yet, love can also serve as
motivation for many despicable deeds when concern for one’s beloved trumps other moral
considerations. Thus, the core of love’s value cannot be in the cultivation of moral virtue.
Perhaps the phenomenon of loving someone is unique and provides special epistemic insights
into human nature. There is little doubt that deeply loving someone profoundly changes one’s
outlook on the world, but simultaneously, we pursue love even after we have experienced it
many times. There is also much we can learn from the loss of love. The unique knowledge that
love often provides cannot be the core of its value.
We could repeat this process with love many more times without identifying any central
reason why love is valuable. But does it follow from this observation that love has no value?
Surely it does not: aside from the most nihilistic, we all agree that love is valuable. What this
exercise shows is that love has many sources of value and that what makes it valuable in a
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particular context can vary. An analogous explanation of biodiversity’s value is consistent with
accepting all Maier’s criticisms of particular reasons that biodiversity is valuable.
Not all valuable things in the world have a single source of all their value. Beyond love,
we might add items like friendship, beauty, moral virtue, wilderness, and sex. The value of
biodiversity can be understood in the same way. Certainly, in some particular cases, its value will
not originate in ecosystem services or its means for creating new medicines. Some species may
not ultimately prove to be treasure troves of knowledge or to add great aesthetic value to the
world. But how often is it going to be the case that none of the many reasons for thinking that
biodiversity is valuable will apply? How frequently could we run through every single item on
the list and check them all as being inapplicable? Much as love rarely fails to add something of
great value to our lives, biodiversity rarely fails to contribute something of great value to the
world. Thus, Maier’s skepticism about the value of biodiversity is unwarranted.
For our purposes, we should also highlight one of the most significant reasons that people
should care about biodiversity: its elimination can lead to ecosystem collapse. Maier may be
skeptical about the relationship between biodiversity and the maintenance of ecosystem services,
but robust meta-analyses demonstrate a general consensus that biodiversity correlates positively
with ecosystem functioning (Balvanera et al. 2006, Cardinale et al. 2012). What this means is
that greater biodiversity is generally associated with greater ecosystem functioning and lower
biodiversity is generally associated with poorer ecosystem functioning. The relations between
species and the role that each plays in maintaining ecosystem functioning will vary significantly
across different ecosystems, but a substantial decrease in the number of species in an ecosystem
is very likely to have an adverse effect on ecosystem functioning. We are on pace to eliminate
between one-quarter and two-thirds of all currently existing species (Myers 1993, Myers and

113

Knoll 2001), and there is mounting evidence that we have initiated the world’s sixth mass
extinction event (Ceballos et al. 2015).
Since the loss of species will be so substantial, it is reasonable to be worried about the
destruction of ecosystems and the elimination of the ecosystem services that they provide. This is
one of the main reasons why E. O. Wilson (2016) states, “The ongoing mass extinction of
species, and with it the extinction of genes and ecosystems, ranks with pandemics, world war,
and climate change as among the deadliest threats that humanity has imposed on itself” (Wilson
2016, p. 187). The perceived gravity of the problem is why Wilson advocates setting aside half
the Earth for the preservation of wildlife: an extreme problem sometimes calls for an extreme
solution. Paul Watson (2012), comparing Earth to a spaceship, describes the problem as follows:
Biodiversity destruction is the single greatest threat to human survival on this planet
because it weakens and removes our custodians, the species that make it possible for us to
be the passengers. What we are in effect doing is eroding the immune system of the
planet, compromising the functioning of Earth’s life-support system. We have become
like a deadly autoimmune disease to Earth, killing the essential crewmembers as we
overload our spaceship with human passengers. (p. 132)
If biodiversity loss continues at its current rates, the impact on humanity could be quite deadly.
Wilson and Watson’s grave language may strike some as hyperbolic. Given humanity’s
resourcefulness and our prevalence across the globe, it seems doubtful that biodiversity loss
could lead to our own extinction. What is more likely is that massive biodiversity loss will
manifest in a variety of less extreme effects: economic costs from ecosystem services that
disappear, a reduction in the availability of pharmaceuticals, greater difficulties providing vital
resources in certain regions, the permanent loss of the knowledge and beauty associated with
particular species, and so on. In more practical terms, these effects will not lead to our extinction
but to people living in a bleaker world – one where resources are scarcer and our numbers are
higher. Some will die as a result, and many more will suffer. These impacts are significant
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enough to demand our attention even if the long-term continuation of our species is not in
jeopardy.

What the Evidence Suggests
Human beings are approaching the limits of what the planet can sustain. We face the
prospect of regional food and water shortages, significant threats to human health, widespread
and rapid species extinctions, the displacement of hundreds of millions of people, and a drastic
rise in the risk of war. These developing problems and possibility that they could soon get worse
make the future look grim, even on the limited survey that I have done here.11 At the time of
writing, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2017) have
placed the Doomsday Clock at two and half minutes to midnight, citing climate change as one of
the two major perils that place us on the precipice of global catastrophe.12 If we are being honest
in our evaluation of the evidence, there is no doubt that swift and substantial action is needed to
avoid significant long-term environmental harms. Does this require us to stabilize and reduce
global population? In the next chapter, I argue that the answer is yes.

11
12

For a much more thorough survey of the effects of population growth, see Weisman (2013).
The other peril is the potential use of nuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER 5: INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND
POPULATION GROWTH
The takeaway from the previous chapter is simple: we face an assortment of
environmental problems that threaten to harm hundreds of millions of people this century and
potentially far more in the centuries that follow. While population growth is not the sole cause of
the problems we have been considering, it is a central contributing factor (sometimes the primary
contributing factor) to all of them. In this chapter, I argue that we have a collective duty first to
stabilize global population and then to reduce it. I will discuss the policy implications of this
general duty in chapter 6.
My overall argument is composed of several smaller arguments, each of which is
defended in its own section, but before delving into the details, it is worth presenting the outline
of the argument in its entirety:
1. We have obligations to avoid causing unnecessary massive harms to presently
existing people.
2. Our obligations of non-harm are just as stringent toward future people as they are
toward present people.
3. Therefore, we have obligations to avoid causing massive unnecessary harms to future
people. [1, 2]
4. If we do not dramatically reduce our current levels of environmental degradation,
then we will cause massive unnecessary harms to future people.
5. Therefore, we have obligations to dramatically reduce our current levels of
environmental degradation. [3, 4]
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6. Anthropogenic environmental degradation is the product of population and the
average rate of environmental degradation per person.
7. Therefore, we have a collective obligation to either reduce our population, reduce the
average rate of environmental degradation per person, or do both of these. [5, 6]
8. We cannot permissibly reduce population quickly enough to solve the problem at our
current rates of environmental degradation per person.
9. We cannot feasibly reduce the average rate of environmental degradation per person
sufficiently to solve the problem given the current size of the world’s population.
10. Therefore, we have obligations both to reduce our rates of environmental degradation
per person and to reduce our current population. [7, 8, 9]
11. We have a duty to reduce our current population. [10]
The argument is valid, so if each premise is true, then the conclusion must follow. In the
remainder of this chapter, I walk through the many steps in the argument and defend each
premise. I will devote the most time to defending claims (2) and (9) because I suspect these
premises will meet the most resistance.

Equity of Non-Harm
The starting point for my argument is the claim that we have moral obligations to avoid
causing massive harms to presently existing people. “Massive harms” refer to death and the
various forms of significant suffering (e.g., debilitating illness, physical injury, psychological
distress, starvation), so this obligation essentially amounts to a duty not to kill, maim, injure,
imprison, or otherwise severely harm others without a very strong justification for doing so. This
moral duty is fundamental to all plausible ethical theories: there is no viable moral code that
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permits causing unnecessary suffering to other people. Rejecting this principle would seem to
require being a skeptic about all of morality.
The second premise, however, is not so straightforwardly supported. I refer to this claim
as Equity of Non-Harm: our obligations of non-harm are just as stringent toward future people as
they are toward present people. One may recoil from this principle immediately, highlighting the
fact that present people exist while future people do not. Present people are already here, and we
do not know whether future people will come to be. That seems like a noteworthy difference that
could make our duties of non-harm stronger with respect to present people. Some may have this
reaction because of confusion about what we mean by a “future person.” Recall (from chapter 3)
that a “future person” is someone who will exist later even though they do not at present; a
merely possible person, in contrast, is someone who could exist but never actually does. There
are clearly morally significant differences between a present person and a merely possible
person: one has interests and experiences; the other does not (and never will). But this difference
does not manifest between present and future people: both have interests and experiences.
Others who object to Equity of Harm might endorse contract theories of ethics. These
theories ground moral principles in “mutually agreeable reciprocity of cooperation between
individuals” (Darwall 2002, p. 1). According to some of these theories, we cannot have
obligations toward future people. These theories base moral obligations on agreement among
people, and since future people do not yet exist, we cannot interact with them in the ways
necessary to form fair and reciprocal agreements with them. Thus, we cannot have any
obligations to those who do not yet exist.
The difficulties with making contract theories extend to future generations have been well
documented (Gardiner 2009). Insofar as contract theories can only explain moral obligations
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between contemporaries, this fact only shows that such theories are unsuitable for addressing
intergenerational moral questions. If proponents of this view really hold that we have no
obligations to those that do not yet exist, they will not be able to explain even some of the most
basic moral convictions that we have about procreation. For example, if we cannot have
obligations to future people, how can parents have an obligation to refrain from conceiving a
child whose life will very likely be dreadful (e.g., because of genetic illness)? They will also not
be able to explain why anything is wrong with harming people in the distant future – even when
the harms are incredibly severe. There are several reasons to think that our duties of non-harm do
not vary so drastically between present and future people.
First, consider a family of similar philosophical thought experiments involving morally
wrong actions whose consequences are delayed to affect people who do not yet exist. To
illustrate the kinds of cases that I have in mind, imagine that a despicable terrorist named Alec
plants a time bomb beneath an elementary school with the intention of causing harm to its
students. Suppose it blows up in one year, killing 10 students. Such an action is surely wrong –
among the worst acts a person could commit. Now imagine the same scenario with one change:
the bomb has a longer timer. In this scenario, it detonates 15 years after Alec places it but causes
the same overall effects: 10 students die in the explosion. Does it make any difference that the
children who were harmed did not exist when Alec first placed the bomb? Is Alec’s action
somehow less wrong and less heinous? Assuming that Alec had good reason to think the school
would still exist 15 years after planting the bomb, this detail does not seem to matter: 10 deaths
15 years from now are just as morally bad as 10 deaths that occur right now.1

1

I have used similar cases in previous work to illustrate the same point. See Hedberg (2013, pp. 29-31).
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Second, consider the moral significance of spatial distance. The fact that a person lives in
a particular location does not affect her moral status. Geographical location has no bearing on the
moral value of human beings, the rights they have, or the extent to which their rights and welfare
should be respected by others. If geographical location makes so little difference to what we owe
others, then why would temporal location make a greater difference? My geographical location is
a morally arbitrary factor about me – in large part determined by factors beyond my control –
that says nothing about my character or my moral and intellectual capacities. We do not typically
think that such morally arbitrary factors are a justification for regarding others as less than our
moral equals. The same reasoning applies to temporal location. The time that a person lives is a
morally arbitrary factor (completely outside one’s own control) that says nothing about the
person’s character or moral and intellectual capacities. So just as my living in the United States
does not in itself make my life more valuable or more worthy of moral protections than the life
of someone who lives in Bangladesh, my living in 2017 does not in itself make my life more
valuable than the life of someone who lives in a different time, whether they lived in 1917 or will
live in 2117. Just as a person has the same moral status regardless of where they live, they have
the same status regardless of when they live. Thus, whatever duties of non-harm we have to those
living now should apply to those who will live in the future.
At this juncture, one might object that geographical distance actually does matter to what
we owe other people because it affects our relationships with them. Typically, we hold that our
special relationships with our families and members of our local communities create obligations
that we do not have to distant strangers. In the same manner, our temporal distance from future
people seems to restrict our relationship with them since we are unable to have any kind of
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reciprocal interaction. Perhaps this difference could explain why our duties not to harm future
people are not as strong as our duties not to harm present people.
While it is true that we generally have stronger duties to those who are geographically
nearer to us, this fact does not result from geographical distance as such. What matters in such
cases are the relationships that we form with others. After all, we can have special duties to
friends or family members who are geographically distant from us, and advances in
transportation and communication have made these relationships relatively common. The real
question then is this: is the relationship that we have with future people sufficiently different
from our relationship with present people to justify our having less stringent duties of non-harm?
The answer to this question is no.
It is true that we have special duties to the small portion presently existing people with
whom we form strong interpersonal relationships, but we also have moral duties that extend to
all people, including those we have never met and never will meet. These include duties not to
steal their property, physically assault them, jeopardize their welfare, or otherwise cause them
harm. These obligations cannot plausibly be grounded in any relationship we form with all these
people. The notion that we form a relationship with all presently existing people – even a very
loose one – is dubious. We form morally significant relationships with only a very small portion
of those who presently exist.
To the extent that special relationships affect our moral duties, they are usually taken to
only affect our duties of assistance. I may well have duties to assist my friends and family (e.g.,
doing favors for them, helping them in emergencies, providing financial assistance to my
children) that I do not have to strangers. But our duties not to harm or wrong others are usually
taken to apply to everyone – strangers and close acquaintances alike. Just as it is wrong from me
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to assault one of my close friends (except in unusual circumstances), it is wrong for me to assault
a stranger. I should avoid harming other people regardless of my relationship with them. Equity
of Non-Harm, as the name implies, only applies to duties not to harm others, so its stringency is
not affected by whether or not we have personal relationships with others.
A third consideration that supports Equity of Non-Harm originates from the general trend
in ethics to ground moral status in the capacities that a person or animal possesses. Many
theorists in animal ethics have approached what we owe to nonhuman animals as dependent
upon the animals’ morally relevant capacities (Singer 2002; Regan 1983; Nussbaum 2006, ch. 6;
DeGrazia 1996; Midgley 1983; Sapontzis 1987). The authors that use this approach attempt to
establish our moral duties to animals by first identifying what features of human beings ground
their robust moral status and then determining the extent to which certain animals possess these
capacities. Underlying these approaches is a straightforward assumption about the moral status
of human beings: a person’s moral status is determined by certain morally relevant capacities.
Philosophers do not all agree about what capacities are important, but this list often includes the
capacity to feel pleasure and pain, to exercise autonomy, to make rational decisions, to
understand oneself as an entity that continues to exist through time, to engage in linguistic
communication, and to establish meaningful relationships with others.
According to these capacity-oriented accounts of moral status, if it is wrong to harm
people who have certain morally relevant capacities, then it is also wrong to harm animals that
possess the same morally relevant capacities. So if future people have the same morally relevant
capacities as present people, and it is wrong to harm present people, then it will likewise be
wrong to harm future people. Will future people have the same morally relevant capacities that
we do? If we are speculating about the characteristics of human beings who might exist in a

122

million years, then it might be reasonable to think that such people would be significantly
different from us. But on the shorter time scales in which we are considering our
intergenerational moral duties, there can be no doubt that future people will be like us in all the
morally relevant ways. They will have the same general psychological and biological
characteristics that we possess. We have no reason to believe, for instance, that those living in
2100 will have lost the ability to reason or will have become unable to experience pleasure and
pain. Since future people – at least those who will exist during the next several centuries – will
have the same morally relevant capacities as present people, our duties not to harm future people
are just as strong as those we have not to harm presently existing people.
These three threads of argument provide compelling support for Equity of Non-Harm, but
economists might nonetheless be reluctant to accept it. Most economists employ a social
discount rate to assess the value of future benefits and losses in comparison to benefits and losses
that occur in the present. As Derek Parfit (1987) summarizes, “According to a Social Discount
Rate, the present moral importance of future events, especially benefits and losses, declines at a
rate of n percent per year” (p. 480). If a discount rate is used, then losses that occur in the future
are not as morally significant as those that occur in the present, which means that preventing
harm in the present should take priority over preventing harm in the future.
The social discount rate has already been criticized on various grounds (Parfit 1987, pp.
480-486; Kelleher 2012). The mere passage of time does not indicate that the moral significance
of an event decreases. Often, the justification for a social discount rate reveals that the passage of
time as such is not the real reason for discounting. For instance, some justify the social discount
rate on the basis of distant future events having a lower probability of occurring than events that
will occur in the immediate future. Granting this claim about the relative probability of events,
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however, does not entail that future benefits and losses are less valuable than they are in the
present; instead, what this would demonstrate is that it is harder to predict benefits and losses the
further into the future they are projected to occur. These benefits and losses would still be just as
morally significant in the future as they are in the present, if they were to occur. Harms that
occur to future people are not less significant just because they take place in the future.
Moreover, with respect to the environmental harms under discussion, we have compelling
evidence that these harms will take place: the probability of their occurrence is overwhelmingly
likely if our current activities do not change.
Recently, however, Duncan Purves (2016) has offered a creative defense of the social
discount rate. Purves appeals to a line of reasoning related to the non-identity problem. Recall
from chapter 2 that many of our present actions will determine the identities of future people.
Policy changes that reduce our long-term environmental impacts would cause different people to
meet and form relationships and for people to procreate at different times in their lives. As a
result, if we do not adopt these policies, and some future people are adversely affected by climate
change, biodiversity loss, and other environmental impacts, it is not the case that they would be
worse off than they otherwise would have been. After all, if we had adopted the policies needed
to reduce the impacts of environmental degradation, these people would never have been born at
all. I argued in chapter 2 that it still makes sense to claim that these future people have been
harmed because the counterfactual comparison notion of harm (CCH) is false.2 According to this
notion of harm, a person is harmed if and only if she is made worse off by some action than she
otherwise would have been.

2

It may be a sufficient condition for harm, but it is clearly not a necessary one.
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Purves’ argument draws on CCH but does not rely on it being a true and comprehensive
account of what actions qualify as harms (although he often speaks as if CCH is correct). Instead,
his central claim is that counterfactual-comparative harms are morally worse than (merely) noncounterfactual comparative harms:
It is important here to acknowledge that some theories of harm imply that we can harm
people in a non-counterfactual comparative sense, even when counterfactual comparative
harm is absent. But, a proponent of these theories should acknowledge that an action is
morally worse if, in addition to being harmful in the way specified by the theory, it is also
harmful in a counterfactual comparative sense. (Purves 2016, p. 218)
To illustrate this point, Purves evaluates Hanser’s (2008) event-based account of harm, according
to which people are harmed when they are deprived of basic goods. Purves (2016) thinks that
accounts like Hanser’s – that is, accounts that do not invoke CCH – will be unable to explain the
intuitive verdict about this case:
Burning Building George sees two of his neighbors trapped in a burning building. Jane,
one of the people trapped in the building, has a fatal heart condition such that if she is not
killed by the fire, she will die from her heart conditions moments later. Elroy, the other
people [sic] trapped in the building, has no such heart condition. If he is not killed by the
fire, he will enjoy many more good years of life. (p. 217)
According to Purves, if George has full information about each of these people, he ought to save
Elroy, and the reason he ought to save Elroy is that Elroy would suffer a greater harm by dying
in the fire than Jane would. Elroy would be deprived of many good years of life if he died in the
fire whereas Jane would be deprived of only a short bit more life. But on Hanser’s account, both
Elroy and Jane are harmed to the same degree by dying in the fire because they would lose all
their basic goods. That verdict is problematic, according to Purves (2016): “clearly the harm to
Elroy is greater, and it would be morally worse” (p.219).
We can (and should) grant Purves’ claim that we should save Elroy in the Burning
Building case, and this case illustrates well enough why CCH is “something we should care
about” (Purves 2016, p. 217). If we do not save Elroy, then he will be deprived of life he
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otherwise could live whereas Jane is not similarly deprived of life if she is not saved. Thus, there
are circumstances where CCH matters to our moral evaluations. Nonetheless, all this can be
granted without endorsing Purves’ conclusions about the moral significance of harms to future
people. Purves does not provide sufficient reason for thinking that counter-factual comparative
harms are always worse than harms he would classify as non-comparative. Consider a couple,
Tom and Sandy, living in the future. Both die in a tropical storm resulting from climate change.
As it happens, Tom would have been born whether or not we enacted policies to significantly
mitigate climate change, but Sandy would not have been born if we had done so. According to
CHH, Tom is harmed by the storm and Sandy is not, even though they are both deprived of many
years of good life by the event. Purves does not demonstrate that the harm to Sandy is less
significant than the harm to Tom. The fact that CCH is morally significant does not demonstrate
that non-comparative harms are automatically less significant.
Purves’ conclusions do not have the same type of intuitive pull that his initial case
analysis might possess when we apply them to long-term moral decisions. Do we really believe
that 100 deaths caused by climate change in 2200 are less morally serious than 100 deaths caused
by climate change that occur this year? After all, some of those born in 2200 will have their
identities altered if we were to pursue policies to mitigate climate change. The fact that the
conclusion Purves’ view would support does not have widespread intuitive appeal highlights the
shakiness of his arguments, even assuming that we grant his use of an intuition-pumping thought
experiment to motivate his position.
One of the main reasons the intuitive appeal of CCH disappears in intergenerational cases
is that it is being applied with an unusually broad scope. CCH, as employed in non-identity
cases, “automatically aggregates all the consequences of an action and determines on the basis of
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the resulting ensemble whether the action has caused harm” (Nolt 2013a, p. 115). In other
contexts, CCH is never employed this way. Imagine that Jerry is crossing the street, and I strike
him with my car while driving recklessly. He breaks his leg in several places and spends several
weeks in a local hospital while recovering. As it happens, however, he falls in love with one of
the nurses there, someone he would not have met had he not been admitted to the hospital. His
love is ultimately reciprocated, and the two enjoy a lasting, loving relationship until they die. Did
I harm Jerry by striking him that fateful day with my car? If we apply CCH in a very broad way,
then it appears I did not, since my breaking his leg bestowed on him a benefit in the long term
that was greater than the harm he initially suffered. But such an analysis is not consistent with
how such a case would ordinarily be judged. Rather, it seems that my action caused two distinct
effects – the harm of Jerry breaking his leg and the benefit of finding true love.
The peculiarity of applying CCH in this broad, effect-aggregating manner becomes
apparent when we consider its implications. If we were to always apply CCH this way, then we
would be fraught with uncertainty about whether many actions were really harmful. Knowing
whether something was really a harm would require us to know all the action’s long-term effects
so that we could compare the harms and benefits accrued by the action. Since we virtually never
have such knowledge, the concept of harm would become useless in our moral reasoning. Thus,
when we apply CCH, we almost always apply it more narrowly. My striking Jerry with my car
makes him worse off in the sense that he now has a broken leg, not in the sense that his entire life
is now worse on the whole as a result of this event.3
The same analysis can be applied to identity-affecting cases. Let’s return to Tom and
Sandy’s deaths in the tropical storm. Our failure to mitigate climate change harms Sandy by
3
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causing her death, and it also benefits Sandy by providing the conditions necessary for her
existence. These are distinct effects and should not be aggregated together. Just as Jerry being
benefited does not erase the harm he suffered, Sandy being benefited does not erase the harm she
suffers. Ultimately, we can understand the harm that Sandy suffers in either a non-comparative
way or in a narrowly comparative way. On either account, the harm she suffers is morally
significant and just as morally significant as counterfactual-comparative harm that Tom suffers.
Harms are bad and ought to be prevented. Furthermore, harms are just as morally serious
whether they occur to present people or to future people. Therefore, just as we have an obligation
to prevent present people from suffering massive, unnecessary harms, we also have an obligation
to prevent future people from suffering massive, unnecessary harms.

Massive, Unnecessary Harm
We have a moral obligation to prevent future people from suffering massive, unnecessary
harm. Furthermore, we know that environmental degradation will cause massive, unnecessary
harm to future people if we continue with business as usual. The support for this claim can be
found in the previous chapter. Climate change, biodiversity loss, and other changes to the natural
environment could cause severe suffering and death to hundreds of millions (if not billions) of
future people. These harms will be “massive” on any plausible meaning of the term.
These harms are also unnecessary. One could argue that our high rates of consumption
are necessary to maintain our welfare, but such a claim is dubious. First, for many in the
developed world, it is simply implausible to claim that all their ecologically damaging habits are
essential to improving their well-being. Many authors have argued that the materialistic,
consumption-driven lifestyles of the western world do not make our lives significantly better
than they would be otherwise (Andreou 2010; Gambrel and Cafaro 2010; Gardiner 2012, pp.
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244-245). Second, even assuming that many of the consumption-driven activities do increase
people’s welfare, it does not follow that the activities are necessary in any morally meaningful
sense. The fact that stealing someone’s property would improve my welfare does not entail that it
would be morally justified. Some environmentally destructive activities really are necessary for
people to survive in their current circumstances, but many of these activities are not necessary in
this sense. For instance, we do not need our homes kept at a stable temperature of 72 degrees
year round, and we do not need to purchase large, fuel-inefficient vehicles just because their
appearance is appealing. We could refrain from these activities with only marginal costs to our
well-being. Thus, the harms resulting from these activities are unnecessary.

Isolating the Population and Consumption Variables
Claim (6) in the argument is a simple equation that isolates the two main variables that
combine to produce environmentally degradation. The first is the population size, and the second
is the average rate of environmentally harmful consumption within the population. Thus, the
equation is as follows:
anthropogenic environmental degradation = population × average rate of environmental
degradation per person
This formulation varies slightly from the IPAT equation, which is one of the standard ways of
understanding environmentally destructive impact.4 According to the IPAT equation,
environmental impact (I) is the product of population (P), affluence (A), and technology (T). My
equation effectively combines affluence and technology into a single variable, resulting in a
simpler equation. I prefer this formulation because affluence and technology are difficult to

4

For an overview of how the IPAT equation has been employed in the past, see Chertow (2000).
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quantify in isolation and can pull in opposing directions. Increases in affluence generally result
in greater environmental impact. Improvements in technology can result in more efficient use of
resources, but often these improvements result in greater aggregate consumption because the
economic demand for the resource increases.5 The effects of technology on rates of consumption
are thus quite difficult to quantify. For our purposes, it will be more fruitful to condense our
analysis to two variables – population and consumption – and examine each to see what we can
do to prevent environmental degradation.
According to my equation, there are two contributing factors to environmental
degradation. Hence, if we want to lower environmental degradation, we have three options:
lower only the first contributing factor, lower only the second contributing factor, or lower both
contributing factors. In the next section, I argue that we should reduce both contributing factors.

Can We Just Reduce Rates of Consumption?
Acknowledging the need to reduce our overall ecological footprint does not automatically
mean that we have a duty to reduce population. One might propose that we focus instead on
reducing rates of environmentally harmful consumption, especially in the developed nations
where consumption rates are particularly high. This approach to the problem has dominated the
literature: as discussed in the opening chapter, explicit discussions of population over the last
two decades have been rare. Population growth is one of the main causes of increasing GHG
emissions around the world, and yet approaches to addressing climate change have largely
ignored it (Cafaro 2012). Naomi Klein (2014), in her book-length discussion of climate change,
dismisses any discussion of population in a meager two sentences that is representative of this
5
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trend. After noting that the 500 million richest people on Earth are responsible for roughly half
of all global GHG emissions, she makes the following remark in a footnote:
This is why the persistent posting of population control as solution to climate change is a
distraction and a moral dead end. As this research makes clear, the most significant cause
of rising emissions is not the reproductive behavior of the poor but the consumer
behaviors of the rich. (Klein 2014, p. 114 fn)
Even if the primary cause of climate change is excessive consumption by the rich, it does not
follow that population reduction does not matter and cannot contribute to solving the problem.
Moreover, Klein appears to assume that efforts to lower fertility rates would focus exclusively on
those in developing nations. As will become apparent in chapter 6, we can (and should) pursue
measures of lowering fertility rates in developed nations as well.
There is no doubt that any serious attempt to resolve our environmental problems will
require radical reduction in our environmentally destructive consumption, particularly in
developed nations that contribute the most to climate change and other ecological harms.
Demographic momentum caused by younger populations coming of reproductive age will ensure
that population growth continues for at least a generation or two further into the future, so
overlooking a devastating virus or a war of unprecedented magnitude, it is not possible to lower
global population sufficiently to maintain these high rates of consumption and avoid the
environmental problems discussed in the previous chapter. (I will assume that manufacturing
such a virus or initiating a nuclear war would be unethical ways of solving our environmental
problems.) The pivotal question then is whether reducing consumption rates will be enough if
population continues to rise at projected rates.
The long-term emissions reductions necessary to avoid going above a 2°C average rise in
global temperature (relative to preindustrial levels) are incredibly steep – over 5% per year for
many nations (Raupach et al. 2014). To stay below this 2°C threshold, we must keep the
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concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere to 450 parts per million (ppm). If we are to stabilize
our GHGs at 450 ppm, then global GHG emissions will have to decline from 2010 levels by 4070% by 2050 and decline to nearly zero by 2100 (IPCC 2014b, p. 20). Believing that the
developed nations who must make drastic reductions can and will do so at the required pace is
not only unrealistic but outright laughable. As it stands, the world is on pace for at least at least a
3°C rise by the end of the century (Brahic 2014), and we may cross the 2°C threshold as early as
2036 (Mann 2014). In the United States, the nation with the highest GHG emissions per capita,
President Donald Trump is attempting to dismantle regulations on emissions from both vehicles
and power plants, undoing much of the progress that Barack Obama made to address climate
change and decrease pollution during his presidency (Davenport 2017, Thrush and Davenport
2017). Fighting our consumption habits also requires fighting social and cultural norms. Much of
the material consumption in the western world is driven by our desire for a lofty social status
rather than a need for basic goods or services (Conly 2016, p. 15). Nevertheless, this status is
important to many people and not something they are willing to relinquish easily.
An additional obstacle toward reducing consumption is that many nations in the world
must be allowed to increase their rates of consumption. According to data from The World Bank
(2016), 767 million people in the world were living on less than the equivalent of $1.90 per day
in 2013. This level of poverty translates to very little spending and very little consumption, but
those living in such circumstances struggle to survive. It would be absurd to expect or demand
that these people reduce their resource consumption. Rather, they must be permitted to consume
more so that they can escape this dehumanizing poverty. Since many of the countries with large
proportions of their citizens living in extreme poverty also have high fertility rates, their
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increased consumption could increase environmental degradation substantially if their population
growth continues.
In short, we have a lot of evidence that we are reluctant to reduce our rates of
consumption, and furthermore, some populations must be allowed to increase their consumption
in the near term. This information suggests that reducing consumption rates at the pace required
to avoid severe harms from environmental degradation is extraordinarily unlikely. Intriguingly,
however, we do have evidence that we are willing to lower our rates of procreation. In many
nations around the world, people have done it voluntarily. The fertility rate worldwide is in
decline, and this trend is particularly pronounced in western Europe, where countries like
Denmark, Italy, and Germany have fertility rates far below replacement levels (CIA 2017). So
there is little doubt that people can be motivated to procreate less.6
Furthermore, we know that procreative activities make an enormous contribution to
increasing overall degradation, particularly procreation that occurs in the developed world. In
one study examining the environmental consequences of having a child in the United States, the
authors conclude:
We would like all potential parents to be aware that, more than any other decision they
ever make, their decision on whether or not to create a child will have the largest impact
on our global environment. We conclude that the most effective way an individual can
protect the global environment, and hence protect the well being of all living people, is to
abstain from creating another human. (Hall et al. 1994, p. 523)
In a more recent study, Murtaugh and Schlax (2009) examine the carbon legacies of individuals
and conclude that each new child in the United States adds about 9441 metric tons of CO2 to an

6
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individual’s carbon legacy, an amount that is roughly 5.7 times a person’s lifetime emissions.7
To offer a basis for comparison, reducing one’s weekly miles driven from 231 to 155 for 80
years would only save 147 metric tons of CO2. Thus, on their calculations, the decision to
procreate will likely overshadow all other life choices that an American makes in an effort to
reduce her individual carbon footprint. While the carbon footprint of those in other countries is
not increased as much by procreating, the effect is still substantial. A new father in China has
increased his carbon legacy by 4.4 times by procreating; a new mother in India has increased her
carbon legacy by 2.4 times by procreating (Murtaugh and Schlax 2009, p. 18). These figures are
also not static. The per capita emissions in China and India have increased significantly since this
study was done and are projected to continue increasing until at least 2030 (Yeo and Evans
2015).
On a broader scale, we have compelling evidence that population growth is one of the
central contributors to anthropogenic environmental stressors (Rosa, York, and Dietz 2004;
Dietz, Rosa, and York 2007). When we examine the growth of global GHG emissions, we see
that they have correlated with population growth at almost a 1:1 ratio (Ryerson 2010). It does not
seem possible to adequately respond to climate change without taking population seriously. The
basic problem was described succinctly by Frederick Meyerson (2008) during a discussion held
by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists:
Just stabilizing total emissions at current levels, while keeping pace with population
growth, would require reducing global per-capita emissions by 1.2 percent each year. We
haven’t managed to decrease per-capita emissions by 1 percent in the last 38 years
7
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combined. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, former Vice President Al
Gore, and many well-intentioned scientific, media, and activist campaigns haven’t
changed that fact. And because of the rapid economic growth and increased coal use in
China and elsewhere, we may now be headed for higher per-capita emissions.
Historically, attempts to decrease rates of consumption have had very limited success, and future
efforts may be undermined by continuing population growth. If we are serious about addressing
these environmental problems, we cannot ignore population growth. The good news is that if we
do decide to take population seriously, slowing the rise in population could make a substantial
difference – not just in the distant future but also during this century.
Based on projections from the United Nations that estimate low, medium, and high
fertility scenarios and the data we have about how population affects GHG emissions, following
the low fertility path rather than the medium fertility path – a difference of about 0.5 births per
woman – we could achieve 16-29% of the emissions reductions needed by 2050 to stay below
the 2°C threshold (O’Neill et al. 2010). The authors of the study add, “By the end of the century,
the effect of slower population growth would be even more significant, reducing total emissions
from fossil fuel use by 37-41% across the two scenarios” (O’Neill et al. 2010, p. 17525). Even
more encouragingly, some of the measures used to reduce population, such as increased funding
to family planning services, are much more cost-effective in mitigating climate change than other
methods (O’Neill and Wexler 2000; Wire 2009; Cafaro 2012). Moreover, for many people,
increased access to family planning services may provide an easier means of decreasing their
ecological footprint than reducing personal consumption. Reducing one’s consumption usually
requires some level of personal sacrifice, but as the data presented in earlier chapters indicates,
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many people desire fewer children than they ultimately have (e.g., because of unintended
pregnancies). Thus, it may be in their own best interests to reduce their fertility rates.8
The picture painted by all these facts is pretty clear. We cannot realistically address
climate change and other environmental problems by focusing solely on reducing our rates of
consumption or by focusing solely on reducing population. To be successful in responding to
these problems, we need to make efforts to both reduce our rates of environmentally harmful
consumption and reduce our population size. In the near term, the best we can achieve with
respect to reducing population at the global level is slowing our growth, so that is what we
should pursue.

The Techno-Optimism Objection
Before considering the policy implications of this argument, we must pause to consider
two related objections. Population growth is not a new challenge for humanity. We have dealt
with rapid population growth throughout the 20th century, and technological developments have
helped us avert catastrophe. In the past, we have been warned about the devastation that
population growth will cause, and these predictions have proven inaccurate. More than two
centuries ago, Thomas Malthus claimed that population growth would outstrip food supply and
soon lead to widespread starvation. He was obviously wrong about that.9 Paul Erlich made a
similar prediction in 1968 when he published The Population Bomb, suggesting that we could
experience widespread starvation in the 1970s and 1980s. But this dire outcome did not come to
pass.
8

Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) make this same point and also add that preference-adjusting interventions (which I
will discuss in the next chapter) could make people want fewer children (p. 870).
9
Beyond getting his empirical claims wrong at the time, Malthus was also criticized by Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels. For an overview of their criticisms, see Charbit (2009, ch. 5).
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Many people point to Malthus and Erlich’s exaggerated claims about rising human
population as evidence that such worries are unjustified. Technological progress has enabled us
to accommodate our growing population. Malthus’s predictions, for instance, were wrong
primarily because he did not foresee how developments in agriculture would enable us to grow
crops on land previously thought unfarmable. Perhaps further technological progress will enable
us to accommodate our growing population as it did in the past.10
Unfortunately, as convenient as it would be if technology came to our rescue, it is
unreasonable to rest our hopes entirely on technological progress. Even if some technological
optimism is justified, the inaccurate predictions of the past are hardly a firm basis for skepticism
about the problems caused by population growth in the twenty-first century. First, the warnings
made by Malthus and Erlich both concerned food supply, but current discussions of
environmental degradation are not exclusively concerned with food supply.11 Granted, as
discussed in chapter 4, there are concerns about how increased demand for food places additional
stress on ecosystems and how increased temperatures caused by climate change may impact food
supply by making us unable to farm previously farmable land and decreasing the food
productivity of the ocean. But food supply is not the sole focus when we consider population
growth in the 21st century.12 Second, the environmental effects taking place around the world are
being studied tirelessly by experts on every continent, and their conclusions largely converge on
one unsettling fact: we are on the cusp of experiencing some very big problems.
10

For a recent discussion and endorsement of this claim, see Pearce (2010, pp. 204-208).
Conly (2016) makes this same point (p. 150).
12
One further reason that food supply is not the focus is that lab grown meat may become viable in the near future.
A few years ago, it cost $325,000 to create an artificial hamburger in a lab (Fountain 2013). Within a few years, the
price of creating these burgers has dropped to less than $12 (Crew 2015). Lab-grown meat may become
economically viable within the next two decades, and it would provide an alternative means of meeting the world’s
demand for meet and will require far fewer resources – far fewer animals and much less land – to produce than meat
that is produced through industrialized farming.
11
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I already addressed the severity of our environmental problems in chapter 4, but it is
worth reiterating a crucial feature of them here: they are already happening. Malthus and Erlich
were concerned about famines that might happen if population growth continued. In contrast, we
are not speculating that we might see a rise in average global temperature in the future – the
temperature rise is already happening. We are not just viewing substantial biodiversity loss as a
possibility – we are already seeing substantial biodiversity loss. Rather than being possible
obstacles in the future, these problems are already upon us. The only pertinent question is what
we are going to do about them; to pretend they do not exist or are unlikely to occur is
unjustifiable.
It is likewise unjustifiable to assume that technological innovation will function as a
silver bullet and provide a solution to these problems in the near future. Even if we acknowledge
that a technological fix is possible, it does not follow from this fact that it is likely to occur or
that we should expect it to occur.13 Certainly, at this stage, we are not justified in acting as if
such a miracle fix is right around the corner. Moreover, subjecting future people to such grave
risk of harm is morally blameworthy even if those harms are miraculously avoided in the future.
We routinely hold people accountable for engaging in actions that are unnecessarily risky even
when their actions do not actually harm anyone. This is the central reason why we impose legal
penalties for running red lights and driving drunk even when specific instances of those
behaviors do not actually cause harm to anyone. Thus, a failure to keep the risks to future people
within reasonable limits, given that we have the means to do so, is morally blameworthy.
13

It is possible that technology will simply not advance fast enough to alleviate these problems, but it is also
possible that the technology will exist but not bring us the solutions we need. Mazur and Saperstein (2010) point out
that the beneficial effects of technology are sometimes only realized under favorable social and economic
conditions. New options for contraception and abortion can improve women’s reproductive health, for example, but
they “have failed to improve women’s lives where underlying health, rights, and poverty issues have not also been
addressed” (Mazur and Saperstein 2010, p. 12).

138

The Ultimate Resource Objection
A variation of technology-driven optimism can be found in the influential work of Julian
Simon (1996). He argues that people – primarily because of their ability to invent and adapt – are
the ultimate resource. When a resource becomes scarce, he notes that the price of this resource
increases and that people gain an incentive to use this resource more effectively or develop
alternatives to it. As a result, supposed shortages of resources are routinely avoided, and we
should not regard natural resources as “finite in any economic sense” (Simon 1996, p. 54).
Simon’s key claim is that resource scarcity plays an important role in technological
advancement. He summarizes the main argument for this claim as follows:
More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce in the short
run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity and
prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail in the search, at a
cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the
longrun the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen.
That is, prices eventually become lower than before the increased scarcity occurred.
(Simon 1996, p. 59, original emphasis)
In this manner, Simon contends that resource scarcity has a positive influence on technological
progress. The rising prices caused by resource scarcity provide an economic incentive for new
discoveries to be made and then put into practice. Much of Simon’s book is an examination of
how this phenomenon has occurred in the past with other resources that became scarce at some
point in the past.
Simon also argues that a growing population increases the rate of technological progress.
He first observes that improvements in productivity come from people putting their minds to use.
Since these improvements originate from people, “the amount of improvement plainly depends
on the number of people available to use their minds” (Simon 1996, p. 372). If other variables
are held constant between two independent societies, the society with the higher population will
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develop more quickly because more people will be making contributions to its technological
advancement.
These two argumentative threads combine to support the following conclusion:
population growth drives technological advancement. Other things equal, a larger population
results in the creation of a larger amount of knowledge because there are more people generating
ideas and trying to put them into practice. Simultaneously, a larger population leads to faster
resource depletion, resulting in an increased demand for these resources. As the prices of these
resources rise, new economic opportunities emerge and provide an incentive to develop new
ways of doing things (e.g., using the resource more efficiently, finding new sources of the
resource, developing alternatives to the resource). In a free society, solutions are eventually
found, and in the end, the prices of the resources end up being lower than they would have been
if the original scarcity had never arisen. In this manner, we ultimately end up being better off for
having endured this (temporary) resource scarcity. If one is persuaded by this line of reasoning,
then significant restraints on population growth may seem not just unnecessary but detrimental,
since reduced population growth will hinder our technological advancement.
Simon is right to point out that this trend has happened many times in human history.
Even so, the argument has a number of significant problems. First, we should highlight that his
understanding of “better off” is purely economic: being better off simply means that we are in an
economically superior position to where we were previously. But that surely cannot be all we
care about. If resource scarcity (even if temporary) is so pronounced and devastating that it
results in the deaths of millions of people and the severe suffering of many million more, in what
sense are we “better off” after this scarcity concludes? Even if we are better off in some narrowly
economic sense, we may well be worse off in terms of aggregate human welfare, a measurement
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that seems to have much greater moral significance.14 This point is perhaps most poignant with
respect to climate change.
Climate change can be interpreted as the scarcity of a resource – namely, the available
carbon sinks on Earth. We have too few carbon sinks to accommodate our GHG production.
There’s certainly plenty of incentive to develop ways of increasing our available carbon sinks.
This thought has motivated some to investigate the possibility of geoengineering the atmosphere
to aid climate change mitigation, but all of them carry significant risks and uncertainties. Some
also do not appear economically viable.15 Herein lies a second problem with Simon’s reasoning:
he assumes that technological solutions to problems of scarcity will always be found within a
viable timeframe. Certainly, that has been the case many times in human history, but what
justifies assuming that it will always happen regardless of the circumstances? Recall from
chapter 4 that the effects of climate change will be extremely long-lasting and impose great
suffering and hardship on large numbers of people. We have already established that increasing
population increases the severity of this environmental problem (and many others). When the
moral stakes are this high, it is both irrational and morally unjustifiable to exacerbate the
problem in the hope that it will motivate people to develop a solution to the problem.
Climate change in particular is an environmental problem that Simon does not properly
address. In fact, some of his remarks about it are outright dismissive:
“Given the history of such environmental scares—over all of human history—my guess
is that global warming is likely to be simply another transient concern, barely worthy of
consideration ten years from now should I then be writing again of these issues” (Simon
1996, p. 266).
14

We are also unlikely to be better off if societies collapse, a possibility that cannot be overlooked. Recent work by
Jared Diamond (2005) highlights how ecological catastrophes – particularly when a society fails to properly respond
to them – can lead to a society’s demise.
15
See Boyd (2008) for a brief appraisal of different geoengineering schemes.
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Obviously, Simon was wrong about climate change. Moreover, climate change is already
causing hundreds of thousands of casualties per year. The problem is here – on our doorstep –
and the miraculous technological advancement that would solve the problem is nowhere to be
found. This seems to be a straightforward counterexample to the claim that all problems of
resource scarcity are solved via technological advancement.
Simon was similarly mistaken about biodiversity. He claims that he and Aaron
Wildavsky “documented the complete absence of evidence for the claim that species extinction
is going up rapidly, or even going up at all” in the mid-1980s and that no one disputed their
documents or “adduced any new evidence since then that would demonstrate rapid species
extinction” (Simon 1996, p. 450). Whatever the state of conservation biology 30 years ago, the
studies I have cited in chapter 4 provide ample evidence that we are experiencing rapid species
extinctions. The consensus among conservation biologists on this point is overwhelming. Again,
the problem is on our doorstep, and technological progress has not been able to solve it.16 If we
are serious about tackling the environmental problems we face, then we must reduce our rates of
consumption and reduce our population. Technological advances can certainly play a role in our
efforts to meet both these goals, but we cannot continue with business as usual under the
expectation that technology will suddenly solve all our problems. Such a path would be both
foolish and ethically unjustifiable.

16

There are efforts underway to create synthetic organisms. In theory, these efforts could enable us to create new
organisms that fill the same ecological role as species that have gone extinct or even to genuinely resurrect extinct
species. But these efforts are nowhere near coming to fruition to the extent that would be required to genuinely avert
biodiversity loss or recover from it. It was only quite recently that we even managed to create the first synthetic cell
(Gibson et al. 2010).
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CHAPTER 6: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
We have a collective duty to reduce our numbers. Doing so is necessary to adequately
respond to the environmental degradation taking place around the globe. Now we turn to the
challenge of practical application. What should be done to promote population stabilization and
reduction? Part of population growth has been caused by an increase in the life expectancy of
people around the world, particularly in Africa (Kweifio-Okai and Holder 2016, Johnson 2016).
While reproductive rates have declined overall, decreases in the rate of population growth have
been muted because of the decrease in death rates. However, since the increases in life
expectancy are a result of better medical care and a significant reduction in human misery, it
seems neither desirable nor ethical to reduce population by lowering life expectancy.1 The
obviously preferable way to reduce the population is to bring fewer people into existence.
In recent decades, discussions of reducing fertility rates have given rise to serious worries
about morally problematic coercion. Such worries are not unfounded: the implementation of
policies in China, India, and Peru aimed at reducing fertility rates resulted in forced abortions
and sterilizations (Mosher 2008, chs. 3 and 5; Alvarado and Echegaray 2010). These practices
are widely regarded as human rights violations and thought morally indefensible. The challenge
we face is how to reduce population effectively without engaging in morally objectionable
practices. As we shall see, meeting this challenge is no easy task.
We need to stabilize and reduce population as quickly as possible, but we also need to
respect people’s personal freedoms. To a degree, these needs are in tension with one another.
Thus, the general principle regarding population policies might be put as follows:
1

As I will discuss later, however, we may face circumstances where we must seriously consider rationing health
care to the elderly.
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Minimal Coercion: we ought to implement the least coercive set of population policies
possible that will still address the problem effectively.
In this chapter, I consider a series of policies that could be implemented to reduce population and
consider whether they are morally defensible. I start with the least controversial policy measure
that would reduce fertility: increased access to contraception and family planning services.

Contraception, Family Planning, and Effective Education
Increasing access to contraception and family planning is one of few measures that
enjoys substantial support among those writing the population crisis (e.g., Mazur 2010; Ryerson
2010; Cafaro 2012; Hickey, Rieder, and Earl 2016; Kukla 2016). It is not hard to see why.
Increased access to family planning services enhances people’s autonomy by providing couples
with more options regarding their procreative choices. In this respect, it is the opposite of being
coercive. When they have these options, many choose to have smaller families than they would
otherwise have. Improved access to contraception results both in people having greater freedom
and lowering fertility rates.
Much progress could be made in lowering fertility rates if we were to provide
contraception to all who have an unmet need for it. Worldwide, only 56% of married women
between the ages of 15 and 49 use modern methods of contraception, and in Africa, this figure
dips to 30% (Population Reference Bureau 2016). About 12% of the women in the world want to
delay or prevent childrearing but were not using any methods of contraception; in the developing
world, this figure rises to 22% (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). These
figures highlight how increased funding for family planning programs could make a significant
difference in slowing population growth. Just meeting the contraceptive needs of Africa could
decrease the global population in 2030 by as much as 1 billion (Ford 2016).
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Of course, we also have evidence that increased access to family planning services is not
enough. A statistic from chapter 3 is worth reiterating here: globally, 40% of pregnancies are
unplanned (Sedgh, Singh, and Hussain 2014). Even in regions of the world where contraception
is readily available, a significant portion of pregnancies are unplanned. Thus, measures must be
taken to improve people’s awareness of how to use contraceptives effectively and the risks
associated with not using them. The most straightforward way to accomplish this feat is to
improve the availability and quality of sex education. What this entails may vary from nation to
nation according to their educational system, but whatever education is provided should include
information on how to use contraception effectively. Abstinence-only programs, which promote
abstinence until marriage and do not cover contraceptive use, have been in place in certain
regions in the United States for decades. While these programs have consistently received federal
funding during the last 20 years, they have proven utterly ineffective in reducing rates of
unintended pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections compared to comprehensive sex
education (Advocates for Youth 2007, Stranger-Hall and Hall 2011, Breuner and Mattson 2016).
Of course, the United States is no model for how to educate the youth about sex: only 24 states
mandate sex education of any kind (Guttmacher Institute 2017). Given these facts, we should not
be surprised that the United States has the highest rates of unintended pregnancy in the
developed world.
The case for improving access to contraception and improving sex education is quite
compelling. Doing so will enhance people’s freedom (especially the reproductive freedom of
women in the developing world) and improve their quality of life (since they will have fewer
unwanted children) while also lowering fertility rates. These policies have, as Rebecca Kukla
(2016) puts it, “no significant moral downside” (p. 845). The real question is whether or not
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these measures would be enough to effectively respond to population growth. Suppose we
improve sex education and give everyone in the world ready access to contraception. Under such
circumstances, would the population problem be solved?
Unfortunately, it is difficult to know what the precise effects of meeting these two
conditions would be. Certainly, it would be convenient if these changes alone solved the
problem: then we would not need to worry about answering the more difficult ethical questions
about coercive policies. Some do genuinely believe that improved access to contraception and
increased awareness of how to use it effectively will solve the problem. In the introduction to her
edited volume on the population problem, Laurie Mazur (2010) states, “It is not necessary to
control anyone to slow population growth: Birthrates come down where individuals have the
means and power to make their own reproductive choices” (p. 16).
Despite Mazur’s optimism, I think it is naïve to believe that increased access to
contraception and increased education about contraception will be sufficient to solve the
problem, for three reasons. First, the data on population suggests that unmet contraceptive needs
are not the only contributor to population size. Consider a few examples based on recent
population data (Population Reference Bureau 2016). In Morocco, 57% of the married women
aged 15-49 use modern contraceptive methods, and the fertility rate is 2.4; in Malawi, 58% of
married women in this age range use modern contraceptive methods, and the fertility rate is 4.4.
In Libya, only 20% of these women use modern contraceptive methods, but the fertility rate is
only 2.4. Women of the same demographic in Senegal use modern contraceptives at almost the
same rate as those in Libya (21%), and yet the fertility rate in Senegal is 5.0. Clearly, the use of
modern contraceptive methods is not the only factor that determines fertility rates. One of the
major influences on fertility rates in a given country is what family size is desired by the
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country’s citizens (Ryerson 2012, pp. 241-243). Economist Lant Pritchett (1994) went so far as
to claim that the desire for children was the primary determinant of fertility rates and that
“contraceptive access (or cost) or family planning effort more generally is not a dominant, or
typically even a major, factor in determining fertility differences” (p. 39).
Second, even under a best-case scenario where we implement these measures to improve
sex education and access to contraception2 (as well as pursuing gender justice for women3) and
almost immediately, we will not reduce fertility rates quickly enough to deal adequately with the
environmental problems we now face. According to recent demographic models, the human
population in this scenario would still closely approximate the nearly 11 billion that we will
otherwise have on Earth in 2100; substantial reductions in the population are unlikely to occur
until the following century (Bradshaw and Brook 2014, pp. 16611-16612). We must take
significant action this century to avert severe climate change and biodiversity loss, so one
worries that these actions, though important, will not be enough by themselves. As mentioned in
chapter 5, mitigating climate change effectively this century with a continuously rising
population is not feasible. We are already struggling to make progress on these problems with a
population of 7.4 billion people. Increasing that number by 50% would make an adequate
response to environmental degradation all but impossible to achieve.
Third, the regions of the world where population reduction would be most beneficial with
respect to ameliorating environmental degradation are developed nations, since they have larger
per capita ecological footprints. In these nations, access to contraception is not the primary
2

Comprehensive sex education programs, access to contraception, and access to abortion would likely to encounter
strong opposition in certain regions of the world from certain religious groups, so this scenario is much more utopian
than what we could reasonable expect.
3
There are compelling moral reasons to pursue gender equality that have nothing at all to do with lowering fertility
rates, but it is true that removing laws that hinder women’s participation in society and granting them the same
educational opportunities as men generally correlate with lower fertility rates (Roudi Fahimi and Kent 2007).
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challenge to lowering fertility rates. While these countries often already have fertility rates lower
than replacement levels, hastening the pace of reduction could make a huge difference. People in
sub-Saharan Africa and other developing nations have small per capita ecological footprints at
present; hence, small declines in fertility rates of developed nations may be more valuable than
larger declines in developing nations. Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) offer a succinct
encapsulation of the main point:
While reducing fertility in developing nations is important, since their per capita GHG
emissions are projected to increase significantly (and should be allowed to do so) over the
next several decades, it is not nearly as critical as near-term reductions in the numbers of
the world’s wealthy. Although it would be difficult to lower the fertility rate in the United
States from 1.9 to, say, 1.4, such a reduction would have a massive impact on both nearterm and long-term global GHG emissions—much more even than proportionally larger
fertility reductions in sub-Saharan Africa. (pp. 855-856)
Given the gravity of the problem and the need to act quickly, we must consider the ways in
which we can lower fertility rates in the developed world even more, particularly in countries
like the United States and Australia where the per capita ecological footprint is high and fertility
rates are still close to two children per woman (CIA 2016). In most cases, citizens in these
nations already have access to family planning services, so if we are looking to decrease fertility
rates in these countries, we must pursue other measures.
At this juncture, the ethical landscape gets a lot more treacherous. We might pursue three
additional strategies for reducing population: preference adjustment, incentivization, and
coercion.4 Preference adjustment refers to the strategy of trying to alter people’s preferences so
that they prefer to have fewer children. Incentivization refers to the strategy of providing
incentives that might motivate people to have fewer children. Coercion involves the prevention
of certain procreative acts. Perhaps the most well-known example of coercion was China’s one4

I borrow this schema for sorting these different strategies from Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016).
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child policy. Ultimately, I will argue against the imposition of coercive policies but in (qualified)
favor of preference-adjusting and incentivizing policies. But before doing so, I must clarify an
implication of improving access to family planning services.

What about Abortion?
Readers may suspect that increasing access to family planning services entails that
women should have the right to abort unwanted pregnancies and that this service should be
readily available to them. While providing this service would give women an additional means
of avoiding unwanted pregnancies and thus have a positive effect on curtailing population
growth, the conclusion that access to abortion should be increased does not strictly follow from
the imperative to increase access to family planning services or the more general imperative to
slow population growth. Whether women should have increased access to abortion services
depends on the moral status of the fetus.
Obviously, it is morally unacceptable to reduce population by murdering those who
already exist. It is virtually always wrong to kill existing human beings, which is one of the most
fundamental moral principles in all of ethics. If a fetus has a moral status comparable to adult
human beings, then it follows that the imperative to reduce population will not justify killing a
fetus. Thus, whether we should increase access to abortion as part of increasing access to family
planning services hinges significantly on whether the fetus has such a robust moral status. In this
manner, the imperative to reduce population does not serve as a decisive consideration that prochoice advocates might use to defend the permissibility of abortion. The question of whether or
not the fetus is a person – that is, an entity deserving of the same basic moral rights and
protections as an adult human being – cannot be bypassed because of considerations about
population.
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The morality of abortion and the issues concerning fetal personhood are too complex to
discuss in full here, but a few general remarks are worth making. First, even assuming that the
fetus is a person from the moment of conception, there are compelling arguments that abortion
remains permissible in certain circumstances (Thomson 1971). One such circumstance is when
pregnancy occurs as a result of rape. When a women is impregnated against her will, it is unfair
to demand that she endure the burdens of pregnancy, and while it is unfortunate that the fetus
will die as a result, we do not typically require people to endure substantial burdens to save the
lives of others when they are not responsible for the other person being in life-threatening
circumstances. A woman carrying a child to term in the case of rape would thus be a
supererogatory action; doing so is not a moral requirement. The other commonly recognized
exception is when the continuation of pregnancy endangers the mother’s life. In this case, the
mother’s right to self-defense justifies her ending the fetus’s life to preserve her own.
As a second general point, it is implausible to regard a fetus as being a person from the
moment of conception. As Mary Anne Warren (1973) argues, an early term fetus does not have
any of the qualities that we typically associate with personhood. She identifies the following
features as being typical components of personhood: consciousness and the capacity to feel pain,
the ability to reason, engagement in self-motivated activity, the ability to communicate, and the
presence of self-concepts and self-awareness (Warren 1973, p. 55). An early term fetus does not
have any of these features. An entity probably does not need all of them to be a person, but it
surely needs at least one of them. An early term fetus does not possess any level of conscious
awareness, which seems like a prerequisite for possessing the other features of personhood.
Thus, at least early in the pregnancy, its moral status should be similar to that of other living
things that lack the capacity for consciousness (e.g., plants).
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The moral picture gets more complicated as pregnancy progresses, however. At some
point during pregnancy, the fetus becomes sentient: at that point, it has the capacity to feel
pleasure and pain. There is disagreement about precisely when the fetus becomes sentient. Some
have placed the threshold for sentience about 30 weeks after conception (Tawia 1992, Lee et al.
2005) while others contend that the fetus can feel pain closer to 20 weeks after conception
(Grossu 2016). Once the fetus becomes sentient, it acquires an interest in avoiding pain, and this
new capacity results in an elevation in its moral status. Past this point, the justification for an
abortion must be significantly stronger than the justification offered for aborting a non-sentient
fetus. In practice, recognizing the significance of sentience might result in a policy of permitting
the abortion of fetuses during the first trimester (when the fetus is clearly not sentient) and only
allowing abortions in exceptional circumstances after the first trimester (Sumner 1981, ch. 4).
Such circumstances could include, for instance, a threat to the mother’s health or the discovery
of significant genetic defects in the fetus.5
Given my views about the moral status of the fetus, I believe that increasing access to
family planning services should also entail giving women greater access to abortion services
during (at least) the first trimester.6 But this position does not result from thinking that the

5

In cases where pregnancy results from rape, the woman would have plenty of time to determine that she was
pregnant, deliberate about whether to carry the fetus to term, and then get an abortion (if she chooses) within the
first trimester. Thus, allowing abortions in response to involuntary pregnancy may not require any special provision
that extends beyond the first trimester.
6
In one of the most widely anthologized papers on abortion, Don Marquis (1989) argues that abortion is wrong
because it deprives the fetus of future experiences. Since Marquis believes this is the same reason killing an adult
human being is wrong, he views abortion as being just as wrong as murdering an adult human being. At first glance,
this argument might appear to bypass the question of whether the fetus is a person, which would suggest that my
analysis of the moral status of the fetus is irrelevant to assessing the morality of abortion. However, Marquis’s
argument only establishes that the fetus has a valuable good that it can lose (i.e., its future); this does not establish
that the fetus is the kind of entity that has a right to its future or that there is anything morally wrong with depriving
it of this good (Sinnott-Armstrong 1999). So despite his intention to dodge the question, Marquis cannot avoid
addressing whether or not the fetus is a person.
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imperative to reduce population automatically warrants allowing more women to receive
abortions. One could coherently hold all my views regarding the need to reduce population but
hold a different view regarding the moral status of fetuses and thereby reach a different position
on whether we should make it easier for women to obtain abortions.

Why Outright Coercion Should Be Avoided
Having addressed the link between population reduction and access to abortion, we can
now return to the question of what population policies we should employ to curtail population
growth. The most direct means of reducing population would involve direct coercion –
government action that forces individuals to keep their family size small. Coercive population
policies are not popular,7 but we have some evidence that coercive policies can be effective: the
one-child policy in China prevented at least 500 million births between 1970 and 2000 (Lee and
Liang 2006). The main justification for implementing an extremely coercive policy is an appeal
to the long-term benefits of doing so. As I have already mentioned, these policies have
historically been associated with severe human rights violations in the form of forced abortions
or sterilizations. They are also often associated with sex selection: in cultures where men are
valued more than women, they create an incentive to abort fetuses identified as female and have

Additionally, Lovering (2005) questions whether a fetus really has a future prior to being conscious.
Possessing a future seems to require a psychologically continuous entity, and consciousness is a prerequisite for this
kind of psychological continuity. If Lovering’s view is correct, then Marquis’ position may not turn out to be much
different than the view I have sketched above, where abortions are permissible in the first trimester but often
prohibited afterward.
7
The philosopher who comes closest to defending them is Sarah Conly (2015, 2016), but even her proposals fall
well short of the coercive policies under discussion here. While she thinks that a one-child policy is permissible
when the harms caused by overpopulation are severe enough, she believes it should be enforced through economic
penalties and not by bodily invasions (Conly 2016, ch. 4).
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another child in the hope that it is a boy.8 The only moral consideration that can justify these
injustices is the overall outcome that results from the policy. The underlying thought is that if the
harms of unchecked population growth are significant enough, then the particular injustices that
occur can be justified. Unchecked population growth will certainly lead to some very bad
outcomes, and reducing their impact would indeed be a substantial benefit. Is that enough to
justify pursuing something as coercive as a one-child policy?
While some believe that the rights violations we have seen in the implementation of
coercive population policies in the past are decisive reasons not to consider them, answering this
question is not so simple. If circumstances are dire enough, we recognize that otherwise
impermissible actions can become permissible. Killing an innocent person is one of the worst
crimes one can commit, but if killing one innocent person is required to save the lives of ten
other innocent people, then such a killing may well be morally permissible.9 In this manner, few
(if any) broad moral principles are absolute. So while we recognize that the human rights
violations that took place as a result of coercive population policies in the past were heinous and
deplorable, there are at least possible circumstances in which the risk of these abuses would be
worth taking. Nevertheless, I do not think we should pursue a one-child policy or any similar
policy that places strict, government-enforced limitations on people’s rights to procreate.
If a one-child policy were to be seriously pursued, it would have to be a last resort – a
final measure implemented solely for the sake of avoiding catastrophe after we have exhausted

8

Conly (2016) points out that the main cause of sex selection is the prevalence of sexist attitudes in the background
culture of these societies rather than coercive population policies as such (pp. 193-204). Even so, in practice, the fact
that a strict limit on the number of children a couple can have could exacerbate gender inequality remains a strong
reason to oppose the implementation of coercive population policies.
9
A famous version of this type of case is found in Williams (1973, pp. 98-99). Williams describes a man named Jim
facing the dilemma of killing a protestor of the government. If he accepts, then the other 19 protestors go free; if he
declines, then the local military will execute all 20 of them.
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our other options. We have clearly not exhausted all our other options. We could obviously
improve access to family planning services in much of the world and do a better job of educating
people on how to prevent unwanted pregnancy. Furthermore, as I will discuss in the next section,
there are other options for motivating people to reduce their fertility rates that do not require
these draconian tactics. We should seriously explore these options before concluding that we
have to adopt coercive population policies.
Moreover, it is unclear whether a one-child policy, even if enacted globally, would be the
best means of lowering fertility rates. Citing data from Bradshaw and Brook (2014), Conly
(2016) notes that dropping the fertility rate to 1 per woman by 2045 through full or nearly full
compliance to a global one-child policy would shrink the population to 3.45 billion by 2100 (p.
219). That would indeed by a drastic reduction in human population, but a global one-child
policy would never decrease the fertility rate to that extent. As Rieder (2016a) mentions, the onechild policy in China, which was more extreme than the kind of policy that Conly would
endorse, only lowered fertility rates to an average of 1.6 children per couple (p. 33). Moreover,
the fact that many European countries already have fertility rates comparable to this figure
indicates that other strategies for reducing fertility rates might be just as effective as these
outright coercive measures.
There is also a more compelling practical reason not to pursue implementing anything
resembling a one-child policy: doing so will almost surely be counterproductive to the general
goal of reducing population. Coercive population policies have been widely condemned, and the
repulsion people feel toward them has played a considerable role in silencing discussion about
population. In democratic societies existing at this stage of the 21st century, coercive population
policies are not viable because they will never garner the necessary support among voters. The
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only likely result of pushing for them is that people will become more reluctant to discuss
population at all. As a result, advocating a one-child policy will probably make it more difficult
to get people to seriously consider other, less coercive measures of reducing fertility rates. In this
manner, advocating for flagrantly coercive population policies with the aim of reducing
population is a self-defeating strategy. We have to consider other means of reducing population
growth beyond increasing access to family planning services, but one-child policies and similar
proposals will not be part of the solution.

Preference Adjustment and Incentivization
There are two broad strategies for reducing fertility rates that are more coercive than the
choice-enhancing measures of improving the availability of education and family planning
services but less coercive than strict prohibitions on the number of children that people may
have. The first is preference adjustment. This strategy involves trying to change cultural norms
or individual desires to lower fertility rates. The second is incentivization. This strategy involves
providing incentives for people to have fewer children. These incentives can involve providing
benefits to those who have few children or imposing penalties on those who have too many
children. Both these strategies are typically regarded as permissible and not thought to constitute
rights violations. As Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) note:
In other contexts, we readily accept similar preference-adjusting or incentivizing
interventions in order to advance public interests or protect others from harm. We attempt
to influence people’s sexual behavior and diet in order to minimize public health costs,
but this does not necessarily infringe on their rights to self-determination and privacy. We
offer various incentives to make certain careers more or less attractive, but this does not
seem to infringe on one’s right to live according to one’s own conception of the good. (p.
857)
Given the general acceptance of these other practices, we ought to consider the effectiveness of
them in the realm of procreation.
155

The primary means of adjusting people’s preferences would be through the use of mass
media – radio, television, poster campaigns, billboards, advertising on popular online video
media (e.g., YouTube), and so on. Sometimes, preference adjustment takes the form of rational
persuasion, which involves objective presentation of factual information. Other times, the
persuasion is more subtle and involves trying to change behavior through tactics like appeals to
emotion, celebrity endorsements, or presentation through a narrative. Although some might
worry that these latter strategies constitute undesirable manipulation, the case for such an
objection is feeble. These strategies are already widely employed in a variety of these contexts
without causing controversy, and they do not need to present false information or to be
undertaken covertly. Moreover, some cultures are dominated by pro-natalist values. These
preference-adjusting campaigns could serve to counter this widespread pro-natalism and enhance
individuals’ autonomy by alleviating the social and cultural pressure to have children (Hickey,
Rieder, and Earl 2016, p. 860).
Preference-adjusting interventions have been implemented before, and they have proven
effective. Television shows that promoted family planning and small family size aired in Mexico
during the 1970s and 1980s, and similar programs were later launched in India. Kenya and
Tanzania promoted the same values through radio programs. In all these cases, the launch of
these media programs was followed by a decline in fertility rates and an increase in contraceptive
use (Ryerson 2012, pp. 244-248). These programs often shifted their audience’s beliefs about the
acceptability of family planning and their perceptions of family size. As a result, viewers became
more likely to use contraception, delay childbearing, and have fewer children (Singhal and
Rogers 1989; Rogers et al. 1999). William Ryerson (2012) estimates that expenses of $35
million per year would be sufficient to fund similar programs in all the world’s major developing
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countries (p. 448). Maybe that financial estimate is too optimistic, but it is clear that mediadriven preference adjustment could be an effective policy tool with respect to reducing family
size.
Incentives are also worth considering, although some incentives toe much closer to the
line of unacceptable coercion than preference adjusting strategies. Negative incentives, such as
severe fines or increased hospital delivery fees, may be indistinguishable from outright coercion
when they are imposed on people who are in financially precarious circumstances. Moreover,
some negative incentives in the past have been imposed in ways that are clearly objectionable.
China’s incentive-oriented policies often pressured mothers to abortion and infanticide (Thomas
1995, p. 10; Hesketh and Xing 1997), and India’s incentives – clothing, electronics, and
monetary payments designed to encourage sterilization or delayed childbearing – exploited the
low literacy rate among the poor to sterilize thousands without their informed consent (Repetto
1968). While these incidents are morally repugnant, incentives nonetheless deserve examination.
The evidence indicates that incentives can be effective in lowering fertility rates despite
differences in cultural norms and resource availability (Heil, Gaalema, and Herrmann 2012).
Thus, if we can adequately guard against abuses and avoid making them objectionably coercive,
incentives may be worth employing.
Clearly, some measures can be taken to reduce the risk that incentives will be unduly
coercive (Hickey, Reider, and Earl 2016). First, we should be transparent about the political
goals behind the incentives, the methods that are used, and the actual outcomes that result from
them. Second, we can restrict payment for incentives to the actual would-be procreators. In
China, local and regional officials were offered incentives to reduce the fertility rates of their
constituents (Thomas 1995, p. 7; Hesketh and Xing 1997), and in India, incentives were offered
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to various intermediaries to encourage other people to be sterilized (Repetto 1968, p. 13). These
practices increase the risk that would-be procreators will be pressured by others into altering
their reproductive behavior rather than it resulting from their own voluntary decisions. Third, we
can take precautions to try to reduce the impact of incentive-based interventions on vulnerable
groups. One means of doing this would be to direct positive incentives toward these vulnerable
groups and reserve negative incentives for other, less vulnerable groups. For example, we could
offer cash payments and tax breaks to the poor and levy fines against the wealthy (Hickey,
Rieder, and Earl 2016, p. 868). On such a scheme the poor would not be made worse off by a
decision to have a large family; they would simply have to forego benefits that they would
otherwise be able to obtain.10
Another incentivization strategy worth considering is the implementation of a cap-andtrade scheme in conjunction with an allowance to have a certain number of children.11 Suppose
we wanted to lower fertility rates in the United States to about 1.5 children per couple. We might
grant everyone in the United States a sellable allowance of 0.75 children. Couples who had one
child would then have their collective allowance reduced to 0.5 (0.25 per person). People who
want only one child or who wish to remain childless could put the remaining sellable allowance
up for sale in an open marketplace. In this manner, couples would have an economic incentive to
have fewer children, and those who want larger families would have an alternative means of
obtaining them. Couples who obtained allowances for large numbers of children could be

10

This strategy has the added advantage of avoiding scenarios where children are heavily disadvantaged by the
actions of their parents, a worry raised by Cripps (2016, p. 382). If the poor were subjected to fines, then there might
be circumstances where a child’s welfare is threatened because the parents are heavily fined for giving birth to the
child. Such scenarios seem deeply unjust because children have no control over the circumstances of their birth.
11
Programs of this sort have been implemented before with some success. A notable example is the EPA’s Acid
Rain Program. See EPA (2016) for an overview.
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allowed to have the appropriate number without, say, losing the tax credits that are usually
reserved for smaller families.12
Whatever incentivization schemes are put into practice, the thresholds for various
incentives would need to be context-sensitive depending on the size of the individual ecological
footprints in a given country. An average person living in Niger, for example, has an ecological
footprint that is less than one-fifth of the ecological footprint of an average person living in the
United States (Global Footprint Network 2016). It is therefore not reasonable for those living in
Niger to face the same financial penalties (or loss of benefits) for having three children as those
who have three children in the United States. Under current circumstances, such a policy would
be unfair: it disproportionately restricts the freedom of people who are contributing relatively
little to the environmental problems that motivate the policy. Furthermore, the people of Niger
(like those in many other developing nations) should be allowed to increase their ecological
footprints so that the country may develop and achieve a decent average standard of living,
presumably lifting many citizens out of poverty in the process. To that end, it is reasonable
incentivize citizens to lower their fertility rates so that the population does not expand so
significantly that increasing per capita consumption becomes morally problematic. But the target
for fertility rate reductions in Niger should not be as low as the target sought in the United States
and other developed nations with large per capita ecological footprints, at least not until some of
the necessary development begins to take place. Perhaps those in the United States really should
only have an allowance of one child per couple whereas those in Niger are permitted without any
12

I am not the first one to consider using a cap-and-trade scheme on children. Albert Mohler (2009) gestures at this
possibility in response to Murtaugh and Schlax’s (2009) study that measures the impact of procreation on the carbon
legacy of individuals. But Mohler views this as a detestable possibility and claims that “the gift of children must
never be seen as an assault upon the Earth.” Obviously, I do not share his outlook on implementing a cap-and-trade
scheme involving an allowed number of children.
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penalty or loss of benefits to have two children per couple.13 The specific numbers are debatable,
of course, but the point is that some variability in the limits on reproduction is appropriate given
the radical difference in ecological impact that the citizens in these countries have.
This variance in national population policy is an important way in which my position
varies from Conly’s (2016). Conly suggests that the imperative to have only one child ought to
apply to everyone. In connection with the importance of our right to bodily autonomy, Conly
(2016) notes that equality is extremely important to us: we want to be able to exercise our rights
to the same extent that others can, and “the sense that we are equal to others, and that others
recognize that, is essential to our well-being” (pp. 90-91). On this basis, she argues that the
constraints on procreation “must apply equally to everyone—not more children for some and
fewer for others” (Conly 2016, p. 92).
The problem with Conly’s position on this matter is that the constraints on procreation
are being proposed in response to a problem where the contributions to it are not equal. Thus,
restricting everyone’s procreation equally violates considerations of fairness: doing so suggests
that everyone has made a roughly equal contribution to the problem, and that is not the case.14 A
fairer way to impose constraints on procreation will impose harsher constraints on those who
have made larger contributions to the problem and lighter constraints on those who have made
smaller contributions.15 The impacts of environmental problems like climate change will also, in
general, be felt more strongly by developing nations with relatively small ecological footprints.

13

This may also be reflected in the cap and trade scheme if such a scheme were implemented globally. So in this
particular case, the right to have a person in the United States might be valued in the global marketplace as
equivalent to twice the price of having a child in Niger.
14
Chen (forthcoming) makes a similar observation in his review of Conly’s One Child.
15
In this manner, our population policies should strive to be consistent with the Polluter Pays principle – the notion
that those who contribute to the problem should bear the burdens of solving the problem or compensating the
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Beyond improving family planning services and education, I have gestured at some
methods of preference adjustment and incentivization that could be employed as part of an effort
to lower fertility rates around the globe. Improving family planning services and preferenceadjustment campaigns would be the main strategies for reducing fertility in the developing
world. Incentivization would be employed primarily in the developed world. Of the three
interventions under consideration, incentivizing measures come the closest to being coercive,
and it is morally appropriate to exert more pressure on wealthier individuals to lower fertility
rates than on others (Hickey, Rieder, and Earl 2016, p. 868). Wealth is a reliable proxy of a
person’s ecological footprint, and so this reflects the view that those who are making larger
contributions to the environmental problems under discussion should bear larger burdens with
respect to addressing the problems.
I now turn to some objections to these policy proposals. I start with two objections I
consider fairly weak and then consider a cluster of stronger, more troubling objections.

Antinatalist Stigma
Rebecca Kukla worries that pursuing preference-adjustment strategies through mass
media would not be able to avoid sending the message that smaller families are a more
responsible choice than larger families. Should these views become entrenched in the
background culture, then women may no longer feel like they have the “unburdened option of
choosing a larger family” (Kukla 2016, p. 872). She also worries that this could result in a loss of
social and economic support for large families. Access to prenatal testing created a prevailing

victims, at least in cases where the pollution is not caused by excusable ignorance. For a critical appraisal of the
Polluter Pays principle in the case of Climate Change, see Caney (2010a).
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norm of discontinuing pregnancies when the fetus has a genetic defect, and disability advocates
worry that this norm may lead to reduced resources for those who choose to carry such a child to
term (Kukla 2016, p. 873). Kukla has a similar fear about parents who want large families,
provided that antinatalist values become sufficiently well-entrenched. She also highlights the
ways in which vulnerable groups (e.g., the economically disadvantaged, women of color, the
disabled) could be particularly harmed by these new cultural norms and the ways in which largefamily stigma would hinder the reproductive autonomy of women even in the developed world.
Hickey, Rieder, and Earl (2016) stress that targeted messaging and careful forethought
regarding the tactics used can avoid the concerns Kukla has in mind (p. 861). Perhaps some of
these concerns can be alleviated, but I am not so sure all the undesirable effects can be avoided.
However, I also believe they have a better response available. In chapter 3, I surveyed many
arguments that supported Antinatalism. While I did not find any of the arguments wholly
successful, the moral considerations underpinning them indicate that the standards for
permissible procreation are very high. Many acts of procreation are undertaken without the
appropriate level of caution or critical reflection on one’s motivations for procreation. As a
result, some children born under these circumstances are subjected to an unacceptable risk of
harm. Since these acts are impermissible, changing cultural norms to favor less procreation
would be preferable to the status quo; as things stand, procreative acts are too often approached
without the care and deliberation that they warrant. Undoubtedly, there will be people who are
made worse off by a change in cultural norms regarding procreation, just as there are currently
people made worse off by cultural norms that put pressure on them to procreate. Neither the
status quo nor a small-family social norm will be perfect, but a shift toward Antinatalism seems
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preferable independent of any concerns about population. The fact that we also need to reduce
population makes the case in favor of antinatalist preference adjustment even more compelling.

Would Significant Population Reduction Make Us Dumber?
A further worry one might have about reducing population concerns its long-term effects.
This objection was illustrated in the 2006 film Idiocracy. The film opens with the observation
that human beings living at the start of the 21st century are no longer affected by the traditional
mechanisms of natural selection that would ensure that people of greater intelligence would be
more likely to survive and reproduce. As a result, since the less intelligent members of society
are more likely to reproduce, human civilization gradually becomes stupider and less civilized
over 500 years. After awakening from a government experiment that left him in suspended
animation until the year 2505, the protagonist Joe Bauers discovers that the United States has
degenerated into complete idiocy and that he, despite being of only average intelligence five
centuries earlier, is the smartest person in the world. During the remainder of the film, Joe is
employed by the president of the United States, a former professional wrestler, to solve a variety
of problems plaguing the country – problems that have been caused by utter foolishness and lack
of forethought. The nation’s crop shortage, for example, results from watering plants with the
sports drink Brawndo instead of ordinary water.
Despite its status as a satire, Idiocracy offers the basis for a more serious concern about
efforts to lower population. Specifically, will it result in the most intelligent members of society
having small families while the less intelligent members have larger families? And if it does, will
we gradually get less intelligent over time as intelligent people have fewer and fewer children?
In the long term, such an outcome could prove very bad – worse than if we had a larger
population with a greater number of intelligent people – because we will make less progress as a
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society, which could even impede our efforts to develop the sustainable technologies that we so
desperately need.
While this line of thought is intriguing, it is not a strong objection to taking measures to
reduce population. First, it is not clear if there is such a thing as all-things-considered
intelligence. Given the varied and multifaceted ways in which we reason about different things, it
may be that intelligence is too varied to be reduced to a single component. One recent
neuroscientific study concluded that different brain structures govern different tasks and that
intelligence manifests in different circumstances according to which cognitive system is being
used (Hampshire et al. 2012). On such a model, how one fares on an intelligence test may vary
widely depending on what skills are being tested, and there may be no coherent way to aggregate
these various intelligences into some holistic concept that we could designate as all-thingsconsidered intelligence.
Second, I am not aware of any data showing that fertility rates negatively correlate with
intelligence as such. There is substantial evidence that women with higher levels of education
have fewer children on average (Jones and Tertilt 2008, Wetztein 2011), but level of education is
not the same as one’s intelligence.16 The level of education that one attains can be influenced by
many factors that have nothing to do with one’s innate intelligence. Some professions require
more education to pursue than others, and those who come from wealthy families will have an
easier time obtaining an education than others will.
Third, assuming that a higher level of education does correlate with intelligence, some of
the policies that I have put forward would actually be favorable to the objector. Those with
16

A recent study also found that this trend was no longer the case in the United States: in the 2000s, women with
advanced degrees increased their fertility levels significantly such that they are no longer clearly having fewer
children than those with lower levels of education (Hazan and Zoabi 2015).
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higher levels of education generally have better prospects at obtaining high-paying jobs, and the
schemes that I have suggested would make it easier for those with higher incomes to maintain
large families than those with more modest incomes.
Fourth, in order for my proposed policies to have the long-term effects that the objector
fears, they would need to be enforced for a very long time (and would probably need to be more
restrictive than what I am advocating). The need to lower fertility rates is a response to our
current predicament. If adequate action is taken to mitigate the environmental degradation that is
taking place, then we can return to higher fertility rates once our population has reached a
sustainable number. The population policies we should pursue will change depending on our
circumstances, and nothing prevents us from altering them in the future if it would be
advantageous for us to do so.

Moral Tragedies and the Hard Questions
Now we turn to some of the bigger challenges to implementing strategies to reduce
population. One of the unfortunate realities of the population predicament is that it may not be
possible to solve the problem while avoiding all unjust outcomes. We know that failing to act
will lead to substantial harm to future people – a great injustice. But there are also effects of
implementing some of the policies I have put forward that may result in significant injustices.
This combination of circumstances may suggest to some readers that none of our available
options is morally permissible. Lisa Tessman (2015) describes these as cases of “moral failure”;
they are also often called “moral dilemmas” (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988; McConnell 2014). I will
refer to these scenarios as moral tragedies. I will not take a stand on whether these moral
tragedies constitute genuine dilemmas in which all our options are morally wrong or whether
they are just difficult moral decisions involving two bad options. In either case, we would still
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need to make a decision about what to do, so I do not think this dispute matters much on the
practical side of things.
The reason we find ourselves in circumstances of moral tragedy is because two
conditions are met: (1) many future people will be severely harmed by environmental
degradation if population is not reduced, and (2) most likely, some present people will be the
victims of significant injustice as a result of population reduction. In chapter 4, I summarized the
harms that jeopardize the welfare of future people. In this section, I will briefly summarize some
of the injustices that present people may suffer if population reduction is pursued and consider
the implications of these consequences for our moral decision-making.
One concern about decreasing population is that there will be too few young members of
the population relative to the number of elderly people (Last 2013, ch. 5). One consequence of
having a smaller working population is that the tax base declines, decreasing government
revenue. Another is that there is an increased demand for medical care, which requires the
government to spend more on health coverage. This combination of effects creates an obvious
problem: either the young, working members of society must bear a greater burden to support the
elderly, or medical care to the elderly must be more strictly rationed. To lessen the burden on the
younger members of society, we might need to consider rationing life-extending health care to
the elderly. Independent of any discussion of population reduction, some have argued that we
ought to ration life-extending health care on the grounds that medical resources are limited and
that keeping the very old alive for a bit longer through expensive procedures is an inappropriate
use of limited resources (Callahan 1995).17 The need to reduce population would seem to make

17

For a recent overview of the issues involved in rationing health care, see Morreim et al. (2014).
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the case for such rationing even stronger, but of course, doing so means that some older members
of society will not receive treatments that could extend their lives.18
Population policies also raise significant concerns about equality. One major concern is
that they will have a disproportionate impact on women, who bear a much larger role in
reproduction than men. Rebecca Kukla (2016) encapsulates the concern as follows:
I think we have plenty of reason to worry that any plausible interventions designed to
reduce fertility will likely have a disproportionate impact on women. In turn, they will
likely enhance an already problematic pattern of gender inequality, and intensify our
interventionism and moralism then it comes to women’s bodies and reproductive
practices. And again, it is especially vexed to heighten such burdens on women while
their sexual and reproductive autonomy is systematically insecure. (p. 876)
The main fear is that women will be subject to substantial pressure from others regarding their
reproductive decisions and that, particularly in societies where their reproductive freedom is
already compromised, their autonomy will be undermined. Some of these concerns can be
mitigated by avoiding certain types of incentives. To offer one illustration, Hickey, Rieder, and
Earl (2016) discuss paying women to attend family planning classes or visit a gynecologist (p.
867). Such incentives might be effective, but they seem to target women exclusively, suggesting
that it is primarily a woman’s responsibility to limit her fertility. Incentives should be gender
neutral insofar as this is possible. Even so, given the prevailing view that women are the ones
who are primarily responsible for their reproductive activities, it is probably naïve to think that
these types of population policies could completely avoid having a disproportionate impact on
women.

18

There may also be situations where the conflict between population reduction and providing adequate medical
care to everyone is more direct, such as if we must choose whether to fund family planning or health care (Mosher
2008, ch. 6).

167

Another concern about inequality stems from who would be able to have large families
under the schemes I have proposed. Since those of lower socioeconomic status will be heavily
incentivized to have smaller families (due to the financial benefits of doing so), large families
may become common only among the very wealthy. After all, under the cap-and-trade scheme I
have proposed, they would be able to afford allowances for many children. Furthermore, even
without a cap-and-trade scheme in place, fines for having too many children would have to be
utterly exorbitant to impact their financial status. In practice, many would be willing and able to
pay the fines to have a larger family. The poor, who would be unable to do so, would be more
likely to have smaller families, and in this manner, family size might become associated with
social class. More worryingly, since the poor are disproportionately likely to be people of color,
these policies could “end up enacting a kind of indirect eugenics” (Kukla 2016, p. 877). Again,
this is a troubling implication that we might be able to mitigate but may not be able to
completely avoid.
The considerations mentioned above are worrying, but perhaps no issue is more befitting
of being called a moral tragedy than immigration policy. Considerations tied to population
complicate this already challenging issue in problematic ways – so much so that some of the
foundational considerations underpinning the issue have to be reassessed. For instance, the
concept of moral equality is typically invoked to generate arguments in favor of an open-borders
immigration policy – a policy in which people are free to cross national borders and relocate to
another country with few or very limited restrictions.19 It is clear that one’s country of origin
plays a very central role in one’s life prospects: people born in the United States will typically
have far better life prospects than those born in Kenya, for example. Yet we do not think that a
19

For some examples, see Cole (2012) and Carens (1987; 2013, ch. 11).
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person being born in a particular country has any effect on their moral value or the moral
significance of their rights and interests. So on what basis do we justify preventing individuals
from migrating to improve their life prospects?
Opponents of open-border positions have generally acknowledged that the moral equality
of persons generates strong objections to their views. Consider Christopher Wellman’s (2008)
diagnosis of the moral-equality objection to closed borders:
For several reasons, this case for open borders presents an especially imposing obstacle to
the prima facie case for the right to restrict immigration outlined above. For starters, both
its moral and empirical premises seem unexceptional. How could one plausibly deny
either that all humans are in some fundamental sense equally deserving of moral
consideration or that the staggering inequalities across the globe dramatically affect
people’s life prospects for living a decent life. Indeed, looked at from this perspective,
sorting humans according to the countries in which they were born appears tantamount to
a geographical caste system. (p. 120)
Wellman then attempts to refute this objection. David Miller (2016, ch. 2) and Michael Blake
(2013) similarly recognize the significance of respecting moral equality and attempt to address
the problem that it poses for their defenses of closed-border positions.
Overpopulation complicates the debate. An appeal to moral equality does not obviously
favor an open-border position if it is understood to extend across generations. In chapter 5, I
argued that we have to regard the harm done to future people as just as morally significant as the
harm done to present people. Future people, at least in this regard, should be regarded as the
moral equals of present people. I also argued that we must stabilize and reduce population to
adequately respond to ongoing environmental degradation. Some developed nations, though they
have achieved fertility rates at or below replacement levels, are still growing because of
immigration, and when citizens from countries with low per capita rates of consumption
immigrate to countries with higher rates of consumption, their individual ecological footprint
increases. As a result, the global environmental degradation is increased. Thus, in the interests of
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protecting future people form harm, some developed nations may need to restrict immigration to
prevent their populations from growing.20 On these grounds, an appeal to moral equality does not
clearly count in favor of an open-borders immigration policy under current conditions.
A further complication arises when we consider climate refugees. The emissions of
developed nations have contributed the most significantly to climate change, so there is a strong
case for claiming that they are morally obligated to accommodate those in developing nations
who are displaced by it (Nawrotzki 2014). But admitting climate refugees will increase the
population of these developed nations and thereby increase their overall ecological footprint and
make it harder for them to lower their overall GHG emissions. Limiting immigration to only
climate refugees might lessen the severity of this problem, but the cost of doing so is that other
refugees, whose lives are in immediate danger, would need to be turned away.
Determining what immigration policies are morally justifiable cannot be done by
considering just one or two arguments,21 but my aim is not to resolve the immigration debate
here. Rather, I am highlighting yet another way in which our collective obligation to reduce
population forces us to make very difficult decisions about what we do. We are faced in a
situation where severe harm will befall some no matter what we do. If we take no action on
population or take only limited action (e.g., providing contraceptive services to the developing
world), then our response to the problem will be inadequate, and future people will suffer severe
harms as a result. If we make a more robust effort to reduce population, then present people will
be harmed. In both scenarios, the people who will be harmed are likely to be members of
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This argument is presented at length with respect to the United States in Cafaro and Staples (2009) and Cafaro
(2015).
21
As the surveys of Wilcox (2009) and Wellman (2015) indicate, there are a plethora of arguments to be considered
in the debate about immigration policy, both for and against open borders.
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vulnerable groups – those who are nonwhite and poor. Remember that the impacts of climate
change will be felt (and are being felt) disproportionately on those in the developing world.
Whichever path we choose, great moral tragedy will occur. So what do we do?
Under such circumstances, considerations of justice do not offer us a resolution. It is not
possible to do justice to all parties involved or protect all parties from harm. The best we can
hope to achieve is to minimize the injustice that occurs and the harm that is suffered. One way to
pursue this strategy is adopting a consequentialism of rights, a strategy discussed by Darrel
Moellendorf (2014) in the context of climate change mitigation. He recognizes the possibility
that some people who will not have their human rights violated under business-as-usual
scenarios will have their human rights violated if we undertake mitigation measures
(Moellendorf 2014, pp. 231-232). If this picture is accurate, then one may wonder how a rightsbased approach favors a policy of mitigation rather than business as usual. After all, rights are
being violated in both scenarios. Moellendorf (2014) suggests that this problem might be
resolved by pursuing “the course of action that is likely to lead to maximal satisfaction of rights”
(p. 232). Of course, this maximizing approach to human rights does run the risk of not according
strong enough protections to the rights of minorities, since the rights of the majority would
appear to always trump the rights of minorities in rights conflicts between these groups, so
perhaps sometimes the rights of minorities would have to be given disproportionate weight in the
calculation. (This consideration is also not relevant to the case we are addressing because the
interests of minority groups will be jeopardized in both scenarios we are considering.)
Another wrinkle to this consequentialism of rights is that some rights violations are worse
than others. Violating someone’s right to life is a more serious moral wrong than violating
someone’s right to bodily autonomy, though both rights are significant. As mentioned briefly in
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chapter 3, the rights that will be violated as a result from unimpeded environmental degradation
will be among the most severe (e.g., the right to life, the right to health, the right to physical
security). There rights violations could be experienced by hundreds of millions of people this
century. Given the staggering numbers and the severity of the rights violations under discussion,
we should prioritize reducing population to avoid these rights violations and accept that some
rights violations, most likely in the form of inequality or coercion that violates reproductive
rights, will be experienced by present people as a result, despite our best efforts to avoid these
outcomes. These results are regrettable, but it would be morally worse for us to not take these
measures to respond to population growth.
This resolution will no doubt strike some readers as troubling. It certainly troubles me. I
would much rather arrive at a solution in which all parties can be treated fairly and protected
from harm. But our circumstances have made such a solution impossible, and we do ourselves no
favors by denying this fact. Moreover, as bad as our options may seem under current
circumstances, they will only get worse the longer that we wait to act. The longer we wait to
slow population growth, the harder it will be to make the reductions in our collective ecological
footprint in time to avert serious harms. Thus, while there are risks associated with pursuing
preference-adjustment and incentivization, these measures must be taken seriously and should be
gradually and cautiously implemented as part of the effort to lower fertility rates. As mentioned
earlier, incentives would be primarily reserved for developed nations, and increased access to
family planning services would be primarily aimed at developing nations. Preference-adjusting
interventions likely have a role to play in both of these groups (in part because of the reasons
unrelated to population growth that favor a less permissive attitude toward the moral
acceptability of procreation). Pursuing these measures is far from a perfect solution, but if the
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aim is to minimize the injustice done to both present and future people, then I believe this
combination of strategies represents our best option.
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CHAPTER 7: THE ETHICS OF INDIVIDUAL PROCREATIVE
DECISION-MAKING
In previous chapters, I argued that we have a collective duty to reduce human population
and surveyed several possible policies that we could enact to accomplish that goal. I have also
considered the undesirable implications of putting these policies into practice but concluded that
they ought to be pursued (with caution) nonetheless. However, in the immediate future, it is
unlikely that the policies I have suggested will be put into action. Even so, individuals still face
important moral questions regarding their own procreative decisions. In light of what has been
discussed with regard to population, how many children are people morally permitted to have?
While prior chapters have focused on the global scope of the population problem and
what we collectively ought to do, it is not societies or nations that have children. People have
children. Furthermore, since extremely coercive policies – that is, those that involve mandatory
abortions or sterilizations – are morally objectionable and impractical, population reduction must
be achieved by individuals’ choices. Thus, we must consider just how many children would-be
parents can permissibly have.

Remembering What’s Been Rejected
In chapter 3, I considered two extreme positions regarding the ethics of procreation:
Antinatalism and Procreative Liberty. According to Antinatalism, it is always morally wrong to
procreate. According to the view I call Procreative Liberty, everyone has a right to procreate an
unlimited number of times. Although I will not repeat the arguments here, it is worth
remembering that both these views have already been dismissed. This observation is important
because it gives us some insight into what an acceptable ethics of individual procreation will
look like.
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Antinatalism is false, so there must be some circumstances in which procreation is
permissible. But Procreative Liberty is also false, so people do not have a right to have as many
children as they like regardless of the circumstances. The correct position must lie somewhere
between these two extremes. These boundaries do not have much practical import, however,
unless we can be more specific. After all, the view that it is only permissible to have one child is
much different than the view that we must limit ourselves to ten children or fewer.
In what follows, I will argue that couples should generally limit themselves to having two
or fewer biological children – the equivalent of one biological child per person. Certainly, there
will be some exceptions to this general rule, such as when a woman becomes pregnant with
triplets or when someone has purchased the rights to additional child through the cap-and-trade
scheme I suggested in chapter 6. The general point, however, is that couples are usually acting
wrongly if they choose to have more than two children – whether or not the policies I have
proposed are put into effect. Call this the Two or Less view.
Christine Overall (2012) and Travis Rieder (2016b) have each already made arguments
defending views similar to Two or Less, although they suggest these positions only apply to
those in the developed world. Since those in the developing world have radically smaller
ecological footprints than those in developed nations, large families do not produce the same
ecological consequences in those regions. Thus, both authors limit the scope of their arguments
to those living in affluent societies.
Overall arrives at her two-child limit by trying to balance the considerations in favor of
procreative limitation with the fact that procreation and child-rearing plays such a central role in
people’s life plans. She objects to a one-child-per-person view by appealing to the general
demandingness of such an obligation, the recognition that such a view does not permit all
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individuals to replace themselves, concerns about the effects of eliminating sibling relationships
altogether, and worries about how a one-child policy could lead to sex selection (Overall 2012,
pp. 181-183). Based on these considerations, Overall (2012) concludes that “an obligation to
have only one child is at most supererogatory and unlikely to be sustainable” (p. 183). The more
sensible position, she reasons, is to claim that adults have the responsibility to limit themselves
to procreative replacement when their children will have large ecological footprints.
Travis Rieder (2016b) does not follow Overall in endorsing a concrete limit on how many
children one may permissibly have. Instead, he articulates reasons for having zero, one, or two
children and then concludes that “whichever precise number may be correct, it seems plausible
that the principles articulated here entail a duty for many of us to have at most two children”
(Rieder 2016b, p. 37). In other words, Rieder thinks that two is the maximum number of
permissible children that a family can have in the developed world. The main principle to which
Rieder (2016b) appeals is a duty not to contribute to massive systematic harms – “a duty not to
inject oneself as an active contributor into the large, causally complex machine” that generates
the catastrophic harm in question (p. 29). Rieder views climate change as an example of a
massive systematic harm, and procreative activities often make a substantial contribution to it.
Thus, those whose procreative activities make such a substantial contribution to climate change
have an obligation to limit their procreative activities and adopt a small family ethic.
My argument for Two or Less differs from these prior arguments for the position in two
ways. First, my argument appeals to the virtues of integrity and mindfulness. The moral
considerations that Overall and Rieder examine are almost exclusively either consequentialist
(e.g., the bad effects of procreation) or deontological (e.g., duties of non-contribution to harm,
concerns about fairness and equity) in nature. Appeals to virtue and character do not play a
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significant role in their arguments.1 Second, my argument is not limited in scope to those in the
developed world. My argument is intended to apply to anyone making a procreative decision,
regardless of where they currently live. In what follows, I will present my argument for Two or
Less and defend it from various objections.

The Integrity Argument for Two or Less2
The first argument for Two or Less appeals to the concept of integrity, a commonly cited
virtue. However, despite the general consensus that integrity is a character trait well worth
having, a precise definition of it is elusive. There are many conceptions of integrity, and each of
them has distinct advantages and disadvantages compared to its competitors (Scherkoske 2013).
Moreover, integrity is sometimes used in a more general way to identify one’s quality of being a
morally good person; as Robert Audi and Patrick Murphy (2006) put the point, “In a great many
cases, ‘integrity’ is a specific sounding term for something like moral soundness, whose exact
character is left unspecified” (p. 8). This general definition is too vague to be useful: it says
nothing about what specific features of integrity are morally praiseworthy or what specific
qualities one must possess to have integrity.
Fortunately, better definitions of integrity are available. Marion Hourdequin (2010),
drawing on Audi and Murphy (2006), highlights two central meanings of integrity: “integration”
and “being integral” (p. 448). She states that being integral “involves the internalisation of
certain commitments, such that these commitments are central to an individual’s identity” (p.
1

Drawing on Jamieson (2014), Rieder (2016b) does acknowledge a small subset of virtues (pp. 56-59), but they do
not play a role in his argument for Two or Less. Rather, he suggests that these virtues could play a role in explaining
why we ought to limit our procreative activities even if we had no strict obligations to limit our procreation. My
argument, in contrast, will appeal to virtues to establish a genuine obligation for individuals to limit procreation to
one child per person.
2
Various portions of this section draw on a related paper that examines whether individuals have a duty to reduce
their individual greenhouse gas emissions. See Hedberg (forthcoming).
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448). Integration is related to being integral because it concerns how one unifies the various
commitments she has so as to avoid conflicts among them. Integration is a special type of unity
among the elements of character that minimizes conflicts among these elements so that “they
form a coherent, ideally a harmonious, structure” (Audi and Murphy 2006, p. 9). In other words,
integrity involves a certain unity of identity: a person of integrity maintains consistency among
her beliefs and behavior across all her different spheres of identity. Hourdequin (2010) applies
this view of integrity to the case of climate change to argue in favor of a duty to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. She argues that a person committed to working toward a solution to
climate change in the political sphere will, in order to satisfy integration, also be committed to
reducing her contribution to climate change in the personal sphere. A failure to act in this way
suggests that this person lacks the “kind of unity that integrity recommends” because her
commitments would be embodied in only a single sphere of her existence rather than all the
different spheres she inhabits (p. 449).
I will ultimately make an argument similar to Hourdequin’s but about population rather
than climate change. Nevertheless, it is worth acknowledging that this account of integrity
cannot be supported so swiftly. As Scherkoske’s (2013) survey indicates, there are at least six
distinct accounts of integrity as a moral virtue.3 Given that controversy, one may wonder why we
should accept an approach to integrity similar to Hourdequin’s rather than one of the competing
views. Fortunately, the appeal to integrity that I will be making relies only on a few of integrity’s
most fundamental features – features that any plausible account of integrity will possess.
3

There is also an error-theoretic account – which suggests that integrity is not a virtue at all – and an account of
integrity as an epistemic virtue. The dominant view is that integrity is a moral virtue, which implies that most
analyses of integrity assume both the error-theoretic and epistemic accounts of integrity are false. My own account
of integrity will bypass issues about what particular account of integrity is correct, but my later remarks about
integrity’s value can be interpreted as an argument against the error-theoretic account.
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Scherkoske (2013) identifies eight “data points” concerning integrity, which refer to the general
ideas that the concept of integrity typically identifies (pp. 29-30):
▪

Stickiness: Integrity is tied importantly to sticking by one’s values and convictions.

▪

Integrity-Within-Reason: A person of integrity must be responsive to reasons;
integrity is not dogmatism.

▪

Range: Integrity is not limited in application to just moral convictions.

▪

Truthfulness: Integrity is centrally tied to traits such as honesty and sincerity.

▪

Coherence: A person of integrity must have her values and convictions properly
cohere with her conduct.

▪

Resoluteness: People of integrity stand by their convictions both individually and
socially and display a special kind of resolve.

▪

Moral Sanity: One cannot have integrity if one is grossly immoral.

▪

Judgment: We are keen to ensure that the people from whom we seek guidance or
mentoring are people of integrity.

A full account of integrity might feature all of these traits (provided all of them could be
endorsed without creating any inconsistency), but since it is controversial whether many of these
data points are central to the concept of integrity, we will be better served by limiting ourselves
to the most central elements of this virtue and crafting an argument that only appeals to these
features.
Coherence, Stickiness, and Resoluteness are the core features of integrity: no plausible
account of integrity can omit any of these elements. Coherence refers to the trait of ensuring a
tight connection between one’s beliefs and one’s actions; it is the feature of integrity that
explains why hypocrisy (which is simply the lack of this coherence) is such a fundamental
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violation of integrity. Stickiness and Resoluteness are related concepts, so much so that
Scherkoske (2013) even describes Resoluteness as a type of “virtuous ‘stickiness’” (p. 29). The
main difference is that Stickiness refers to the willingness to stay mentally committed to one’s
principles while Resoluteness refers to the willingness to demonstrate commitment to those
principles through one’s actions. In this manner, Resoluteness can be seen as Stickiness that
manifests properly in one’s actions.4
The Integrity Argument for Two or Less can be sustained so long as the account of
integrity that is endorsed satisfies Coherence, Stickiness, and Resoluteness. A complete account
of integrity may well involve more than accommodating just these three data points. It may be
impossible for a thoroughgoing Nazi to possess integrity, no matter how well he satisfies
Stickiness, Coherence, and Resoluteness.5 To reiterate, however, I want to keep my account of
integrity minimal so that this argument is not taken to hinge on a convoluted and controversial
conception of it. I maintain that Coherence, Stickiness and Resoluteness are necessary
ingredients any plausible account of integrity and take no stand here on whether anything further
is required. Call this resulting conception of integrity CSR+. The “+” acknowledges that a full
account of integrity may include other important features.
Having specified the details of the CSR+ account of integrity, we can now examine the
argument that uses integrity to argue for Two or Less:
(1) Individuals have a general prima facie obligation to facilitate a collective political
solution to overpopulation.

4

As this phrasing suggests, it is possible to read Resoluteness in a robust way that encompasses Stickiness, but the
convention in the literature has been to separate these traits.
5
It is worth noting that Moral Sanity, even if required, would not threaten the Integrity Argument because working
toward a solution to overpopulation is a morally worthy cause.
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(2) Individuals ought to live with integrity.
(3) Individuals ought to be mindful of the effects of their actions.
(4) If individuals have a general prima facie obligation to facilitate a collective political
solution to overpopulation, ought to live with integrity, and ought to be mindful of the
effects of their actions, then they also have a prima facie obligation to refrain from
having more than two children.
(5) Therefore, individuals have a prima facie obligation to refrain from having more than
two children. [1-4]
The argument has valid form, so any flaws it contains must reside in the premises. I have already
made the case for (1) in chapters 4 and 5 of the dissertation. It should be obvious at this point
that we have a collective duty to stabilize and reduce global population. Individuals are limited in
what they can do to enact change themselves, but at a minimum, they should adopt a
commitment to cooperate in the quest to find a solution. Minimally, those in democratic societies
with the power to vote should, when possible, strive to elect politicians who take overpopulation
seriously and are committed to developing a solution to it. I will leave it open what more this
obligation may require, but the general point is that it is a commitment that all should share.
Supporting (2) is more complicated. To explain why one ought to live with integrity, we
need to consider why integrity is valuable – why it is something worth cultivating in ourselves. A
skeptic might wonder, especially given the disagreement over what integrity is, whether integrity
is actually just misidentified as various other virtues. Perhaps it does not really identify anything
valuable after all. The skeptic is right in thinking that integrity is a mysterious concept and that
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its careless use has been the cause of some significant philosophical confusion.6 Nevertheless,
there seems be a fairly significant consensus in the literature on at least one trait of integrity: it is
a good thing (Scherkoske 2013).7 And on reflection, we can offer several reasons for thinking
that integrity is valuable.
Integrity’s value can in part be illustrated by considering how people react to certain
unusual cases. Consider this example from Thomas Hill (1979):
She [an old woman in Nazi Germany] lives on modest savings and offers no support to
the Nazi regime either physically or morally. When the latest discriminatory laws against
Jews are enforced, she is moved to protest. As a non-Jew she could have remained silent
and thereby avoided much subsequent harassment. She is regarded as a silly eccentric and
so cannot expect to make an impact on others, much less to stop the Nazi machinery. She
still feels she should speak up, but she wonders why (p. 84).8
This woman takes a stand against the Nazi regime even though it works against her self-interest
and even though her protest is unlikely to contribute to solving the problem, but most do not
regard her behavior as being irrational. In fact, we often praise individuals who take these kinds
of symbolic stands to oppose practices that appear grossly unjust, even when their protests work
to their individual disadvantage and do not make a difference to solving the problem. One
explanation for this praiseworthiness is that these individuals exemplify integrity: they are
unwilling to abandon their deeply held moral convictions even when it is disadvantageous for
them not to do so.
6

The relative scarcity of explicit discussion of integrity in classic virtue ethics literature also contributes to this
problem, as noted by Audi and Murphy (2006, pp. 3-4).
7
This is especially true in the literature on business ethics. See Audi and Murphy (2006, pp. 7-8).
8
Hill (1979) examines acts of symbolic protest from a more deontological perspective; my borrowing of his case
does not mean that I read him as endorsing my integrity-based analysis.
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Hourdequin (2010) provides two additional reasons to believe that integrity is valuable.
First, integrity takes proper account of human psychology: it explains why it is undesirable and
unrealistic to promote or allow for serious discord among one’s political and personal
commitments. People are generally happier when their aims and values within the different
spheres they inhabit are unified rather than in conflict because they will avoid the unpleasant
cognitive dissonance that such discord creates. Second, integrity is valuable because it
communicates to others the seriousness with which people hold their particular commitments. In
Hourdequin’s (2010) words:
Interpersonally, integrity is a virtue from the perspective of intersubjective intelligibility
and in affirming to others the authenticity of one’s commitments. Where we see in others
a lack of coherence between their political commitments and personal choices, we often
wonder how to make sense of this apparent mismatch, and we may question the sincerity
with which certain commitments are held. A politician’s environmental commitments, as
embodied in public pronouncements and legislative support, for example, may be called
into question if he or she lives a lavish and environmentally damaging lifestyle (p. 451).
In this manner, some of integrity’s value can be explained through consequentialist
considerations: if we want to enact serious political change, we must appropriately unify our
commitments so that others will take them seriously. In our personal actions, we must manifest
the social change that we want to see in the world. If we do not act this way, then others will
question whether we are really as committed to our cause as we claim.
It is crucial not to underestimate the value of integrity with respect to its social
significance. Dale Jamieson (1992) highlighted its importance with respect to climate change 25
years ago when he noted that approaching climate change from the perspective of calculating
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probable outcomes had “made us cynical calculators and institutionalized hypocrisy” (p. 150).
Since we can all reason that our individual contributions to climate change are small and
(seemingly) negligible, the effects of climate change seem fated to occur regardless of what we
(individually) do, which means that we have no reason to change our individual behavior. If
everyone reasons this way, the large-scale social change required will not come to pass. Thus, if
this social change is to occur, “it is important that there be people of integrity and character who
act on the basis of principles and ideals” (pp. 150‒151). This does not mean that the value of
integrity is reducible to its utility in solving climate change or other collective action problems.
Rather, the point is that promoting integrity (and other relevant virtues) is particularly important
in the context of collective action problems. When confronted with these kinds of problems, even
the staunchest utilitarians have reasons to take virtue seriously (Jamieson 2007).
We can see from the prior arguments that the claim that we should live with integrity is
more than mere rhetorical banter. Integrity is a genuine virtue, and thus, it is a character trait
worth cultivating in ourselves. Premise (2) is defensible. The next challenge is supporting
premise (3).
One of the unfortunate aspects of living in contemporary society, especially in the wake
of globalization, is that our actions often have very far-reaching consequences. If we are to act in
morally responsible ways, we have to develop some awareness of these consequences. Dale
Jamieson (2007) refers to this process as the cultivation of mindfulness, a virtue that proves
particularly important in the context of environmental decision-making:
Much of our environmentally destructive behavior is unthinking, even mechanical. In
order to improve our behavior we need to appreciate the consequences of our actions that
are remote in time and space. A virtuous green would see herself as taking on the moral
weight of production and disposal when she purchases an article of clothing (for
example). She makes herself responsible for the cultivation of the cotton, the impacts of
the dyeing process, the energy costs of the transport, and so on. Making decisions in this
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way would be encouraged by the recognition of a morally admirable trait that is rarely
exemplified and hardly ever noticed in our society. (Jamieson 2007, pp. 181-182)
Mindfulness is not just an environmental virtue, however. A general imperative to be minimally
informed is required for us to act appropriately with respect to any moral decision.
Exercising moral virtues and acting rightly requires being informed (Kawall 2010; Jenni
2003). If we do not have accurate information, we are at risk of making moral mistakes when we
act. Thus, we have a general duty to be mindful of the effects of our actions and try to understand
how they could impact others. Certainly, it is beyond human capacities to be fully informed
about every morally significant event currently occurring, but we at least ought to investigate the
matters that are most salient and in which we are personally implicated, particularly when the
information about these issues is prevalent and can be accessed at low costs to us (Kawall 2010,
pp. 111‒116).
Admittedly, living up to the requirement expressed in premise (3) can be challenging. We
are relatively unaccustomed to thinking with the long-term vision that mindfulness requires.
Even so, being aware of the consequences of one’s actions is a fundamental requirement of
acting ethically. In light of the fact that our actions can have a substantial impact upon those who
are geographically and temporally distant from us, we have three options: we can give up on
trying to live ethically, we can live in ways that ensure our actions do not have far-reaching
consequences, or we can try to be mindful of the consequences of our actions and reduce their
negative impacts. If we take moral demands seriously, then the first option is unacceptable. The
second option might be acceptable, if we are willing to live in the minimalist ways that it would
require. Most of us, however, are not willing to forego the social and individual benefits
provided by globalization and technological progress. We are not willing to disconnect from the
power grid and pursue life in a rustic mountain village. Thus, for most of us, we are left only
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with the third option – trying to be aware of the consequences of our actions and curtail our
harmful behaviors accordingly.
With premise (3) defended, we can now turn to premise (4). This portion of the argument
is where CSR+ does its work. If CSR+ is endorsed, then (4) becomes a fairly strong claim.
Coherence captures the notion that such a person should bring their conviction in the political
sphere into alignment with their behavior in the personal sphere. Stickiness and Resoluteness
establish that this person should hold firm to their convictions and resist temptations to
compromise them, abandon them, or fail to act on them.9 Thus, if one seeks to maintain integrity,
adopting a political commitment to work toward stabilizing and reducing human population
entails adopting a personal commitment not to promote population growth in one’s own actions.
If both members of a couple claim that it is important to reduce population growth but then
proceed to have three children or more in a series of intentional ordinary pregnancies, they are
either acting incoherently, failing to live up to their own moral standards because of weakness of
will, or inadequately informed about the consequences of their procreative activities.10
At this juncture, one might suggest that it is not possible for some people in the world to
acquire accurate information about the impact of population growth. Uncovering the truth about
the impacts of population growth is not as easy as it could be, especially since it has received less

9

This is particularly important with respect to GHG emissions because most developed countries (especially the
consumerist United States) present many temptations for frivolously increasing one’s individual emissions,
sometimes without even receiving any meaningful benefit from doing so.
10
A moral assessment of procreative decisions where the members of the couple disagree about how many children
per person can be permissibly conceived would be more complicated. I assume that we can make compromises in
relationships – even about important things – without violating our personal integrity. My hope, however, is that the
arguments in prior chapters will illustrate that we all should share the political commitment to cooperate in reducing
human population and that we should be particularly reluctant to renege on this commitment at either the personal or
political level. The problem is just too grave to be lax in these commitments.
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coverage in the recent past than it deserves.11 Nevertheless, given the scope and magnitude of
population growth’s impacts and the fact that all individuals affect population size through their
procreative decisions, this issue is one that we should be particularly committed to researching
and understanding. There are surely some people who are genuinely unable to learn about the
effects of population growth – perhaps because they live in dire poverty with no internet access
and few other resources for acquiring information – and for this reason, the Integrity Argument
will probably not apply to them. They may not be blameworthy for underestimating the moral
significance of their procreative decisions and may be able to maintain integrity by acting in
ways that are consistent with their false beliefs. Even so, maintaining integrity by holding false
beliefs is not a morally or epistemically laudable ambition, and the sources cited elsewhere in
this manuscript indicate that accurate information on population growth’s impacts can usually be
found without great difficulty. While the number of people who are genuinely unable to uncover
accurate information about population growth is hard to specify, we should not conclude that
these exceptions undercut the general rule. Given the stakes, the presumption should be that
people have this obligation and need to inquire about the subject before we absolve them of their
obligation.12
If this reasoning is correct, then all four premises are true, and we must accept the
argument’s conclusion: we have a prima facie obligation to refrain from having more than two
children. This obligation may be overridden in extreme cases, but the presumption is that two
11

The mass media often ignores or understates the significance of population growth, but the problem runs deeper
than that. Shragg (2015) documents a number of environmental organizations and institutes that do not acknowledge
the contribution of overpopulation to the environmental problems that they are trying to resolve (pp. 23-32). Some
examples include the Jane Goodall Institute, The Nature Conservancy, and the Rainforest Action Network.
12
This requirement holds with respect to procreation in general, independent of overpopulation. As discussed in
chapter 3, many moral considerations suggest that procreation is not permissible nearly as often as people typically
believe. So people should investigate whether their circumstances permit procreation even when population growth
is not a concern.
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children is the limit. This presumption will be particularly strong for those living in the
developed world where the environmental impact of having children is extremely high, but this
argument is intended to apply to everyone. Under present circumstances, the political
commitment that starts the argument is one that all human beings should share.

Objections to the Integrity Argument
Even if the prior reasoning appears persuasive, one might think that having integrity is
actually not worth cultivating because living with integrity is too demanding. Most believe that
there are limits to what morality can reasonably demand of us. As individuals, we must be
allowed some choice in how we live so that we can pursue personal projects and ambitions that
are important to us; otherwise, life would cease to have the meaningfulness that we usually
associate with human flourishing. According to this objection, it might be morally praiseworthy
to live with integrity to the degree required by the Integrity Argument, but doing so is
supererogatory.
Consider the earlier example of the woman who voices her criticism of the Nazis. This
behavior may be morally praiseworthy, and it may exemplify integrity. Still, it does not follow
from those facts alone that acting with integrity is all-things-considered desirable. Living with
integrity could, at least in the context of how we impact the environment, be quite demanding
given the severity of the environmental problems we face and the various ways in which the
great majority of us contribute to the problem. The demandingness may be particularly
pronounced for those in the developed world since people in these countries have such
substantial ecological footprints. In many cases, radically reducing our ecological footprint may
have negative effects not only on us but also on our families, friends, and others who depend on
us. If living with integrity really demands so much of us, then perhaps it is not really something
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worth cultivating in ourselves. One could just bite the bullet and claim that integrity is, perhaps
like many other virtues, a challenging character trait to develop and sustain, but such a response
is unlikely to placate objectors. The Integrity Argument requires a stronger defense.
By way of an initial response, appeals to demandingness are sometimes greatly
exaggerated. Many so-called “sacrifices” of living in a more eco-friendly way are not really
sacrifices at all; they are just lifestyle changes. Some of them even work to our advantage in the
long run. Some people will be a little uncomfortable in the summer if they set the air conditioner
to 75 degrees instead of 72, but in a few weeks, they will adapt. Then this lifestyle change will
actually be to their benefit because they will save money on utility expenses. It is also worth
reiterating a point made in chapter 5: the values and lifestyles that our consumption supports do
not clearly make our lives significantly better (Andreou 2010; Gambrel and Cafaro 2010;
Gardiner 2012, pp. 244‒245). The claim that a lifestyle change is “too demanding” may often
serve as a mere rationalization for avoiding minor lifestyle changes. Tying these thoughts
together, the general point is that living in a more eco-friendly way need not be construed as a
debilitating sacrifice. Like the bullet-biting reply, however, this point cannot suffice as a
response by itself. What about real sacrifices? Are we really required to limit our family size or
potentially forego child-rearing experiences altogether?
Integrity does not make such harsh demands on a person. Remember that one of the core
features of integrity is Coherence – the unity of one’s values and convictions. We are all likely to
have a large number of values and convictions that conflict with our commitment to reducing our
ecological footprint. We may value the welfare of our spouse or children and not want to subject
them to harsh lifestyle changes that would make their lives significantly worse. We might find
great aesthetic value in film but recognize that we cannot easily view films without using

189

electronic devices that are powered by fossil fuels. We may love our family members and value
getting to see them over the holidays even though it requires us to fly across the country (an
activity that emits a lot of GHGs). In these cases, we have conflicts between various values we
hold, and we have to determine how to settle them. In all likelihood, different values will survive
these conflicts in different contexts. We might even compromise between values, for instance, by
deciding to only fly across the country twice a year instead of three or four times. It is obvious,
however, that if we never choose to act in ways that reduce our ecological footprint, then we lack
integrity: either we are rationalizing our unwillingness to change our ways, or we do not
genuinely hold the commitments that we claim to hold.
Remember that the Integrity Argument allows individuals to permissibly have up to two
children, even if they live in a part of the world where their environmental footprints are large.
Moreover, as discussed in chapter 3, the fundamental interests associated with having children
can be achieved by having only one child. Having two children (or fewer) is not a debilitating
sacrifice. In fact, even just limiting the scope to our contributions to climate change, some
philosophers have argued for far harsher duties regarding how much we ought to reduce our
ecological footprints.13 Given how large a role population growth plays in exacerbating
environmental problems (especially climate change), a limit of one child per person is perfectly
reasonable: couples will still be able to enjoy the most substantial benefits associated with having
children while tempering their impact on the environment. The Integrity Argument should not be
dismissed because of concerns about demandingness.

13

Nolt (2013b) argues that we have a moral obligation to stop using all unnecessary GHG-emitting devices. Broome
(2014, ch. 5) argues that individuals are required to live in a carbon neutral way – that is, they must live such that the
net balance of carbon emitted into the atmosphere over their lives is zero. On Broome’s view, this does not mean
that we refrain from emitting all GHGs: we can achieve this carbon neutrality through offsetting our emissions.
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A skeptic might think the concern about demandingness could be put a different way,
however. Perhaps the problem is that people, even when they have access to the relevant
information, are incapable of psychologically accepting the implications of the facts. Perhaps
they cannot grasp the significance of the information or are in the grip of fear or anger so deep
that they cannot take the facts at face value. For these reasons, living up to the requirements of
integrity and mindfulness is too demanding because doing so violates the principle of “ought”
implies “can” (which I briefly discussed in chapter 3). According to this principle, people cannot
be morally obligated to do what they cannot in fact do: being morally required to φ entails an
ability to φ. Such a principle is deeply appealing because it explains why we routinely excuse
otherwise unethical behavior when we realize the person could not have reasonably avoided
acting as they did. If people really are incapable of cultivating this degree of integrity and
mindfulness, then perhaps we ought to excuse them from this obligation.
It is possible to challenge the “ought” implies “can” principle,14 but I will grant it for the
sake of argument. How many people genuinely lack the ability to cultivate this degree of
integrity and mindfulness? The answer depends in part on our perspective. Developing these
virtues will usually take some time and effort. The development and maintenance of integrity is
an ongoing, interminable process because we are often tempted to abandon or compromise our
values. With mindfulness, the challenge is different but no less significant: we have to be
constantly receptive to information and how that information applies to the geographically and
temporally distant effects of our actions. Nevertheless, the development of these virtues can be
achieved with practice – a process sometimes called habituation. This process is not foreign to
how we might approach other problems in environmental ethics. Many believe, for instance, that
14

See, for example, Martin (2009) and Graham (2011).

191

it is wrong to consume factory-farmed meat, but it may be difficult to instantly cull all factory
farmed meat from one’s diet. Rather than give up hope, however, one should work to reduce
one’s meat consumption gradually over time until this eating habit can finally be abandoned
altogether.
The real question is whether people are willing and able to engage in the process of
habituation to the degree necessary to realize the necessary level of integrity and mindfulness.
An empirical question of this sort is hard to resolve, and I imagine there are some for whom it
will be psychologically impossible. But I also believe that we ought not to underestimate
people’s potential in this regard. Too often, concerns about psychological difficulty are used as a
means of rationalizing moral apathy. Too often, they serve as a justification for not taking any
action in the first place. We may not have a clear grasp of what we are psychologically capable
of, but adopting a defeatist attitude about cultivating these virtues is a surefire way to fail in our
quest to cultivate them. We will do better to assume that their cultivation is possible and strive to
achieve that goal, even if that goal turns out to be more of an ideal than something that is
achievable for everyone. In short, there are good reasons to act as if these virtues are attainable
even if some will fail in their efforts to cultivate them. We should strive to expand the scope of
our moral awareness and the extent to which we live up to our values and not be content with
leaving them where they are, at least so long as we can clearly do better.15
An alternative objection may arise from the argument’s starting assumption. While it is
clear that population growth is a significant problem, a pessimist about our current political
systems might reject the claim that we have any individual obligation to adopt the political
15

The view expressed here is similar in spirit to one defended by Raterman (2012). According to his position, while
we are not required to become environmental martyrs, we should generally strive to do more than whatever we
currently do with respect to limiting our contributions to environmental harm.
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commitment that begins the argument. Take the United States as an illustrative example. The
national political system is beholden to large financial donors who are invested in maintaining a
carbon-based economy and maintaining economic growth, and the system strongly discourages
genuine third-party alternatives. Under these circumstances, it may not seem like adopting a
political commitment accomplishes much. After all, are any politicians seriously going to push
for constraints on procreative freedom? This line of thought may prove even more powerful in
countries like Denmark or Russia where the political pull is often in the direction of encouraging
their citizens to have more children. Guaranteed ineffectiveness in the political arena would
undermine the presence of a duty to work toward a collective solution to overpopulation and
thereby threaten the Integrity Argument’s starting point. Since it would be impossible to achieve
a collective solution to overpopulation, one would have little reason to pursue the attainment of
that solution.
There are two basic responses to this objection. The first, which we might call the
optimistic response, is to deny that political action is doomed to be insignificant or ineffective.
Just as there are corporate and political interests in avoiding discussion or pursuit of population
reduction, there are also corporate and political interests interested in encouraging people to have
fewer children. These are not just limited to organizations with environmental aims, such as the
Population Institute; they also include organizations that are simply interested in promoting
women’s sexual and reproductive health, such as Planned Parenthood.16 The political landscape,
in other words, is not a one-way street. Furthermore, it is becoming more socially acceptable (at
least in many areas of the world) to have fewer children, and we have evidence from prior
16

Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned that I would not specify in great detail precisely what – beyond responsible
voting – the political obligation requires. However, for those worried that voting may be ineffective, involvement in
these organizations may serve as an alternative means of adopting the political commitment.
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chapters that people can be motivated to have fewer children through means that are not as
politically objectionable as extremely coercive measures. There is no reason to assume that
cultural shifts in procreative norms could not make certain political views palatable even though
they are presently unfavorable. In the United States, such a cultural shift took place rather rapidly
with respect to general acceptance of homosexuality. The political picture is not yet bleak
enough to give up hope in the effectiveness of political action.17
Additionally, even if one remains worried about the effectiveness of political action, I
argue that such a defeatist perspective ought to be avoided. Adopting an attitude of resignation
with respect to political action toward population growth only makes it more likely that the
problem will remain unsolved until it is too late to escape its gravest effects. If belief in political
ineffectiveness becomes widespread, it may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy by inhibiting the
social change that is a necessary catalyst for a lasting solution to population growth. Given the
severity of the impacts of population growth and the many problems to which it contributes, we
must resist adopting this outlook: we should not promote this attitude in ourselves or others and
must act as if political action (of some sort) can make a difference, even if our doubts persist. If
we act to the contrary, then we are only increasing the chances that our worries will be realized
and that our efforts at avoiding environmental catastrophe will fail.

Why Not One Child?
Suppose that my reasoning thus far has been persuasive. Many readers will be left with a
curious question: why don’t the arguments from the previous sections lead us to the conclusion
17

Karen Shragg (2015) is one activist who has recently argued that the population problem is solvable, although she
does not think that the solution will start with appealing directly to politicians. She believes that first a grassroots
movement will need to demonstrate to politicians that there is a “groundswell of concern out there demanding their
action” (Shragg 2015, p. 76).
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that we should limit ourselves to a single child? In chapter 3, I argued that the fundamental
interests associated with rearing children can be satisfied with only one child. In chapter 4, I
emphasized the severity of various environmental crises on the horizon and the ways in which
population growth contributes to these problems. If the problems are really as serious as I have
indicated, why are couples permitted to have two children rather than just one?
Overall actually considers a similar concern in her own treatment of the issue and offers
several responses. Some of her responses appeal to the effects of a one-child imperative, such as
encouraging people to have families where children never have siblings and the ways in which
this could promote sex selection (Overall 2012, p. 182). She also notes that such an obligation
would be hard to sustain at a societal level because noncompliance of others and the knowledge
that future people might not need to make these procreative sacrifices could undercut one’s
motivation to live up to this one-child imperative (pp. 181-182). These concerns, however, are
best understood as reasons why such an obligation might not be feasible as a social policy or
might be challenging for individuals to adhere to. Such concerns are reasonable but not pertinent
to what is under discussion here. In this chapter, we are trying to establish what individuals
morally ought to do. General concerns about policy implications or the effects of people not
living up to their moral obligations do not establish that they lack the moral obligation to limit
themselves to one child per couple.
Overall also offers an argument against a one-child obligation based on a right for
individuals to replace themselves through procreation. Since her articulation of the argument is
brief, I present the relevant passage here in its entirety:
...I suggest that a further problem with the one-child-per-couple obligation is that it
implicitly negates one person in the couple. If a couple has two children, however, there
is a child for each one—not in the sense that each raises only one child, but in the sense
that each individual has replaced himself or herself. By contrast, a moral rule of only one
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child per couple says, in effect, “You ought not to replace yourself.” (Perhaps it would
also carry the message “You do not deserve to be replaced.”) (Overall 2012, p. 182)
Overall’s reasoning here is hard to decipher, but the core idea appears to be that there is
something morally objectionable about the following moral principle: you ought not to replace
yourself. The underlying thought may be that all people, merely by virtue of being rational and
autonomous agents, have a right to replace themselves through procreation. Alternatively, the
parenthetical remark may indicate the real problem – the concern that such a moral imperative
would carry with it a pejorative message that we ought not promote.
Unfortunately, I cannot see an interpretation of this argument that renders it plausible.
The moral rule we are considering is contingent upon certain background conditions – namely,
overpopulation and its ongoing effects – and so the moral rule of one-child-per-couple would say
something more akin to “Under current conditions of overpopulation, not all people ought to
replace themselves.” This principle clearly doesn’t connote the pejorative implication that people
“do not deserve” to be replaced since it is derived from tragic social circumstances. (The
rationale for the principle has nothing to do with what people deserve.) The notion that a person
in a couple is “negated” when they are only allowed to have one child is also puzzling: it is not
as if parents designate that a particular child is the father’s replacement or the mother’s
replacement. Both parents claim the child as theirs. Why is it so important that parents be
allowed to have enough children to ensure numerical replacement, particularly when the
consequences of their doing so contribute to such significant detrimental consequences?
Overall later suggests that what is objectionable about a one-child-per-couple obligation
is that it does not properly acknowledge the value of adult human beings. Although not directly
stated, this claim can be inferred from what she says about the benefits of a one-child-per-person
obligation:
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All persons get to (try to) have a child of “their own,” if they want one, and the value of
every adult is implicitly endorsed through the fact that each one is allowed to reproduce
herself or himself. Such a responsibility implies that every person is sufficiently valuable
to be worth replacing… (Overall 2012, p. 183).
The suggestion here is that a one-child-per-couple policy would not imply that every person is
sufficiently valuable to be worth replacing, but Overall is mistaken in her belief that a one-childper-couple obligation entails this claim about the value of people’s lives. In fact, the justification
for this restriction on procreation arises directly from a concern about the value of people’s lives
– particularly, the negative value associated with widespread human suffering. In advocating a
one-child-per-couple obligation, we would be claiming that the welfare loss of present and future
people is so significant that we must limit our procreative activities. This reasoning does not
imply making judgments about who is worth replacing and who is not. In fact, what we hope in
the long term is that we can create background conditions that will enable people to “replace
themselves” through procreation with greater liberty. In light of these considerations, I cannot
see a reason why the parents’ ability to achieve numerical replacement could be regarded as so
morally important as to render a one-child-per-couple obligation problematic.
Overall does, however, allude to one other argument against a one-child-per-couple
obligation that is more promising than these others. She notes that this procreative limitation
could be a substantial hardship for many people, especially for single people who will not be
able to procreate unless they can find another single person who has no children. Based on these
considerations, she remarks that a one-child-per-couple obligation is “at most supererogatory”
(Overall 2012, p. 183). Given the hardship that a one-child policy imposes on many people and
the central role that child-rearing plays in so many people’s lives, an obligation for couples to
restrict themselves to only one child.
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While I believe that it is morally better – at least at the present time and under ordinary
circumstances – to have only a single child or to have none at all, it is only morally required that
a couple not have more than two. The replacement rate is approximately 2.1 births per woman,
so having two children will not increase the overall population in the long term (though it will
also not do much to slow its growth). Stabilizing and reducing human population can only be
achieved through large-scale collective action, so it is unreasonable to demand that individuals
undertake severe sacrifices in the absence of a collective scheme to address the problem unless
their actions are making the problem worse. People value their children for many reasons, and
children often occupy a prominent role in people’s life plans.18 A birth rate of two children per
woman does not make the population problem worse: collectively, we need to aim for a lower
birth rate than this, but at least this birth rate would eventually bring us to a population that was
not continuously growing in size. A birth rate of three children per woman, on the other hand,
would clearly make the problem worse because it would cause the population to grow.
The general moral principle applicable to cases of individual procreation might be put
this way: absent any collective scheme to stabilize or reduce human population, individuals
ought to act in such a way that their individual actions do not clearly make the population
problem worse. In practice, this means that all couples should strive for two children or fewer
and that all individuals should refrain from procreating more than the equivalent of one child per
person. The prima facie obligation established by the Integrity Argument applies to everyone,

18

See Dillard (2010) for a survey of the reasons that people value having children.
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regardless of where they live, and although there will be exceptions in unusual cases, 19 the
standard of Two or Less is one we should all follow.

19

Since those in developing countries have a lower ecological footprint than those in the developed world, citizens
in developing countries will sometimes have an easier time arguing that their individual circumstances constitute an
exception to this general obligation. Nevertheless, the obligation extends to everyone, and the default position is that
two children is the maximum.
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CHAPTER 8: LINGERING QUESTIONS
Overpopulation contributes to a host of environmental problems, the most notable of
which are climate change and biodiversity loss. Since these problems cannot be addressed
entirely by reducing our rates of environmentally harmful consumption, we must also strive to
halt population growth and (in the long term) reduce global population to a level that we can
sustain for the long term. In pursuing the goal of population reduction, we want to enact policies
that are no more coercive than what is required to solve the problem. Thus, we should start by
increasing access to contraception and family planning services, increasing educational
opportunities for women in the developing world, and promoting awareness of the contributions
that population growth makes to various problems around the world. These measures, however,
are unlikely to be enough on their own, and so we will also need to consider methods of
preference adjustment and incentivization that could be effective in lowering fertility rates. Even
if no substantial policy efforts are made to reduce population, I have also argued that individuals
should have two or fewer children on the grounds of maintaining integrity.
Despite the arguments I have presented thus far, several important questions about this
issue remain unaddressed. In this chapter, I raise some of these lingering questions and highlight
some of the moral considerations that future research on solving the population problem will
need to investigate.

What About the Nonhuman Community?
Throughout this dissertation, I have assumed an anthropocentric perspective. I have only
examined the effects of environmental degradation insofar as they matter to human beings. I
believe, along with many other environmental ethicists, that some members of the nonhuman
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community have direct moral standing and that their interests ought to be considered when we
make moral decisions, but I have said nothing about how much these interests matter or how
they ought to be factored into our deliberations about solving the population problem. Even in
my discussion of biodiversity loss, biodiversity was only presented as valuable in virtue of its
instrumental value to human beings.
While I encourage other environmental ethicists to catalogue the effects of population
growth on the nonhuman community and debate the moral significance of those effects, I have
deliberately avoided doing so for two reasons. First, I have sought to demonstrate that we should
stabilize and reduce population even if we adopt the most minimal assumptions about moral
status possible. Non-anthropocentric arguments do not carry the same weight in policy
discussions as anthropocentric arguments, and hinging my arguments on claims about the moral
status of animals may allow skeptics about their status to easily dismiss my arguments. My
arguments do not hinge on any controversial claims about the moral standing on nonhuman life
(or anything else in the nonhuman world).
Second, however strong my arguments are, they will be much stronger if the moral
significance of animal suffering is taken into account and if species extinctions are evaluated
through a non-anthropocentric lens. When assessing the gravity of the population problem, I
gave no weight to animal suffering, and I said nothing about how biodiversity loss adversely
affects the lives of animals in various ecosystems. To the extent that these non-anthropocentric
considerations are morally significant, they will only increase the significance of the population
problem. This effect will likely be most pronounced with respect to animal agriculture. We
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slaughter billions of animals annually for human consumption,1 and billions more are harvested
from the sea.2 People require food for sustenance, so the more people there are, the greater the
need to slaughter animals for consumption. While it is possible for many of us to survive on
vegetarian diets, most in the world do not, and under current circumstances, rising population
leads to rising pressures to farm more animals and harvest more fish. The way these creatures are
raised and harvested often subjects them to severe suffering.3 To name a few of the more
common ways these animals suffer, fish often die of suffocation, pigs and other animals have
their throats cut or stabbed (often without being stunned beforehand), chickens live in cramped
and crowded battery cages where they lack the space to even stretch their wings, and veal calves
are confined to such small spaces that they can barely move at all. Any ethic that takes animal
suffering seriously will regard these harms as quite severe, particularly given their enormous
frequency: to reiterate, the number of animals under killed for human consumption every year is
well over 100 billion on even the most conservative estimates.
If what I have argued in earlier sections of the dissertation is correct, then we have a
moral duty to stabilize and reduce population when we limit moral consideration to just human
beings and human interests. If we extend the scope of moral consideration to include members of
the nonhuman community, then we will only find further support for such a duty. For this reason,

1

Current data is compiled by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (2017) and can be accessed at
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data. Their data from 2010 concludes that roughly 63 billion animals were
slaughtered that year, and this figure recurs in the literature somewhat frequently (e.g., Benatar 2015, p. 116 fn 43;
Wadiwel 2015, p. 6 fn 17), although their estimates exclude animals that die in the process of collecting animal
products (like eggs and milk) or are killed by human beings for recreational purposes.
2
The number of marine animals that die annually is quite difficult to estimate due to variance in regional fisheries
and the fact that catches are reported in weight rather than individual fish caught. Estimates range from 90 billion
(ADAPTT 2017) to over 1 trillion (Mood & Brooke 2010).
3
A brief but chilling list of the types of suffering these animals endure is found in Benatar (2015, pp.94-95).
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my arguments in prior chapters very likely understate the moral importance attached to the
population problem.

How Many People Should We Aim For?
Throughout this dissertation, I have stressed a need to eventually reduce our population
below our current levels. I have not, however, specified exactly what number we should target in
the long term. As mentioned in chapter 1, some have advocated that we pursue a target of two
billion people, an approximation of how many people the Earth could sustainably support if
everyone lived a lifestyle similar to those currently living in Europe (Smail 1997, Foreman
2012). Karen Shragg (2015) sets the number even lower – 1.5 billion (p. 94).
I have not specified a number because I expect this number will change significantly in
the future. Given the current population – about 7.4 billion people – it is clear that we should aim
for something lower. That will be even truer in the future when global population approaches 9
billion, an outcome that is virtually guaranteed regardless of what population policies we pursue,
since it will take time to alter our demographic trajectory. Simultaneously, technological
improvements could alter the number of people that the planet can sustain: the number of people
we can accommodate on Earth is not infinite, but this number is also not static. So for now we
should aim to stop population growth and start shrinking our numbers. Once our numbers are on
the way down, we can reassess exactly how much shrinking should take place. I do not think we
can specify in advance what our long-term target should be.

What About Religious Exemptions?
Some readers may be curious whether certain individuals may be exempt from general
population policies. Specifically, some may believe that restrictions on procreation would be a
violation of their religious freedom. Sometimes, we recognize religious exemptions to state laws
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that allow individuals or organizations not to abide by certain laws that conflict with their
religious beliefs. Could this exempt certain individuals from a duty to abide by whatever
population restrictions (or recommendations) are put in place?
One simple way to answer this question in the negative is to deny that religious beliefs
deserve any special privilege over other beliefs. On such a view, religious beliefs should not
ground exemptions to laws any more than other beliefs do, which means that religious beliefs
will generally not provide the basis for being exempt from state laws. Although this line of
argument has been endorsed by some (e.g., Leiter 2012), I suspect that such a view is too strong
because it undervalues the role that religious belief often plays in people’s lives. Religious
beliefs are very personal and precious to many people, and so it is worth taking the possibility of
religious exemptions seriously.
Even so, we often recognize that constraints on the exercise of religious belief are
appropriate when the beliefs can cause harm to others. We would never condone a practice of
human sacrifice, for instance, even if adherents of a certain religion genuinely believed that it
was required by their faith. As discussed in chapter 3, population growth does not cause harm in
quite the same way that directly killing or injuring a person does, but given the widespread
nature of the harms and the need to curtail them, imposing restrictions on people’s freedoms may
be appropriate. As I argued in chapter 3, rights are often constrained by the presence of other
rights. The exercise of religious freedom is one such right, and like the right to procreation, it can
be limited when the harms associated with its collective exercise are inconsistent with respecting
the most fundamental rights of other people (e.g., right to life, right to health, right to physical
security).
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It is also important to recognize that none of the policies I have proposed would prevent
people from having more children than the established standard. They would have to deal with
economic penalties (either a loss of certain tax exemptions or a fine), but they would not be
strictly required (via abortion or sterilization) to limit their number of children. That will, of
course, make the pursuit of lifestyles associated with certain religious beliefs more difficult, but
this may be the best balance that can be struck. We are, after all, trying to reach a compromise
between two important moral goals – trying to properly respect people’s religious freedom and
trying to ensure that the welfare of future people is properly protected. As the discussion of
moral tragedy in chapter 6 indicates, many of the problems created by population growth are
unlikely to have tidy solutions.

Can We Actually Solve the Problem?
The final question to consider in this dissertation is whether it is actually possible to solve
the myriad of environmental problems we now face. A reader could theoretically agree with
everything I have argued but still believe that we should not make extensive sacrifices of our
procreative liberties to avert these catastrophes because their outcomes are unavoidable. We have
known about climate change for some time, but international discussion has not led to
widespread reduction in global GHG emissions. We may know about the contributions that
population growth makes to climate change, biodiversity loss, and other environmental
problems, but we have also examined evidence that demographic momentum ensures that
population growth will continue for the next few generations regardless of whether any major
efforts to limit procreation are undertaken. These considerations can lead one to a rather
pessimistic outlook on our situation. Scientist Stephen Emmott (2013) expresses this sentiment
rather bluntly in the final lines of Ten Billion:
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As I said in the beginning, we can rightly call the situation we’re in an unprecedented
emergency.
We urgently need to do—and I mean actually do—something radical to avert a global
catastrophe. But I don’t think we will.
I think we’re fucked. (pp. 215-216)
If there genuinely is nothing that can be done to avert the harms that await, then our attempts to
do so may appear pointless. Why should we make sacrifices for the welfare of future people if
those sacrifices will not make a difference?
This line of thought is a product of a common but inaccurate way of thinking about moral
problems. We have a tendency to view them as being either solvable or unsolvable and believe
that there is a sharp distinction between these categories. If we believe a moral problem is
solvable, we strive to solve it. If we believe a moral problem is unsolvable, then we try to figure
out how best to live with it, since it would be pointless to try to solve it. Many moral problems
are genuinely solvable. If you steal from someone, you can return their property or provide them
adequate compensation. If you say something offensive, you can apologize to the offended
parties and make amends. But moral problems that occur on a grand scale often do not allow for
comprehensive or straightforward solutions, and I suspect that most of them are not “solvable” in
any strict sense.
Virtually anyone with a functioning moral compass will acknowledge that the elimination
of race-related discrimination is a morally worthy pursuit, but is it possible to fully eliminate
racism? I doubt it. No matter how much progress is made, it is a safe bet that certain forms of
racial discrimination will persist. After all, the abundant research on implicit bias reveals that
even those who consciously reject prejudiced ways of thinking can unintentionally express racist
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attitudes and preferences through subconscious cognitive processes.4 This means that racism may
be an unsolvable moral problem,5 but this fact does not make trying to eliminate racism a less
worthwhile pursuit. Moreover, the moral progress we have made with respect to eliminating
racism is undeniable and has improved the lives of billions of people during that time. The world
is surely a better place now that race-based slavery has been widely condemned and that
members of all races are typically regarded as having equal moral and legal status.
There is no doubt that our actions will lead to many destructive outcomes in the 21st
century. Many species will go extinct. Some natural environments will be destroyed. Some lowlying island nations will be swallowed by the ocean, and their populations will have to relocate.
We will witness more frequent extreme weather events. Members of some nations will suffer
from harsh heat waves, droughts, and famine. These effects are already observable to some
extent, and they will only get worse as time passes. In some cases, the damage done may well be
irreversible, but just because these problems cannot be fully prevented (or solved) does not mean
that the situation is hopeless.
The scope of harm done to present and future people (and to the nonhuman world) will
vary drastically depending on what we do this century. Some harm has already been done, and
more will come. But how much more? In large part, we will answer that question by what we
decide to do in the next 50-100 years. We cannot solve the problem of climate change: we cannot
erase its effects or shield all future people from its harms. We cannot solve the problem of
biodiversity loss: we cannot prevent all vulnerable species from going extinct. But we can make

4

For an overview of research on implicit bias in philosophy, see Brownstein (2015).
Its complete solution may require neural modification or require such a significant degree of racial mixing that
discrimination on the basis of race becomes impractical. As of now, it is unclear whether the proper technology or
cultural circumstances will manifest to make the complete elimination of racism a viable possibility.
5
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these problems a lot more manageable for ourselves and our descendants. We can still improve
the welfare of present and future people tremendously by working to minimize the harm that
occurs. The problems are not solvable, but their harms can be mitigated. Thus, it is wrong to
believe that acting to avert these harms is pointless.
Of course, under present circumstances, serious political action aimed at slowing
population growth is unlikely to be forthcoming (Shragg 2015, ch. 12). Population activists like
Dave Foreman (2014, ch. 13) sometimes provide lengthy lists of what individuals can do to
promote awareness of overpopulation and what organizations are taking action to reduce the rate
of population growth. Sometimes additional political actions are suggested, like calling one’s
local political representatives or advocating for local caps on population growth in your city or
region. These measures will likely play a crucial role in developing the broad consensus among
the public that is needed to make politicians take the population problem seriously, but a genuine
response to overpopulation requires political action on an international scale that simply will not
materialize any time soon.6 Nonetheless, that fact does not make this project any less valuable or
significant.
In time, the population problem will force itself upon us. The harms associated with
population growth will eventually become so pronounced and so dire that we will face a choice:
mobilize to reduce the impacts of the problem and work toward a long-term solution or face
catastrophic losses to perhaps billions of people. Under those circumstances, I am optimistic that

6

The desire for a growing population is in part connected to a broader desire for continued economic growth.
Endless growth is not possible in a world of finite resources, and the evidence shows that we need to start setting
limits on our aspirations toward economic growth. But until this ideal becomes more widespread and we make the
necessary changes to the neo-liberal economic project that we have undertaken during the last century, it is unlikely
that we will reach a broad consensus on setting limits to population size.
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we will respond, and when that time comes, we will be glad that some philosophers and
environmentalists have given thought to what we should do in response to the problem.
For now, we must confront the grim reality that most people do not yet take population
seriously, and remarkably, even some who know the facts about population still retreat from
discussing it. Consider Alan Weisman’s interview with haredi environmental educator Rachel
Ladani. When asked what will happen when Israel’s population doubles by 2050 and when the
world population teeters near 10 billion, she replies, “I don’t have to think about it. God made
the problem, and He will solve it” (Weisman 2013, p. 12). A divine solution to the problem
would certainly be convenient, but if God intends to intervene, he is certainly biding his time.
We will probably have to cope with the problem on our own.
Not everyone takes refuge from population worries in religion. Others, as discussed in
chapter 5, place their hopes in currently nonexistent technologies. Others embrace denial. These
reactions are understandable. Many of us are reluctant to think deeply about our population
problem – to seriously confront the challenges it poses and the efforts that are needed to address
those challenges. Population discussions make us uncomfortable. Procreative decisions are
personal in a way that few other choices are. But we have to stop hiding from the problem. There
are more of us on the planet each day, and the sooner we take the moral significance of that fact
seriously, the more favorable our options for stabilizing and reducing our population will be. If
we wait too long to take the problem seriously, then more draconian measures really might
become necessary for our response to be adequate, and it will be that much harder to explain to
our children why the world they inherit is so much bleaker than the one we inherited.

209

REFERENCES

210

ADAPTT. 2017. More Than 150 Billion Animals Slaughtered Every Year.
http://www.adaptt.org/killcounter.html. Accessed March 16, 2017.
Advocates for Youth. 2007. The Truth about Abstinence-Only Programs.
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/publications/publications-a-z/409-the-truth-aboutabstinence-only-programs. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Albert, Simon, Javier Leon, Alistair Grinham, John Church, Badin Gibbes, and Colin
Woodroffe. 2016. “Interactions Between Sea-Level Rise and Wave Exposure on Reef
Island Dynamics in the Solomon Islands.” Environmental Research Letters 11: 054011.
DOI:10.1088/1748-9326/11/5/054011.
Alesina, Alberto, Rafael Di Tella, and Robert MacCulloch. 2004. “Inequality and Happiness:
Are Europeans and Americans Different?” Journal of Public Economics 88, no. 9–10:
2009–2042.
Alexandratos, Nikos, and Jelle Bruinsma. 2016. World Agriculture towards 2030/2050: The
2012 Revision. Rome: UN Food and Agricultural Organization.
http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap106e/ap106e.pdf. Accessed March 7, 2017.
Allhoff, Fritz. 2010. “What Is Modesty?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 23, no. 2:
165–187.
Alvarado, Susana, and Jaqueline Echegaray. 2010. “Going to Extremes: Population Politics and
Reproductive Rights in Peru.” In A Pivotal Moment: Population, Justice and the
Environmental Challenge, 2nd ed., edited by Laurie Mazur, 292–299. Washington, D.C.:
Island Press.
Andreou, Chrisoula. 2010. “A Shallow Route to Environmentally Friendly Happiness: Why
Evidence That We Are Shallow Materialists Need not be Bad News for the
Environment(alist).” Ethics, Place and Environment 13, no. 1: 1‒10.
André, Catherine, and Jean-Philippe Platteau. 1998. “Land Relations under Unbearable Stress:
Rwanda caught in the Malthusian Trap.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
34, no. 1: 1–47.
Anglin, Bill. 1977. “The Repugnant Conclusion.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 4: 745–
754.
Archer, David, Michael Eby, Bictor Brovkin, Andy Ridgwell, Long Cao, Uwe Mikolajewicz,
Ken Caldeira, Katsumi Matsumoto, Guy Munhoven, Alvaro Montenegro, and Kathy
Tokos. 2009. “Atmospheric Lifetime of Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide.” Annual Review of
Earth and Planetary Sciences 37: 117–134. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.earth.031208.100206.
Aristotle. 1980. Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

211

Attfield, Robin. 1991. The Ethics of Environmental Concern, 2nd ed. Athens, Ga.: University of
Georgia Press.
Audi, Robert and Patrick Murphy. 2006. “The Many Faces of Integrity.” Business Ethics
Quarterly, 16, no. 1: 3‒21.
Balvanera, Patricia, Andrea Pfisterer, Nina Buchmann, Jing-Shen He, Tohru Nakashizuka, David
Raffaelli, and Bernhard Schmid. 2006. “Quantifying the Evidence for Biodiversity
Effects on Ecosystem Functioning and Services.” Ecology Letters 9, no. 10: 1146–1156.
Barry, Brian. 1997. “Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice.” Theoria: A Journal of Social
and Political Theory 89: 43–64.
Bartlett, Albert. 1993. “The Arithmetic of Growth: Methods of Calculation.” Population and
Environment 14, no. 4: 359–387.
Barnosky, Anthony, Nicholas Matzke, Susumu Tomiya, Guinevere Wogan, Brian Swartz, Tiago
Quental, Charles Marshall, Jenny McGuire, Emily Lindsey, Kaitlin Maguire, Ben
Mersey, and Elizabeth Ferrer. 2011. “Has the Earth’s Sixth Mass Extinction Already
Arrived?” Nature 471: 51–57.
Baumeister, Roy, Kathleen Vohs, Jennifer Aaker, and Emily Garbinsky. 2013. “Some Key
Differences Between a Happy Life and a Meaningful One.” The Journal of Positive
Psychology 8, no. 6: 505–516.
Bayne, Tim. 2010. “In Defence of Genethical Parity.” In Procreation and Parenthood, eds.
David Archard and David Benatar, pp. 31–56. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bell, Derek. 2011. “Does Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human Rights?” Critical
Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14, no. 2: 99–124.
Belshaw, Christopher. 2007. Review of Better Never to Have Been: The Harm of Coming Into
Existence, by David Benatar. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25313/?id=9983. Accessed September 22, 2016.
Benatar, David. 2006. Better Never to Have Been. Oxford: Clarendon.
Benatar, David. 2013. “Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics.” The
Journal of Ethics 17, no. 1: 121–151.
Benatar, David. 2015. “Part I: Anti-Natalism.” In Debating Procreation, eds. David Benatar and
David Wasserman, pp. 11–132. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blake, Michael. 2013. “Immigration, Jurisdiction, and Exclusion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs
41, no. 2: 103–130.
Bommarito, Nicolas. 2013. “Modesty as a Virtue of Attention.” Philosophical Review 122, no. 1:
93–117.
212

Boonin, David. 2003. A Defense of Abortion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boonin, David. 2014. The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Bourget, David, and David Chalmers. 2014. “What Do Philosophers Believe?” Philosophical
Studies 170: 465–500.
Boyd, Philip W. 2008. “Ranking Geo-Engineering Schemes.” Nature Geoscience 1: 722-724.
Bradley, Ben. 2010. “Benatar and the Logic of Betterness.” Journal of Ethics & Social
Philosophy: 1–5. http://www.jesp.org/articles/download/BenataronBetternessNote.pdf.
Accessed September 27, 2016.
Bradley, Ben. 2012. “Doing Away with Harm.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85,
no. 2: 390–412.
Bradshaw, Corey, and Barry Brook. 2014. “Human Population Reduction is Not a Quick Fix for
Environmental Problems.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111, no. 46:
16610–16615.
Brahic, Catherine. 2014. “World on Track for Worst-Case Warming Scenario.” New Scientist.
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26243-world-on-track-for-worst-case-warmingscenario/. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Brennan, Jason. 2007. “Modesty without Illusion.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
75, no. 1: 111–128.
Brennan, Jason. 2011. The Ethics of Voting. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Breuner, Cora, and Gerri Mattson. 2016. “Sexuality Education for Children and Adolescents.”
American Academy of Pediatrics.
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2016/07/14/peds.2016-1348. Accessed
March 8, 2017.
Brickman, Phillip, Dan Coates, and Januff-Bulman. 1978. “Lottery Winners and Accident
Victims: Is Happiness Relative?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36, no. 8:
917–927.
Broome, John. 2012. Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc.
Brown, Campbell. 2011. “Better Never to Have Been Believed: Benatar on the Harm of
Existence.” Economics and Philosophy 27, no. 1: 45–52.
Brown, Jonathon, and Keith Dutton. 1995. “Truth and Consequences: The Costs and Benefits of
Accurate Self-Knowledge.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 21, no. 12:
1288–1296.
213

Brownstein, Michael. 2015. “Implicit Bias.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/. Accessed June 27, 2016.
Butkus, Matthew. 2015. “All Health is Local: Biodiversity, Ethics, and Human Health.” Ethics,
Policy & Environment 18, no. 1: 1–15.
Cafaro, Phil. 2012. “Climate Ethics and Population Policy.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews:
Climate Change 3, no. 1: 65–81.
Cafaro, Philip. 2015. How Many Is Too Many? The Progressive Argument for Reducing
Immigration into the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Cafaro, Phil, and Winthrop Staples III. 2009. “The Environmental Argument for Reducing
Immigration into the United States.” Environmental Ethics 31, no. 1: 5–30.
Callahan, Daniel. 1995. Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society. Washington D.C.:
Georgetown University Press.
Campbell, Martha. 2012. “Why the Silence on Population?” In Life on the Brink: Philosophers
Confront Population, eds. Phil Cafaro and Eileen Crist, 41–55. Athens: University of
Georgia Press.
Caney, Simon. 2010a. “Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged.” Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy 13, no. 1: 203–228.
Caney, Simon. 2010b. “Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds.” In Climate
Ethics: Essential Readings, edited by Stephen Gardiner, et al., pp. 163–177. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Cantwell, Nigel. 2003. “Intercountry Adoption. A Comment on the Number of ‘Adoptable’
Children and the Number of Persons Seeking to Adopt Internationally.” The Judges’
Newsletter on International Child Protection 5. http://www.issssi.org/2007/Resource_Centre/Tronc_DI/documents/CantwellIntercountryAdoptionENG.
pdf. Accessed February 21, 2017.
Cardinale, Bradley, Emmett Duffy, Andrew Gonzalez, David Hooper, Charles Perrings, Patrick
Venail, Anita Narwani, Georgina Mace, David Tilman, David Wardle, Ann Kinzig,
Gretchen Daily, Michel Loreau, James Grace, Anne Larigauderie, Diane Srivastava, and
Shahid Naeem. 2012. “Biodiversity Loss and Its Impact on Humanity.” Nature 486, no.
7401: 59–67.
Carens, Joseph. 1987. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders.” Review of Politics 49,
no. 2: 251–273.
Carens, Joseph. 2013. The Ethics of Immigration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carrington, Damian. 2016. “Climate Change Will Stir ‘Unimaginable’ Refugee Crisis, Says
Military.” The Guardian.
214

https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/01/climate-change-triggerunimaginable-refugee-crisis-senior-military. Accessed March 7, 2017.
Carruthers, Peter. 1992. The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Carter, Alan. 2010. “Biodiversity and All That Jazz.” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 80, no. 1: 58–75.
Ceballos, Gerardo, Paul Erlich, Anthony Barnosky, Andrés Garcia, Robert Pringle, and Todd
Palmer. 2015. “Accelerated Modern Human-Induced Species Losses: Entering the Sixth
Mass Extinction.” Science Advances 1, no. 5: e1400253. DOI: 10.1126/sciadv.1400253.
Charbit, Yves. 2009. Economic, Social and Demographic Thought in the XIXth Century: The
Population Debate from Malthus to Marx. Dordrecht: Springer.
Chen, Jason. forthcoming. “One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More?” Journal of Applied
Philosophy.
Chertow, Marian. 2000. “The IPAT Equation and Its Variants.” Journal of Industrial Ecology 4,
no. 4: 13–29.
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). 2016. “Total Fertility Rate.” The World Factbook.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2127.html. Accessed
March 18, 2017.
Cohen, Joel. 1995. How Many People Can the Earth Support? New York: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Conly, Sarah. 2015. “Here’s Why China’s One-Child Policy Was a Good Thing.” Boston Globe.
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/10/31/here-why-china-one-child-policy-wasgood-thing/GY4XiQLeYfAZ8e8Y7yFycI/story.html. Accessed March 20, 2017.
Conly, Sarah. 2016. One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More? Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Crew, Bec. 2015. “Cost of Lab-Grown Burger Patty Drops from $325,000 to $11.36.” Science
Alert. http://www.sciencealert.com/lab-grown-burger-patty-cost-drops-from-325-000-to12. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Cripps, Elizabeth. 2016. “Population and Environment: The Impossible, the Impermissible, and
the Imperative.” In The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Ethics, eds. Stephen
Gardiner and Allen Thompson, 380–390. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
DARA (Development Assistance Research Associates). Climate Vulnerability Monitor 2nd
Edition: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a Hot Planet. Madrid: DARA and the Climate
Vulnerable Forum, 2012. http://daraint.org/climate-vulnerability-monitor/climatevulnerability-monitor-2012/report/. Accessed March 12, 2017.
215

Darwall, Stephen. 2002. “Introduction.” In Contractarianism / Contractualism, edited by
Stephen Darwall, 1–8. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Davenport, Coral. 2017. “Trump to Undo Vehicle Rules that Curb Global Warming.” The New
York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/us/politics/trump-vehicle-emissionsregulation.html. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Davidson, Marc. 2008. “Wrongful Harm to Future Generations: The Case of Climate Change.”
Environmental Values 17: 471–488.
Deaton, Angus, and Arthur Stone. 2014. “Evaluative and Hedonic Wellbeing among Those with
and without Children at Home.”
DeGrazia, David. 1996. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
DeGrazia, David. 2010. “Is It Wrong to Impose the Harms of Human Life? A Reply to Benatar.”
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31, no. 4: 317–331.
DeGrazia, David. 2012. Creation Ethics: Reproduction, Genetics, and Quality of Life. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
De Vos, Jurriaan, Lucas Joppa, John Gittleman, Patrick Stephens, and Stuart Pimm. 2015.
“Estimating the Normal Background Rate of Species Extinction.” Conservation Biology
29, no. 2: 452–462.
Di Tella, Rafael, Robert MacCulloch, and Andrew Oswald. 2003. “The Macroeconomics of
Happiness.” Review of Economics and Statistics 85, no. 4: 809–827.
Diamond, Jared. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. London: Penguin
Books.
Dietz, Thomas, Eugene A. Rosa, Richard York. 2007. “Driving the Human Ecological
Footprint.” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 5, no. 1: 13–18.
Dillard, Carter. 2010. “Valuing Having Children.” Journal of Law and Family Studies 12: 151–
198.
Doris, John, and Stephen Stich. 2005. “As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics.”
In The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Frank Jackson and
Michael Smith, pp. 114–152. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Driver, Julia. 1989. “The Virtue of Ignorance.” The Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 7: 373–384.
Driver, Julia. 1999. “Modesty and Ignorance.” Ethics 109, no. 4: 827–834.
Emmott, Stephen. 2013. Ten Billion. New York: Vintage Books.

216

EPA (United States Environmental Protection Agency). 2016. Acid Rain Program.
https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/acid-rain-program. Accessed March 22, 2017.
Erlich, Paul. 1975. The Population Bomb, Revised ed. Jackson Heights, NY: Rivercity Press.
Festinger, Leon, and James M. Carlsmith. 1959. “Cognitive Consequences of Forced
Compliance.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 58, no. 2: 203‒210.
Festinger, Leon, Henry W. Riecken, and Stanley Schachter. 1964. When Prophecy Fails: A
Social and Psychological Study of a Modern Group that Predicted the Destruction of the
World. New York: Harper and Row.
Finer, Lawrence, and Mia Zolna. 2016. “Declines in Unintended Pregnancy in the United States,
2008-2011.” New England Journal of Medicine 374, no. 9: 843–852.
Foot, Philippa. 1967. “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.” Oxford
Review 5: 5–15.
Ford, Liz. 2016. “Rise In Use of Contraception Offers Hope for Containing Global Population.”
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/mar/08/rise-usecontraception-global-population-growth-family-planning. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Foreman, Dave. 2012. “The Great Backtrack.” In Life on the Brink: Philosophers Confront
Population, eds. Phil Cafaro and Eileen Crist, 56–71. Athens: University of Georgia
Press.
Foreman, Dave. 2014. Man Swarm: How Overpopulation Is Killing the Wild World, 2nd ed.,
edited by Laura Carroll. LiveTrue Books.
Fotion, Nick. 1997. “Repugnant Thoughts About the Repugnant Conclusion Argument.” In
Contingent Future Persons, edited by Nick Fotion and Jan C. Heller, pp. 85–97.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Fountain, Henry. 2013. “Building a $325,000 Burger.” The New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/science/engineering-the-325000-in-vitroburger.html. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Friedrich, Daniel. 2013. “A Duty to Adopt?” Journal of Applied Philosophy 30, no. 1: 25–39.
Funk, Cary, Lee Rainie, Aaron Smith, Kenneth Olmstead, Maeve Duggan, and Dana Page. 2015.
“Public and Scientists’ Views on Science and Society.”
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_ScienceandSociety_Report_012915.pdf.
Accessed April 17, 2017.
Gambrel, Joshua Colt, and Philip Cafaro. 2010. “The Virtue of Simplicity.” Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23, nos. 1–2: 85–108.

217

Gardiner, Stephen 2009. “A Contract on Future Generations?” In Intergenerational Justice,
edited by Axel Gosseries and Lukas Meyer, 77–118 Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gardiner, Stephen. 2012. “Are We the Scum of the Earth?” In Ethical Adaptation to Climate
Change: Human Virtues of the Future, edited by Allen Thompson and Jeremy BendikKeymer, pp. 241‒259. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gerland, Patrick, Adrian E. Raftery, Hana Ševčíková, Nan Li, Danan Gu, Thomas Spoorenberg,
Leontine Alkema, Bailey K. Fosdick, Jennifer Chunn, Nevena Lalic, Guiomar Bay,
Thomas Buettner, Gerhard K. Heilig, and John Wilmoth. “World Population Stabilization
Unlikely This Century.” 2014. Science 346, no. 6206: 234–237.
Gettier, Edmund. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963): 121–123.
Gibson, Daniel, John Glass, Carole Lartigue, Vladimir Noskov, Ray-Yuan Chuang, Mikkel
Algire, Gwynedd Benders, Michael Montague, Li Ma, Monzia Moodie, Chuck
Merryman, Sanjay Vashee, Radha Krishnakumar, Nacyra Assad-Garcia, Cynthia
Andrews-Pfannkoch, Evgeniya Denisova1, Lei Young, Zhi-Qing Qi, Thomas SegallShapiro, Christopher Calvey, Prashanth Parmar, Clyde Hutchison III, Hamilton Smith, J.
Craig Venter. 2010. “Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically
Synthesized Genome.” Science 329, no. 5987: 52–56.
Gilbert, Daniel. 2007. Stumbling on Happiness. New York: Vintage Books.
Gillis, Justin. 2016. “Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already Begun.” The
New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flooding-of-coastcaused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html. Accessed March 12, 2017.
Giordano, Mark. 2009. “Global Groundwater? Issues and Solutions.” Annual Review of
Environment and Resources 34: 153–178.
Giubilini, Alberto, and Fransesca Minerva. 2012. “After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby
Live?” Journal of Medical Ethics.
GiveWell. 2017. “Top Charities.” http://www.givewell.org/charities/top-charities. Accessed
February 21, 2017.
Glass, Jennifer, Robin Simon, and Matthew Andersson. 2016. “Parenthood and Happiness:
Effects of Work-Family Reconciliation Policies in 22 OECD Countries.” American
Journal of Sociology 122, no. 3: 886–929.
Gleeson, Tom, Yoshihide Wada, Marc Bierkens, and Ludovicus van Beek. 2012. “Water
Balance of Global Aquifers Revealed by Groundwater Footprint.” Nature 488, no. 7410:
197–200.
Gleick, Peter. 2014. “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria.” Weather,
Climate, and Society 6, no. 3: 331–340.

218

Global Footprint Network. 2016. “Ecological Footprint Per Capita.”
http://www.footprintnetwork.org/content/documents/ecological_footprint_nations/ecologi
cal_per_capita.html. Accessed March 2, 2017.
Goodman, Nelson. 1955. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Graham, Peter. 2011. “‘Ought’ and Ability.” Philosophical Review 120, no. 3: 337–382.
Gray, Alison. 2001. Definitions of Crowding and the Effects of Crowding on Health: A
Literature Review. Wellington, NZ: Ministry of Social Policy.
http://www.msd.govt.nz/documents/about-msd-and-our-work/publicationsresources/archive/2001-definitionsofcrowding.pdf. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Greene, Joshua, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh Nystrom, John Darley, and Jonathan Cohen. 2001.
“An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment.” Science 293:
2105–2108.
Grossu, Arina. 2016. What Science Reveals about Fetal Pain.
http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF15A104.pdf. Accessed March 21, 2017.
Graff, E. J. 2009. “The Lie We Love.” Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/06/thelie-we-love/. Accessed February 20, 2017.
Gustafsson, Johan E., ed. n.d. “Population Ethics.” http://philpapers.org/browse/populationethics/. Accessed January 17, 2017.
Guttmacher Institute. 2017. Sex and HIV Education. https://www.guttmacher.org/statepolicy/explore/sex-and-hiv-education. Accessed March 8, 2017.
Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach
to Moral Judgment.” Psychological Review 108, no. 4: 814–834.
Hall, Charles, R. Gil Pontius, Jr., Lisa Coleman, and Jae-Young Ko. 1994. “The Environmental
Consequences of Having a Baby in the United States.” Population and Environment: A
Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 15, no. 6: 505–524.
Hampshire, Adam, Roger Highfield, Beth Parkin, and Adrian Owen. 2012. “Fractioning Human
Intelligence.” Neuron 76, no. 6: 1225–1237.
Hansen, Thomas. 2012. “Parenthood and Happiness: A Review of Folk Theories Versus
Empirical Evidence.” Social Indicators Research 108, no. 1: 29–64.
Hardin, Garrett. 1974. “Living on a Lifeboat.” Bioscience 24, no. 10: 561–568.
Harman, Elizabeth. 2009a. “David Benatar. Better Never To Have Been: The Harm of Coming
into Existence.” Nous 43, no. 4: 776–785.

219

Harman, Elizabeth. 2009b. “Harming as Causing Harm.” In Harming Future Persons, edited by
Melinda Roberts and David Wasserman, pp. 137–154. Dordrecht: Springer.
Harrison, Gerald, and Julia Tanner. 2011. “Better Not to Have Children.” Think 10, no. 27: 113–
121.
Häyry, Matti. 2004. “A Rational Cure for Prereproductive Stress Syndrome.” Journal of Medical
Ethics 30: 377–378.
Hazan, Moche, and Hosny Zoabi. 2015. “Do Highly Educated Women Choose Smaller
Families?” Economic Journal 125, no. 587: 1191–1226.
Hedberg, Trevor. 2013. “Wouldn’t Future People Like to Know? A Compensation-Based
Approach to Global Climate Change.” Master’s Thesis, University of Tennessee.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/2607. Accessed March 17, 2017.
Hedberg, Trevor. 2016. “Unraveling the Asymmetry in Procreative Ethics.” APA Newsletter for
Philosophy and Medicine 15, no. 2: 18–21.
Hedberg, Trevor. forthcoming. “Climate Change, Moral Integrity. and Obligations to Reduce
Individual Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Ethics, Policy & Environment.
Heil, Sarah, Diann Gaalema, and Evan Herrmann. 2012. “Incentives to Promote Family
Planning.” Preventative Medicine 55, no. Suppl: S106–S112.
Held, Virginia. 2006. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hesketh, Therese, and Wei Xing Zhu. 1997. “The One Child Family Policy: The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly.” British Medical Journal 314, no. 7095: 1685–1687.
Hickey, Colin, Travis Rieder, and Jake Earl. 2016. “Population Engineering and the Fight against
Climate Change.” Social Theory and Practice 42, no. 4: 845–870.
Hooker, Brad. 2003. Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Hooper, D. U., F. S. Chapin III, J. J. Ewel, A. Hector, P. Inchausti, S. Lavorel, J. H. Lawton, D.
M. Lodge, M. Loreau, S. Naeem, B. Sachmid, H. Setälä, A. J. Symstad, J. Vandermeer,
and D. A. Wardle. 2005. “Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning: A
Consensus of Current Knowledge.” Ecological Monographs 75, no. 1: 3–35.
http://www.cedarcreek.umn.edu/biblio/fulltext/t2038.pdf. Accessed March 12, 2017.
Hourdequin, Marion. 2010. Climate, Collective Action, and Individual Ethical Obligations.
Environmental Values 19, no. 4: 443‒464.
Hsieh, Nien-hê. 2016. “Incommensurable Values.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-incommensurable/. Accessed October 4, 2016.
220

Huemer, Michael. 2008. “In Defence of Repugnance.” Mind 117, no. 468: 899–933.
IAP (Interacademy Panel on International Issues). 2009. “IAP Statement on Ocean
Acidification.” http://www.interacademies.net/File.aspx?id=9075. Accessed March 12,
2017.
Idiocracy. Film. Directed by Mike Judge. New York: 20th Century Fox, 2006.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2014a. Climate Change 2014: Impacts,
Adaptation, and Vulnerability, edited by C. B. Field, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2014b. “Summary for Policy Makers.”
Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report. https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/. Accessed
March 18, 2017.
Jackson, M. W. (1986). “The Nature of Supererogation.” The Journal of Value Inquiry 20, 289296.
Jamieson, Dale. 1992. “Ethics, Public Policy, and Global Warming.” Science, Technology, and
Human Values 17, no. 2:139‒153.
Jamieson, Dale. 2007. “When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists?” Utilitas 19, no. 2:
160‒183.
Jamieson, Dale. 2014. Reason in a Dark Time: Why the Struggle Against Climate Change
Failed—And What It Means for Our Future. New York: Oxford University Press.
Jecker, Nancy. 2012. “The Right Not to Be Born: Reinterpreting the Nonidentity Problem.”
American Journal of Bioethics 12, no. 8: 34–35.
Jenni, Kathie. 2003. “Vices of Inattention.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 20, no. 3: 279–295.
Johnson, Steve. 2016. “Africa’s Life Expectancy Jumps Dramatically.” Financial Times.
https://www.ft.com/content/38c2ad3e-0874-11e6-b6d3-746f8e9cdd33. Accessed March
12, 2017.
Jones, Larry, and Michele Tertilt. 2008. “An Economic History of Fertility in the U.S.: 18261960.” In Frontiers of Family Economics, edited by P. Rupert, 165–230. Bingley:
Emerald Publishing.
Kahn, Brian. 2016. “Earth’s CO2 Passes the 400 PPM Threshold—Maybe Permanently.”
Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-s-co2-passes-the400-ppm-threshold-maybe-permanently/. Accessed March 10, 2017.
Kahneman, Daniel, Edward Diener, and Norbert Schwarz (eds.). 2003. Well-Being: Foundations
of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

221

Kawall, Jason. 2010. “The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue.” Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 23, nos. 1‒2, 109‒128.
Kelleher, J. Paul. 2012. “Energy Policy and the Social Discount Rate.” Ethics, Policy &
Environment 15, no. 1: 45–50.
Kim, Ki-Hyun, Ehsanul Kabir, and Shamin Ara Jahan. 2014. “A Review of the Consequences of
Global Climate Change on Human Health.” Journal of Environmental Science and
Health, Part C 32, no. 3: 299–318.
Klein, Naomi. 2014. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. New York: Simon &
Schuster.
Kolankiewicz, Leon. 2015. “Silencing Free Speech for the Sake of ‘Diversity’ – The
Immigration Taboo and Censorship Strike Again.”
http://www.capsweb.org/blog/silencing-free-speech- sake%E2%80%98diversity%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-immigration-taboo-and-censorshipstrike-again. Accessed September 25, 2015.
Kukla, Rebecca. 2016. “Whose Job Is It to Fight Climate Change? A Response to Hickey,
Rieder, and Earl.” Social Theory and Practice 42, no. 4: 871–878.
Kumar, Rahul. 2003. “Who Can Be Wronged?” Philosophy & Public Affairs 31, no. 2: 99–118.
Kweifio-Okai, Carla, and Josh Holder. 2016. “Over-populated or Under-developed? The Real
Story of Population Growth.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/datablog/2016/jun/28/over-populated-or-under-developed-real-storypopulation-growth. Accessed March 12, 2017.
Lammerant, Isabelle, and Marlène Hofstetter. 2007. Adoption: At What Cost? For an Ethical
Responsibility of Receiving Countries in Intercountry Adoption. Geneva: Terre des
Hommes International Federation.
Last, Jonathan. 2013. What to Expect When No One’s Expecting: America’s Coming
Demographic Disaster. New York: Encounter Books.
Lee, Che-Fu, and Quisheng Liang. 2006. “Fertility, Family Planning, and Population Policy in
China.” In Fertility, Family Planning, and Population Policy in China, edited by Dudley
Poston, Jr., Che-Fu Lee, Chiung-Fang Chang, Sherry McKibben, and Carol Walther,
159–171. London: Routledge.
Lee, Susan, Henry Ralston, Eleanor Drey, John Partridge, and Mark Rosen. 2005. “Fetal Pain: A
Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence.” Journal of the American Medical
Association 294, no. 8: 947–954.
Leiter, Brian. 2012. Why Tolerate Religion? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Licon, Jimmy. 2012. “The Immorality of Procreation.” Think 11, no. 32: 85–91.
222

Lino, Mark, Kevin Kuczynski, Nestor Rodriguez, and TusaRebecca Schap. 2017. Expenditures
on Children by Families, 2015. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Center for Nutrition
Policy and Promotion.
https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/sites/default/files/expenditures_on_children_by_families/crc2
015.pdf. Accessed February 21, 2017.
Lovering, Robert. 2005. “Does a Normal Fetus Really Have a Future of Value? A Reply to
Marquis.” Bioethics 19, no. 2: 131–145.
Luck, Gary. 2007. “A Review of the Relationships between Human Population Density and
Biodiversity.” Biological Reviews 82: 607–645.
Lutz, Wolfgang. 2014. “A Population Policy for the Twenty-First Century.” Population and
Development Review 40, no. 3: 527–544.
Lutz, Wolfgang, Warren Sanderson, and Sergei Scherbov. 2001. “The End of World Population
Growth.” Nature 412: 543-545.
Maier, Donald. 2012. What’s So Good About Biodiversity? A Call for Better Reasoning About
Nature’s Value. Dordrecht: Springer.
Malthus, Thomas. 2007 [1798]. An Essay on the Principle of Population. Meneola, NY: Dover
Publications, Inc.
Mann, Michael. 2014. “Earth Will Cross the Climate Danger Threshold by 2036.” Scientific
American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-will-cross-the-climatedanger-threshold-by-2036/. Accessed March 17, 2017.
Margolis, Rachel, and Mikko Myrskylä. 2015. “Parental Well-being Surrounding First Birth as a
Determinant of Further Parity Progression.” Demography 52, no. 4: 1147–1166.
Marquis, Don. 1989. “Why Abortion Is Immoral.” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 4: 183–202.
Marsh, Jason. 2014. “Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative
Responsibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89, no. 2: 436–466.
Martin, Wayne. 2009. “Ought but Cannot.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109: 103–
128.
Maslow, Abraham. 1970. Motivation and Personality. 2nd ed. New York: Harper & Row
Publishers.
Matlin, Margaret, and David Stang. 1978. The Polyanna Principle: Selectivity in Language,
Memory, and Thought. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.
Mazur, Laurie. 2010. “Introduction.” In A Pivotal Moment: Population, Justice and the
Environmental Challenge, 2nd ed., edited by Laurie Mazur, 1–23. Washington, D.C.:
Island Press.
223

Mazur, Laurie, and Shira Saperstein. 2010. “Beware the Techno-Fix.” In A Pivotal Moment:
Population, Justice and the Environmental Challenge, 2nd ed., edited by Laurie Mazur,
12–13. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
McConnell, Terrance. 2014. “Moral Dilemmas.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-dilemmas/. Accessed March 21, 2017.
McMahan, Jeff. 1981. “Problems of Population Theory.” Ethics 92, no. 1: 96–127.
McMahan, Jeff. 2000. “Moral Intuition.” In Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, edited by Hugh
LaFollette, 92–110. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
McMahan, Jeff. 2009. “Asymmetries in the Morality of Causing People to Exist.” In Harming
Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics, and the Nonidentity Problem, eds. Melinda Roberts
and David Wasserman, 49–68. Dordrecht: Springer.
McMahan, Jeff. 2013. “Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives.” Journal of Ethics
17, no. 1-2: 5–35.
Meyerson, Frederick. 2008. “Population Growth Is Easier to Manage than Per Capita
Emissions.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. http://thebulletin.org/population-andclimate-change/population-growth-easier-manage-capita-emissions. Accessed March 18,
2017.
Midgley, Mary. 1983. Animals and Why They Matter. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Miller, David. 2016. Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Moellendorf, Darrel. 2014. The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values,
Poverty, and Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mohler, Albert. 2009. Is Cap and Trade for Babies Next?
http://www.albertmohler.com/2009/08/12/is-cap-and-trade-for-babies-next/. Accessed
March 22, 2017.
Mood, A., and P. Brooke. 2010. Estimating the Number of Fish Caught in Global Fishing Each
Year. http://fishcount.org.uk/published/std/fishcountstudy.pdf. Accessed March 16, 2017.
Mora, Camilo, Derek Tittensor, Sina Adl, Alastair Simpson, and Boris Worm. 2011. “How Many
Species Are There on Earth and in the Ocean?” PLOSBiology 9, no. 8: e1001127.
DOI:10.1371/journal.pbio.1001127.
Morreim, Haavi, Ryan Antiel, David Zacharias, and Daniel Hall. 2014. “Should Age Be a Basic
for Rationing Health Care?” Virtual Mentor 16, no. 5: 339–347.
Mosher, Steven. 2008. Population Control: Real Costs, Illusory Benefits. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers.
224

Murtaugh, Paul, and Michael Schlax. 2009. “Reproduction and the Carbon Legacies of
Individuals.” Global Environmental Change 19, no. 1: 14–20.
Myers, Norman. 1993. “Questions of Mass Extinction.” Biodiversity & Conservation 2, no. 1: 2–
17.
Myers, Norman, and Andrew Knoll. 2001. “The Biotic Crisis and the Future of Evolution.”
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 98, no. 10: 5389–5392.
Nagel, Thomas. 1986. The View from Nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press.
NASA. 2017. “Carbon Dioxide.” https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/carbon-dioxide/. Accessed
March 10, 2017.
Nawrotzki, Raphael. 2014. “Climate Migration and Moral Responsibility.” Ethics, Policy &
Environment 17, no. 1: 69–87.
Nelkin, Dana. 2013. “Moral Luck.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-luck/. Accessed September 19, 2016.
Nelson, Jamie. 2016. Review of Permissible Progeny? The Morality of Procreation and
Parenting, by Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan, and Richard Vernon (eds.). Notre Dame
Philosophical Reviews. https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/65648-permissible-progeny-themorality-of-procreation- and-parenting/. Accessed August 25, 2016.
Ng, Yew-Kwang. 1990. “Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation.” Utilitas 2, no. 2: 171–
193.
Nielsen, Kai. 1994. “Methods of Ethics: Wide Reflective Equilibrium and a Kind of
Constructivism.” Journal of Social Philosophy 25, no. 2: 57–72.
Nolt, John. 2011a. “Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Domination of Posterity.” In The Ethics
of Global Climate Change, edited by Denis Arnold, 60–76. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nolt, John. 2011b. “How Harmful Are the Average American’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions?”
Ethics, Policy & Environment 14, no. 1: 3–10.
Nolt, John. 2013a. “Replies to Critics of ‘How Harmful Are the Average American’s
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” Ethics, Policy & Environment 16, no. 1: 111–119.
Nolt, John. 2013b. “The Individual’s Obligation to Relinquish Unnecessary Greenhouse GasEmitting Devices.” Philosophy & Public Issues 3, no. 1: 139–165.
Nolt, John. 2015. Environmental Ethics for the Long Term. New York: Routledge.

225

Nolt, John. 2016. “Future Generations in Environmental Ethics.” In The Oxford Handbook of
Environmental Ethics, eds. Stephen Gardiner and Allen Thompson, 344–354. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Norton, Bryan. 1987. Why Preserve Natural Variety? Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, and Species Membership.
Harvard: Harvard University Press.
O’Neill, Brian, Michael Dalton, Regina Fuchs, Leiwen Jiang, Shonali Pachuri, and Katarina
Zigova. 2010. “Global Demographic Trends and Future Carbon Emissions.” Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 41: 17521–17526.
O’Neill, Brian, and Lee Wexler. 2000. “The Greenhouse Externality to Childbearing: A
Sensitivity Analysis.” Climatic Change 47, no. 3: 283–324.
Overall, Christine. 2012. Why Have Children? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Palmer, Tim. 2012. “Beyond Futility.” In Life on the Brink: Philosophers Confront Population,
eds. Phil Cafaro and Eileen Crist, 98–107. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Parfit, Derek. 1982. “Future Generations, Further Problems.” Philosophy & Public Affairs 11,
no. 2: 113–172.
Parfit, Derek. 1987. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pearce, Fred. 2010. The Coming Population Crash and Our Planet’s Surprising Future. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Persson, Ingmar. 2009. “Rights and Asymmetry Between Creating Good and Bad Lives.” In
Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics, and the Nonidentity Problem, eds. Melinda
Roberts and David Wasserman, 29–47. Dordrecht: Springer.
Pimentel, David. 2006. “Soil Erosion: A Food and Environmental Threat.” Environment,
Development and Sustainability 8, no. 1: 119–137.
Pimentel, David, Michele Whitecraft, Zachary R. Scott, Leixin Zhao, Patricia Satkiewicz,
Timothy J. Scott, Jennifer Phillips, Daniel Szimak, Gurpreet Singh, Daniela O. Gonzalez,
and Tun Lin Moe. 2010. “Will Limited Land, Water, and Energy Control Human
Population Numbers in the Future?” Human Ecology 38, no. 5: 599–611.
Pimm, S., C. Jenkins, R. Abell, T. Brooks, J. Gittleman, L. Joppa, P. Raven, C. Roberts, and J.
Sexton. “The Biodiversity of Species and Their Rates of Extinctions, Distribution, and
Protection.” Science 344, no. 6187. DOI: 10.1126/science.1246752.
Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: The Decline of Violence in History and
its Causes. New York: Viking.

226

Population Reference Bureau. 2016. “2016 World Population Data Sheet.”
http://www.prb.org/pdf16/prb-wpds2016-web-2016.pdf. Accessed January 17, 2017.
Potts, Malcom, and Martha Campbell. 2005. “Reverse Gear: Cairo’s Dependence on a
Disappearing Paradigm.” Journal of Reproduction & Contraception 16, no. 3: 179–186.
Powdthavee, Nattavudh. 2008. “Putting a Price Tag on Friends, Relatives, and Neighbours:
Using Surveys of Life Satisfaction to Value Social Relationships.” Journal of SocioEconomics 37, no. 4: 1459–1480.
Pritchett, Lant. 1994. “Desired Fertility and the Impact of Population Policies.” Population and
Development Review 20, no. 1: 1–55.
Rachels, Stuart. 2014. “The Immorality of Having Children.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
17, no. 3: 567–582.
Räikkä, Juha. 2000. “Problems in Population Theory.” Journal of Social Philosophy 31, no. 4:
401–413.
Raterman, Ty. 2012. “Bearing the Weight of the World: On the Extent of an Individual’s
Environmental Responsibility.” Environmental Values 21, no. 4: 417–436.
Raupach, Michael, Steven Davis, Glen Peters, Robbie Andrew, Josep Canadell, Philippe Ciais,
Pierre Friedlingstein, Frank Jotzo, Detlef van Vuuren, and Corinne Le Quéré. 2014.
“Sharing a Quota on Cumulative Carbon Emissions.” Nature Climate Change 4, no.
10:873 –879.
Rawls, John. 1951. “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics.” Philosophical Review 60, no.
2: 177–197.
Rawls, John. 1999. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Rawls, John. 2005. Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Repetto, Robert. 1968. “India: A Case Study of the Madras Vasectomy Program.” Studies in
Family Planning 31: 8–16.
Ridge, Michael. 2000. “Modesty as a Virtue.” American Philosophical Quarterly 37, no. 3: 269–
283.
Rieder, Travis. 2015. “Procreation, Adoption, and the Contours of Obligation.” Journal of
Applied Philosophy 32, no. 3: 293–309.
Rieder, Travis. 2016a. “Review: Sarah Conly, One Child: Do We Have a Right to Have More?”
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 26, no. 2: 29–34.
227

Rieder, Travis. 2016b. Toward a Small Family Ethic: How Overpopulation and Climate Change
Are Affecting the Morality of Procreation. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Roberts, Melinda. 2011a. “An Asymmetry in the Ethics of Procreation.” Philosophy Compass 6,
no. 11: 765–776.
Roberts, Melinda. 2011b. “The Asymmetry: A Solution.” Theoria 77, no. 4: 333–367.
Robertson, John. 1994. Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rogers, Everett, Peter Vaughan, Ramadhan Swalehe, Nagesh Rao, Peer Svenkerud, and Suruchi
Sood. 1999. “Effects of an Entertainment-education Radio Soap Opera on Family
Planning Behavior in Tanzania.” Studies in Family Planning 30, no. 3: 193–211.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1988. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World.
Rosa, Eugene A., Richard York, and Thomas Dietz. 2004. “Tracking Anthropogenic Drivers of
Ecological Impacts.” AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment 33, no. 8: 509–512.
Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh, and Mary Mederios Kent. 2007. “Challenges and Opportunities—The
Population of the Middle East and North Africa.” Population Bulletin 62, no. 2: 1–19.
Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau.
http://www.prb.org/pdf07/62.2MENA.pdf. Accessed March 20, 2017.
Rulli, Tina. 2016. “Preferring a Genetically-Related Child.” Jorunal of Moral Philosophy 13, no.
6: 669–698
Ryberg, Jesper. 1996. “Is the Repugnant Conclusion Repugnant?” Philosophical Papers 25, no.
3: 161–177.
Ryerson, William. 2010. “Population: The Multiplier of Everything Else.” In The Post Carbon
Reader: Managing the 21st Century’s Sustainability Crises, eds. Richard Heinberg &
Daniel Lerch, 153–174. Healdsburg, CA: Watershed Media.
Ryerson, William. 2012.”How Do We Solve the Population Problem?” In Life on the Brink:
Philosophers Confront Population, eds. Phil Cafaro and Eileen Crist, 240–254. Athens:
University of Georgia Press.
Sapontzis, S. F. 1987. Morals, Reason, and Animals. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Sarkar, Sahotra. 2005. Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Savulescu, Julian. 2001. “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children.”
Bioethics 15, no. 5/6: 414–426.

228

Savulescu, Julian. 2013. “Abortion, Infanticide, and Allowing Babies to Die, 40 Years On.”
Journal of Medical Ethics 39, no. 5: 257–259.
Savulescu, Julian, and Guy Kahane. 2009. “The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the
Best Chance of the Best Life.” Bioethics 23, no. 5: 274–290.
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Scanlon, T. M. 2014. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scherkoske, Greg. 2013. “Whither Integrity I: Recent Faces of Integrity.” Philosophy Compass
8, no. 1: 28‒39.
Schöne-Seifert, Bettina, and Klaus-Peter Rippe. 1991. “Silencing the Singer: Antibioethics in
Germany.” The Hastings Center Report 21, no. 6: 20–27.
Schueler, G. F. 1997. “Why Modesty Is a Virtue.” Ethics 107, no. 3: 467–485.
Schueler, G. F. 1999. “Why IS Modest a Virtue?” Ethics 109, no 4: 835–841.
Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 2017. “2017 Doomsday
Clock Statement.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
http://thebulletin.org/sites/default/files/Final%202017%20Clock%20Statement.pdf.
Accessed March 7, 2017.
Sedgh, Gilda, Susheela Singh, and Rubina Hussain. 2014. “Intended and Unintended
Pregnancies Worldwide in 2012 and Recent Trends.” Studies in Family Planning 45, no.
3: 301–314.
Shiffrin, Seana. 1999. “Wrongful Life, Procreative Possibility, and the Significance of Harm.”
Legal Theory 5: 117–148.
Shragg, Karen. 2015. Move Upstream: A Call to Solve Overpopulation. Minneapolis–St. Paul:
Freethought House.
Shue, Henry. 1996. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd ed.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Siebert, S., J. Burke, J. M. Faures, K. Frenken, J. Hoogeveen, P. Döll, and F. T. Portman. 2010.
“Groudwater for Use in Irrigation – a Global Inventory.” Hydrology and Earth System
Sciences 14, no. 10: 1863–1880.
Sikora, R. I. 1975. “Utilitarianism: The Classical Principle and the Average Principle.” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 5, no. 3: 409–419.
Sikora, R. I. 1981. “Classical Utilitarianism and Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion: A Reply to
McMahan.” Ethics 92, no. 1: 128–133.
Simon, Julian L. 1996. The Ultimate Resource 2. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
229

Singer, Peter. 1972. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 3:
229–243.
Singer, Peter. 1993. Practical Ethics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Singer, Peter. 2002. Animal Liberation. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.
Singer, Peter. 2009. The Life You Can Save. New York: Random House.
Singhal, Arvind, and Everett Rogers. 1989. India’s Information Revolution. New Delhi: Sage.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1988. Moral Dilemmas. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1999. “You Can’t Lose What You Ain’t Never Had: A Reply to
Marquis on Abortion.” Philosophical Studies 96, no. 1: 59–72.
Smail, J. Kennth. 1997. “Beyond Population Stabilization: The Case for Dramatically Reducing
Global Human Numbers.” Politics and the Life Sciences 16, no. 2: 183–192.
Smart, J. J. C. 1956. “Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 6, no.
25: 344–354.
Smilansky, Saul. 1995. “Is There a Moral Obligation to Have Children?” Journal of Applied
Philosophy 12, no. 1: 41–53.
Smolkin, Doran. 1999. “Towards a Rights-Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem.” Journal
of Social Philosophy 30, no. 1: 194–208.
Smuts, Aaron. 2014. “To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living.”
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 4: 711–729.
Springmann, Marco, Daniel Mason-D’Croz, Sherman Robinson, Tara Garnett, H. Charles J.
Godfray, Douglas Gollin, Mike Rayner, Paola Vallon, Peter Scarborough. 2016. “Global
and Regional Health Effects of Future Food Production Under Climate Change: A
Modelling Study.” The Lancet 387, no. 10031: 1937–1946.
Stanlick, Nancy. (1999). “The Nature and Value of Supererogatory Actions.” Journal of Social
Philosophy 30, no 1: 209–222.
Stranger-Hall, Kathrin, and David Hall. 2011. “Abstinence-Only Education and Teen Pregnancy
Rates: Why We Need Comprehensive Sex Education in the United States.” PLoS One 6,
no. 10: e24658. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0024658.
Suh, Eudkook, Ed Diener, and Frank Fujita. 1996. “Events and Subjective Well-Being: Only
Recent Events Matter.” The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70, no. 5:
1091–1102.
Sumner, L. W. 1981. Abortion and Moral Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
230

‘t Hooft, Visser. 1999. Justice to Future Generations and the Environment. Dordrecht: Luwer
Academic Publishers.
Tännsjö, Torbjörn. 1998. Hedonistic Utilitarianism. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Tännsjö, Torbjörn. 2002. “Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion.” Utilitas 14, no.
3: 339–359.
Tawia, Susan. 1992. “When Is the Capacity for Sentience Acquired During Fetal Development?”
Journal of Maternal-Fetal Medicine 1, no. 3: 153–165.
Taylor, Shelley. 1989. Positive Illusions: Creative Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind. New
York: Basic Books.
Taylor, Shelley, and Jonathon Brown. 1998. “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological
Perspective on Mental Health.” Psychological Bulletin 103, no. 2: 193–210.
Temkin, Larry. 1996. “A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity.” Philosophy & Public Affairs
25, no. 3: 175–210.
Tessman, Lisa. 2015. Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality. New York:
Oxford University Press.
The World Bank. 2016. Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2016: Taking on Inequality. Washington,
D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25078/9781464809583.pd
f. Accessed March 18, 2017.
The World Bank. 2017. Population Growth (Annual %).
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW. Accessed January 17, 2017.
Thomas, Chris, Alison Cameron, Rhys Green, Michel Bakkenes, Linda Beaumont, Yvonne
Collingham, Barend Erasmus, Marinez Ferreira de Sequeira, Alan Gainger, Lee Hannah,
Lesley Hughes, Brian Huntley, Albert van Jaarsveld, Guy Midgley, Lera Miles, Miguel
Ortega-Huerta, A. Townsend Peterson, Oliver Phillips, and Stephen Williams. 2004.
“Extinction Risk from Climate Change.” Nature 427, no. 6970: 145–148.
Thomas, Neil. 1995. “The Ethics of Population Control in Rural China.” Population, Space, and
Place 1, no. 1: 3–18.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1971. “A Defense of Abortion.” Philsoophy and Public Affairs 1, no. 1:
47–66.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 2011. “More on the Metaphysics of Harm.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 82, no. 2: 436–458.
Thrush, Glenn, and Coral Davenport. 2017. “Donald Trump Budget Slashes Funds for E.P.A.
and State Department.” The New York Times.
231

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/budget-epa-state-department-cuts.html.
Accessed March 18, 2017.
Tiger, Lionel. 1979. Optimism: The Biology of Hope. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Tooley, Michael. 1972. “Abortion and Infanticide.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (1): 37–65.
Twenge, Jean, W. Keith Campbell, and Craig Foster. 2003. “Parenthood and Marital
Satisfaction: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Journal of Marriage and Family 65, no. 3: 574–
583.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2017. “U.S. and World Population Clock.”
http://www.census.gov/popclock/. Accessed January 17, 2017.
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 1999. The World at Six
Billion. http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/sixbillion/sixbillion.htm.
Accessed March 15, 2015.
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2004. World Population
to 2300.
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/longrange2/WorldPop2300final.pdf.
Accessed January 17, 2017.
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2015. Trends in
Contraceptive Use 2015.
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/family/trendsContra
ceptiveUse2015Report.pdf. Accessed March 19, 2017.
UN Food and Agricultural Organization. 2006. World Agriculture towards 2030/2050. Rome:
UN Food and Agricultural Organization.
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/esag/docs/Interim_report_AT2050web.pdf.
Accessed March 7, 2017.
UN Food and Agricultural Organization. 2015. The State of Food Insecurity in the World.
Rome: UN Food and Agricultural Organization. http://www.fao.org/3/a4ef2d16-70a7460a-a9ac-2a65a533269a/i4646e.pdf. Accessed March 7, 2017.
UN Food and Agriculture Organization. 2016. The State of the World Fisheries and Agriculture.
Rome: UN Food and Agricultural Organization. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf.
Accessed March 7, 2017.
UN Food and Agriculture Organization. 2017. FAOSTAT. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data.
Accessed March 16, 2017.
UN News Centre. 2011. “As world passes 7 billion milestone, UN urges action to meet key
challenges.” http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40257#.VQYyLI7F8b0.
Accessed March 15, 2015.

232

Urbanek, Valentina Maria. 2010. “The Non-Identity Problem.” Ph.D. dissertation, Department of
Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT.
Urmson, J. O. 1958. “Saints and Heroes.” In Essays in Moral Philosophy, edited by A.I. Melden,
198–216. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
USDA. 2010. Expenditures on Children by Families, 2009 Policy. Washington D.C.: USDA.
Velleman, J. David. 2008. “Persons in Prospect, Part III: Love and Nonexistence.” Philosophy
and Public Affairs 36, no. 3: 266–288.
Vermeulen, Sonja J., Bruce M. Campbell, and John S. I. Ingram. 2012. “Climate Change and
Food Systems.” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 37: 195–222.
Wadiwel, Dinesh. 2015. The War Against Animals. Lieden: Brill Rodopi.
Warren, Mary Anne. 1973. “On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion.” The Monist 57, no 1:
43–61.
Wasserman, David. 2015. “Part II: Pro-Natalism.” In Debating Procreation, eds. David Benatar
and David Wasserman, pp. 133–264. New York: Oxford University Press.
Watson, Paul. 2012. “The Laws of Ecology and Human Population Growth.” In Life on the
Brink: Philosophers Confront Population, eds. Phil Cafaro and Eileen Crist, 130–137.
Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Weinberg, Rivka. 2016. The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May Be
Permissible. New York: Oxford University Press.
Weinstein, Neil. 1980. “Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events.” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 39, no. 5: 806–820.
Weinstein, Neil. 1984. “Why it Won’t Happen to Me: Perceptions of Risk and Susceptibility.”
Health Psychology 3, no. 5: 431–457.
Weisman, Alan. 2013. Countdown: Our Last, Best Hope for a Future on Earth? New York:
Little, Brown, and Company.
Wellman, Christopher. 2008. “Immigration and Freedom of Association.” Ethics 119, no. 1:
109–141.
Wellman, Christopher. 2015. “Immigration.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immigration/. Accessed January 30, 2017.
Wetzstein, Cheryl. 2011. “Education Level Inversely Related to Childbearing.” The Washington
Times. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/9/education-level-inverselyrelated-to-childbearing/. Accessed March 22, 2017.

233

Wilcox, Shelley. 2009. “The Open Borders Debate on Immigration.” Philosophy Compass 4, no.
5: 813–821.
Williams, Bernard. 1973. “A Critique of Utilitarianism.” In Utilitarianism: For and Against, eds.
J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, 77–150. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, Alan. 2016. “Modesty as Kindness.” Ratio 29, no. 1: 73–88.
Wilson, Edward O. 1992. The Diversity of Life. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Wilson, Edward O. 2016. Half-Earth: Our Planet’s Fight for Life. New York: Liveright.
Wire, Thomas. 2009. Fewer Emitters, Lower Emissions, Less Cost: Reducing Future Carbon
Emissions by Investing in Family Planning: A Cost/Benefit Analysis. London: London
School of Economics.
Wood, Joanne. 1996. “What is Social Comparison and How Should We Study It?” Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 22, no. 5: 520–537.
Woodward, James. 1986. “The Nonidentity Problem.” Ethics 96, no. 4: 804–831.
Woollard, Fiona. 2012. “Have We Solved the Non-Identity Problem?” Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice 15: 677–690.
World Health Organization. 2005. Climate and health: Fact sheet, July 2005.
http://www.who.int/globalchange/news/fsclimandhealth/en/index.html. Accessed October
10, 2013.
World Health Organization. 2009. Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease
attributable to selected major risks. Geneva: WHO Press. http://www.who.int/healthinfo/
global_burden_disease/GlobalHealthRisks_report_full.pdf. Accessed March 12, 2017.
World Health Organization . 2014. Quantitative risk assessment of the effects of climate change
on selected causes of death, 2030s and 2050s. Geneva: WHO Press.
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/134014/1/9789241507691_eng.pdf. Accessed
March 12, 2017.
World Health Organization. 2016. “Children: Reducing Mortality.”
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs178/en/. Accessed February 21, 2017.
Worldometers. 2017. “Growth Rate.” http://www.worldometers.info/worldpopulation/#growthrate. Accessed January 17, 2017.
Yeo, Sophie, and Simon Evans. 2015. “Analysis: India’s Climate Pledge Suggests Significant
Emissions Growth up to 2030.” Paris Summit 2015. https://www.carbonbrief.org/indiasindc. Accessed March 23, 2017.

234

York, Richard. 2006. “Ecological Paradoxes: William Stanley Jevons and the Paperless Office.”
Human Ecology Review 13, no. 2: 143–147.
Zeebe, Richard. 2013. “Time-dependent Climate Sensitivity and the Legacy of Anthropogenic
Greenhouse Gas Emissions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 110, no. 34: 13739–13744.
Zwarthoed, Danielle. 2016. “Should Future Generations be Content with Plastic Trees and
Singing Electronic Birds?” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29: 219–
236.

235

VITA
Trevor Hedberg received a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and English from Baker
University in 2009. He completed the technical communication program at the University of
Kansas in 2010 and received a Master of Arts in Philosophy from the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville in 2013. He is currently finishing his PhD in philosophy at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville. After its completion, he will begin an appointment as a postdoctoral
scholar at the University of South Florida.
Trevor was awarded the 2012 Karen M. T. Muskavitch Award for Graduate Work in
Practical Ethics by the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics for his “Greater
Knowledge in a Warmer World,” the paper that formed the basis for his Master’s Thesis. He has
since published articles and book chapters on topics such as our duties to nonhuman animals, our
obligations to reduce our individual carbon footprints, and the defensibility of apatheism (an
attitude of apathy toward whether or not God exists). In the future, he aims to turn his doctoral
dissertation into a book and continue his research at the intersection of procreative and
environmental ethics.

236

